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I.  INTRODUCTION
The Year-in-Review contains brief summaries of selected deci-
sions handed down in 2002 by the Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska
Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
and the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska.  The summa-
ries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed, the stat-
utes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence of the
primary holdings.  Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the in-
formation contained in this review without further reference to the
cases cited.  The Year in Review is also available online at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/20ALRYearinReview.
The opinions are grouped by general subject matter rather
than the nature of the underlying claims.  The summaries are pre-
sented alphabetically in the following ten areas of the law: adminis-
trative, business, civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, employ-
ment, family, insurance, property, and torts.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Chugach Electric Ass’n v. Regulatory Commission of
Alaska,1 the supreme court held that Alaska law required Chugach
to obtain commission approval before selling electricity outside the
geographic region to which it had previously been assigned to sup-
ply electric service.2  Chugach had been granted a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from the commission which al-
lowed it to provide electric service within a specific geographic
area, but it wished to provide electricity to two customers outside
of that area.3  The Regulatory Commission found that it had power
to regulate competition and denied Chugach the opportunity to
serve customers outside its area.4  The superior court affirmed that
Chugach needed commission approval to sell electricity outside its
geographic area.5  The supreme court also agreed that Alaska Stat-
utes section 42.05.221(a) gives the Commission the general power
1. 49 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2002).
2. Id. at 254.
3. Id. at 248.
4. Id. at 249.
5. Id.
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to limit competition through the issuance of certificates.6  Further,
the supreme court rejected Chugach’s argument that there was a
distinction between selling electricity as a commodity and provid-
ing electric utility services.7
In Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, Office of Management and
Budget, Division of Governmental Coordination,8 the supreme
court held that the State could not exclude any permitted uses or
activities from a Coastal Program consistency review of a specific
project, regardless of whether a general permit for the activity had
been previously granted.9  The Forest Oil Corporation filed permit
applications seeking to install an oil exploration platform over the
Redoubt Shoals in Cook Inlet.10  Under the Alaska Coastal Man-
agement Act11, the platform could only be authorized if the State
determined that its use was consistent with the applicable Coastal
Program standards.12  Before the close of the public comment pe-
riod on the permit, the U.S. EPA issued a general permit author-
izing specified wastewater discharges for existing and future ex-
ploratory drilling projects in the upper Cook Inlet.13  After the
close of the public comment period, the State made a final consis-
tency determination approving the platform but specifically ex-
cluding wastewater discharge activities because the EPA’s permit
already covered those activities.14  Cook Inlet Keeper, an environ-
mental group, appealed the matter to the superior court, which af-
firmed the consistency determination.15  On appeal, the supreme
court held that the various statutory provisions relating to consis-
tency reviews unequivocally established that consistency review
must be a project-specific process and that each consistency review
determination must encompass the entire project.16  The supreme
court also held that the mere existence of an earlier consistency de-
termination for the EPA’s general permit could not justify the ex-
clusion of the wastewater discharge activities from the project’s
consistency review.17  Accordingly, the oil exploration project was
6. Id. at 252.
7. Id. at 253-54.
8. 46 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2002).
9. Id. at 965.
10. Id. at 959.
11. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.010-.220 (Michie 2002).
12. Cook Inlet, 46 P.3d at 959.
13. Id. at 960.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 963.
17. Id. at 965.
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remanded for a full consistency review that included the wastewa-
ter discharge activities.18
In Hayes v. Municipality of Anchorage,19 the supreme court
held that a candidate living within a newly redrawn assembly dis-
trict met the residency requirement to run for office in that dis-
trict.20  After Anchorage’s assembly districts were redrawn in Sep-
tember of 2001, candidate Whittle’s home of twenty years fell
within a new district.21  Candidate Hayes filed a petition in superior
court to disqualify Whittle from appearing on the ballot because
Anchorage law required a candidate to have lived in the district he
is running in for at least one year prior to the election.22  The supe-
rior court denied Hayes’s petition.23  The supreme court affirmed,
holding that Whittle, having lived in the same residence for over
twenty years, fulfilled the requirements of the Charter and was eli-
gible to run for election.24  The court reasoned that the residency
requirement can only be reasonably intereted to require residency
for at least one year before the election within the geographical
boundaries of an election district as it is drawn at the time of elec-
tion.25
In In re Curda,26 the supreme court held that legal errors
committed by a district judge did not amount to ethical violations
because they were not willful or part of a pattern of judicial mis-
conduct.27  Judge Curda imprisoned a state’s witness at a criminal
hearing because she showed up drunk on the day she was sched-
uled to testify.28  Judge Curda reasoned that it was the only way to
secure her protection, her children’s protection, and her testi-
mony.29  The Judicial Conduct Committee investigated Judge
Curda’s action and recommended that he be given a private repri-
18. Id. at 967.
19. 46 P.3d 971 (Alaska 2002).
20. Id. at 974.
21. Id. at 973.
22. ANCHORAGE, AK., MUNICIPAL CHARTER, CODE AND REGULATIONS §
4.02(b)(2) (1996); Hayes, 46 P.3d at 972.
23. Hayes, 46 P.3d at 972.
24. Id. at 973.
25. Id. at 974.
26. 49 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2002).
27. Id. at 261.
28. Id. at 255.  In an ex parte meeting with Judge Curda, the Assistant District
Attorney expressed the concern that the witness would either fail to appear a sec-
ond time or at least not be able to stay sober.  Judge Curda held a short contempt
proceeding with the witness and the District Attorney before imprisoning the wit-
ness for contempt.  Id.
29. Id. at 257.
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mand by the supreme court.30  Reviewing the alleged judicial con-
duct de novo and by a standard of clear and convincing evidence,31
the supreme court declined to reprimand Judge Curda.32  The su-
preme court concluded that although Judge Curda had committed
legal errors by depriving the witness of fundamental due process
rights,33 the errors did not amount to ethical violations because they
were not willful or part of a pattern of misconduct.34
In Lakosh v. Alaska Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion,35 the supreme court declared an oil-spill contingency plan
regulation invalid as contrary to the enabling statute.36  The Oil
Pollution Control Act, as modified by the legislature following the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, required persons involved in oil-related ac-
tivities to obtain approval from the Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) for oil spill contingency plans.37  These plans
required such persons to “provide for use . . . of the best available
technology that was available at the time the contingency plan was
submitted or renewed.”38  The DEC adopted a three-tiered ap-
proach for determining if a contingency plan provided for the use
of the “best available” technology.39  On plaintiff’s motion for de-
claratory judgment that the regulation was invalid, the supreme
court found that, for technologies covered in the first two tiers of
the DEC’s approach, compliance with applicable standards essen-
tially served as a proxy for the best available technology determi-
nation.40  The court found that the DEC’s approach defied the plain
meaning of the term “best” and that the legislative history showed
that the legislature intended best available technology to be an ad-
ditional requirement beyond meeting certain standards.41  Because
the DEC’s definition did not include any “winnowing” process, the
court reversed the superior court and declared the DEC regulation
to be invalid.42
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 261.
33. Id. at 258.
34. Id. at 261.
35. 49 P.3d 1111 (Alaska 2002).
36. Id. at 1120.
37. Id. at 1113; ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.30 (Michie 2002).
38. § 46.04.030(e) (Michie 2002).
39. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 75.445(k) (2001).
40. Lakosh, 49 P.3d at 1115-16.
41. Id. at 1117-19.
42. Id. at 1120.
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In Matanuska Electric Ass’n  v. Chugach Electric Ass’n,43 the
supreme court held that the Regulatory Commission of Alaska’s
order compelling the Chugach Electric Association to refund mis-
calculated payments44 was in fact retroactive ratemaking by a util-
ity, which is prohibited in Alaska.45  In 1997, plaintiff and Chugach
noticed that the estimate Chugach used to calculate its surcharge
was substantially higher than the actual amount.46  Chugach refused
to refund the overcharged amount, relying on Alaska law that pro-
hibits retroactive ratemaking.47  In administrative proceedings, the
Regulatory Commission ordered Chugach to refund the difference,
noting that the rule against retroactive ratemaking does not apply
to fuel adjustment surcharges.48  Chugach argued, and the supreme
court agreed, that the fuel surcharge is a commission-made rate,
distinguishable from other surcharges outside the scope of the rule
against retroactive ratemaking, as the Commission had extensively
reviewed and approved the rates before enactment.49  This was in
accordance with the “essential principal” of the rule against retro-
active ratemaking: when the estimates are inaccurate, the Commis-
sion may not correct previous rates, but may only “prospectively
revise rates in an effort to set more appropriate ones.”50  Further,
“the commission had full power to review additional data” con-
cerning the appropriateness of the surcharge structure then in
place, yet chose not to do so.51  Accordingly, the court affirmed the
decision of the superior court overruling the Commission and held
that the surcharge fell under the rule against retroactive ratemak-
ing.52
In Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Chugach Electric Ass’n,53 the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Chugach because (1) the Regulatory Commission
of Alaska had jurisdiction to hear the contract dispute between
43. 53 P.3d 578 (Alaska 2002).
44. The miscalculated payment refers to an overestimated surcharge for “gen-
eration and transmission system energy loss.” Id. at 581.
45. Id. at 580.
46. Id. at 582.
47. Id.  The purposes of this prohibition are to protect the integrity of the ra-
temaking process and to aid a utility in planning its finances.  Id. at 583.
48. Id. at 582.
49. Id. at 584.  The court found the commission’s review of the surcharge to be
substantial enough to constitute a rate.  Id. at 585.
50. Id. (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 331
N.W.2d 159, 164 (Mich. 1982)).
51. Id. at 586.
52. Id. at 587.
53. 58 P.3d 491 (Alaska 2002).
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Chugach and Matanuska, and (2) Matanuska could have filed a
timely appeal from the Commission’s decision in favor of Chugach
if it felt that such decision was in error.54  Matanuska and Chugach
entered into a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) in 1989 by
which Matanuska agreed to purchase electricity from Chugach and
pay a pro rata portion of Chugach’s actual costs incurred in gener-
ating and transmitting electricity.55  A dispute arose between
Chugach and Matanuska about how to charge Matanuska a portion
of additional taxes and interest on gas Chugach had purchased
from another oil company.56  The Regulatory Commission of
Alaska ruled in favor of Chugach, allowing Chugach to pass the
charges on to Matanuska; Matanuska objected to the ruling and
subsequent tariff advice letters.57  Chugach eventually filed for de-
claratory and injunctive relief against Matanuska in the trial court,
and Matanuska counterclaimed for declaratory relief for breach of
contract.58  Affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Chugach,59 the supreme court ruled that because the
PSA expressly deals with matters within the Commission’s core
area of jurisdiction and evinces the parties’ intent to submit to the
Commission all rate-related disputes arising under the PSA, the
dispute was within the Commission’s jurisdiction.60  The supreme
court further held that the Commission’s interpretation of the PSA
was within the scope of the Commission’s power to set rates.61
In Samissa Anchorage, Inc. v. Department of Health and Social
Services,62 the supreme court held that the State was not required to
pay “prejudgment interest.”63  In 1999, Samissa Anchorage, Inc.
(North Star), challenged the Department of Health and Social
Service’s Medicaid reimbursement rates from 1993 to 1995.64  The
department agreed to recalculate the rate, but refused to pay the
prejudgment interest.65  North Star appealed the decision regarding
the prejudgment interest, claiming that it was entitled to the pay-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 492.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 492-93.
58. Id. at 493.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 494-95.
61. Id. at 495.
62. 57 P.3d 676 (Alaska 2002).
63. Id. at 676-77.
64. Id. at 677.
65. Id.
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ment under Alaska Statutes sections 09.50.25066 and 09.50.28067 be-
cause the claim arose from a contract with the State and therefore
the State had waived sovereign immunity.68  The superior court ac-
cepted this argument and reversed the administrative denial of the
interest.69  Upon rehearing the issue, however, the superior court
vacated the previous decision and held that North Star was not en-
titled to prejudgment interest.70  The supreme court affirmed,
holding that an award of prejudgment interest can only be author-
ized if the legislature waives the State’s sovereign immunity.71  The
court reasoned that while section 09.50.25072 waives sovereign im-
munity for contract claims, North Star’s claim was not governed by
section 09.50.250, but rather by administrative procedures.73
In Snyder v. State, Department of Public Safety, Division of
Motor Vehicles,74 the supreme court held that Snyder was denied
his right to due process where (1) the reassignment of his adminis-
trative case on remand to a new hearing officer was unannounced,
and (2) where the officer reversed the original hearing officer’s
credibility findings without forewarning.75  In 1996, Snyder was
charged with DWI after driving his car into a snow bank and failing
repeated sobriety tests.76  At his DMV hearing, Snyder testified be-
fore a hearing officer that he was sober at the time of the accident
but that he had consumed three to five beers within the two hour
gap between the time of the accident and the arrival of a state
trooper.77  The hearing officer found Snyder’s testimony about his
post-accident drinking credible, but reasoned that the alcohol Sny-
der consumed after the accident could not account for the result of
his breath test.78  Accordingly, she concluded that Snyder had failed
to prove that his blood alcohol level was within the legal limit at
the time of the accident.79  Snyder appealed to the superior court,
which remanded for reconsideration because the State had misap-
66. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 2002).
67. § 09.50.280.
68. Samissa, 57 P.3d at 677-78.
69. Id. at 678.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. § 09.50.250.
73. Samissa, 57 P.3d at 679-80.
74. 43 P.3d 157 (Alaska 2002).
75. Id. at 160.
76. Id. at 158.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 159.
79. Id.
YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC 04/22/03  12:57 PM
2003] YEAR IN REVIEW 87
plied the burden of proof by placing it upon Snyder.80  By that time,
a new hearing officer was assigned because the original hearing of-
ficer had retired.81  The new hearing officer affirmed the original
revocation but based her ruling on a new factual theory—modify-
ing the prior hearing officer’s conclusion about the credibility of
Snyder’s testimony and finding that his claim of post-alcohol con-
sumption was not credible.82  The superior court affirmed,83 but the
supreme court vacated and remanded.84  First, the court ruled that
where a witness’s truthfulness is disputed, denying an in-person
hearing prevents a defendant from presenting evidence in front of
a trier of fact who can observe the defendant’s demeanor.85  Sec-
ond, the court concluded that because Snyder was not notified of
the reassignment of hearing officers, he was unable to provide any
meaningful consent to her participation.86  Finally, the court con-
cluded that in an administrative revocation proceeding where a
new hearing officer reverses the original officer’s credibility find-
ings, advance notice of the reassignment would have provided a
reasonable opportunity for the accused to respond to the concerns
of the new hearing officer.87
III. BUSINESS LAW
In Alakayak v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd.,88 the supreme
court held that it is improper to grant a motion for summary judg-
ment in antitrust litigation where the plaintiff presented evidence
that raised material issues of fact as to the existence of an antitrust
conspiracy.89  A number of commercial sockeye salmon fishers
brought an antitrust action under the Alaska Antitrust Act90 alleg-
ing that certain salmon processors and importers conspired to de-
press the prices paid to fishers for raw salmon.  The superior court
granted summary judgment for the defendants.91  On appeal, the
supreme court noted that Alaska courts use federal antitrust law as
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 160.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 162.
85. Id. at 160.
86. Id. at 161 (citing Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 345 (Alaska 1998)).
87. Id. at 161.
88. 48 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2002).
89. Id. at 463.
90. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.562 (Michie 2002).
91. Alakayak, 48 P.3d at 437.
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a guide when considering claims under the Alaska Antitrust Act.92
There is a two-part test for summary judgment in antitrust litiga-
tion where the plaintiff’s theory of conspiracy relies entirely on cir-
cumstantial evidence.93  The court first determines if the evidence
of the defendant’s conduct appears to be as consistent with permis-
sible competition as with illegal conspiracy.94  If the evidence is
“ambiguous,” the plaintiff can only avoid summary judgment if
there is evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility that the al-
leged conspirators acted independently.”95  When plaintiff’s theory
is based on conscious parallelism, the plaintiff must present evi-
dence of one or more of five “plus factors,” including: “(a) actions
contrary to the defendants’ economic interest; (b) motive to enter
the conspiracy; (c) a traditional conspiracy agreement; (d) interde-
fendant conspiratorial communications; or (e) attempts to control
or influence the behavior of other nondefendant sellers or buyers
who could thwart the conspiracy.”96  Because the plaintiffs pre-
sented evidence of (1) a collective agreement to end a former
strike, (2) future pricing discussions among processors, (3) collec-
tive pressure applied on nonparty processors and importers, and
(4) ovations of “mutual cooperation,” the supreme court reversed
the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants.97
Finally, the court found that “suit for a continuing violation may
take place at any time during which the violation was ongoing but
that recovery is limited to the period prior to the filing of suit pre-
scribed by the applicable statute of limitations.”98
In Collins v. Blair,99 the supreme court affirmed an order dis-
solving a corporation formed to settle a dispute over fishing shares
allocated by the federal government and affirmed the equitable dis-
tribution established by the trial court.100  In 1989, Blair purchased
the vessel F/V Milky Way from Collins.101  The purchase agreement
included an option to purchase that provided for the transfer of
fishing right shares for halibut and sablefish to the corporation
should the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) implement a
92. Id. at 450.
93. Id. at 451.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 452.
97. Id. at 456-58.
98. Id. at 463.
99. No. S-9810, No. 5606, 2002 Alas. LEXIS 111, at *1 (Alaska Aug. 9, 2002).
100. Id. at *1-2.
101. Id. at *2.
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permit system.102  In 1995, NMFS implemented a permit system,
and Blair was awarded fishing shares based on his Milky Way catch
from 1988-1990, while Collins was awarded shares based on his
Milky Way catch from 1984-87.103  Under the option to purchase
agreement, Collins’s shares should have been transferred to Blair.104
Instead of litigating the issue, Blair and Collins entered into a joint
venture.105  Blair never transferred his fishing shares into the joint
venture because of a dispute with NMFS.106  Collins transferred his
shares from another vessel to the corporation, but when he did, he
became ineligible to receive other shares to which he was entitled
(the “lost shares”).107  He therefore transferred his shares back to
himself, and NMFS allocated the “lost shares” to him.108  Blair filed
suit claiming that Collins had breached his fiduciary duty when he
transferred his shares out of the corporation.109  Collins counter-
claimed, arguing that Blair had violated his fiduciary duty because
he never transferred his Milky Way shares into the corporation.110
The trial court ordered the corporation to dissolve and held that,
under the option to purchase, any fishing shares allotted to the
Milky Way should have been transferred to Blair.111  Accordingly,
the trial court ordered an equitable distribution of the corporate
assets,112 whereby the corporation would distribute to Blair the F/V
Milky Way and all of its fishing shares and Collins would retain
100% of the corporation’s stock.113  On appeal, the supreme court
found: (1) that the option to purchase agreement reflected a set-
tlement between Blair and Collins,114 (2) that Collins had agreed to
contribute his additional Predator shares on starting the joint ven-
ture with Blair,115 (3) that Blair had not agreed to contribute ap-
102. Id.
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *4.
106. Id. at *5.
107. Id.
108. Id.  Blair eventually forced Collins to transfer his shares back into the cor-
poration, at which time the NMFS revoked Collins’ lost shares.  Id. at *6.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *8.  Further, the court found that Blair had not acted improperly by
forcing Collins to return the shares to the corporation and held that the corpora-
tion should therefore pay his legal bills.  Id. at *10.
112. Id. at *9-10.
113. Id. at *8.
114. Id. at *15-16.
115. Id. at *17.
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proximately 50,000 pounds of halibut shares to the joint venture,116
and (4) that therefore Collins was wrong to remove his shares.117
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision
regarding dissolution and distribution of the assets.118
In Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc.,119 the supreme court ruled
that Kootznoowoo, the Native village corporation for the village of
Angoon, did not distribute corporate wealth in a discriminatory
manner.120  Kootznoowoo, which established a shareholder hiring
preference, paid for about half of its workers’ transportation costs
for flights originating in Angoon.121  About sixty-three percent of
Kootznoowoo’s shareholders lived outside of Angoon.122  The court
held that such payment of transportation costs did not constitute
discriminatory treatment among shareholders because the subsidi-
zation of flights from Angoon was necessary to maximize efficiency
and productivity.123  Thus, the hiring and subsidization program en-
sured a “coordinated team[] of workers,” increased shareholder
employment, increased Kootznoowoo’s profits to the benefit of all
the shareholders, and did not distribute corporate wealth in a dis-
criminatory manner.124
In D.H. Blattner & Sons, Inc. v. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd.,125
Blattner and Rothschild each separately brought a lien enforce-
ment and foreclosure action against USMX of Alaska each claim-
ing priority for payment over the other.126  The superior court held
that Blattner’s liens had priority over Rothschild’s liens, “to the ex-
tent that Blattner’s liens were valid.”127  However, the superior
court limited Blattner’s lien to its dump lien labor and interest
charges and refused to include non-labor charges or work com-
pleted after mining work ceased.128  As a result, the superior court
awarded Blattner substantially less than it requested and ordered
that Rothschild was entitled to the remainder of the liquidated as-
sets plus attorney’s fees.129  On appeal, the supreme court found
116. Id. at *18.
117. Id. at *19-21.
118. Id. at *28.
119. 45 P.3d 1208 (Alaska 2002).
120. Id. at 1209-10.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1211.
123. Id. at 1212.
124. Id. at 1211-12.
125. 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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that “work” under Alaska Statutes section 34.35.140(a) included
both human labor and equipment costs.130  However, equipment
costs do not include material costs, and it is the service contract
that determines the compensation for equipment usage.131  The
court noted that Blattner failed to mitigate its damages, and thus its
recovery was limited to the quantum meruit value of the equip-
ment costs, and not the residual equipment value.132  Also, recovery
for a dump lien is limited to work performed nine months before
cessation.133  Standby charges are only recoverable when they con-
cern the future development of the mine, and Blattner’s additional
liens did not meet that standard.134  Accordingly, the court re-
manded the case to the superior court.135
In Lake and Peninsula Borough v. Norquest Seafoods, Inc.,136
the supreme court held that a borough could not assess a sales tax
on proceeds from the settlement of an antitrust class action lawsuit
settlement between fishers and fish processors.137  In 1995, Bristol
Bay fishers filed a class action lawsuit against numerous fish proc-
essors alleging that the processors violated Alaska antitrust laws by
conspiring to set below-market prices for sockeye salmon.138  In
1997, the fishers reached a settlement with two of the defendants,
Norquest Seafoods, Inc. and Lafayette Fisheries, Inc.139  The Lake
and Peninsula Borough then determined that the settlement pro-
ceeds were subject to its tax on sales of raw fish, characterizing the
tax as a post-season adjustment.140  The fishers and the processors
filed written protests to the borough, which the borough manager
denied.141  The fishers and processors then appealed the decision to
the superior court which held that the settlement was not a taxable
event.142  The borough appealed to the supreme court143 which af-
firmed the court’s decision, reasoning that the settlement money
was not taxable “because neither the basic allegations of the anti-
trust action nor the actual provisions of the disputed settlement
130. Id. at 48.
131. Id. at 48-49.
132. Id. at 49.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 50-51.
135. Id.
136. 42 P.3d 521 (Alaska 2002).
137. Id. at 523-24.
138. Id. at 521.
139. Id. at 522.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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correspond to any particular sale, or set of sales, within the bor-
ough.”144
In Nerox Power Systems v. M-B Contracting Co.,145 the su-
preme court affirmed the superior court holding that two deeds of
trust should be equitably subordinated to the claims of other credi-
tors of Nerox Power, and that the controlling shareholder should
be personally liable for the debts of the company.146  Nerox Power,
controlled by Nicholas Ross, recorded two deeds of trust on its
only asset, a coal mine, while the company was in financial peril.147
The beneficiaries of the first deed of trust were Nerox Power’s
president and a company the court found was a standard contractor
hired by the company.148  The beneficiaries of the second deed of
trust were individuals who had contributed money to the corpora-
tion to purchase the coal mine.149  The court held that the first deed
of trust should be subject to equitable subordination based on the
presence of fraud.150  As to the company’s president, the deed of
trust was fraudulent, and therefore subject to equitable subordina-
tion, because the debt had already been satisfied by the issuance of
stock,151 the deed of trust was a fraudulent conveyance representing
a breach of fiduciary duty,152 and the corporation was “grossly un-
dercapitalized.”153  As to the additional beneficiary to the first deed
of trust, the court found that a lack of substantiation on either side
of the amount of the debt owed to the contractor warranted the
equitable subordination of the claim.154  The court also held that the
second deed of trust should be subject to equitable subordination
because it would be inequitable to compensate those investors over
the rights of bona fide creditors.155  Finally, the court found that
Nerox Power was a mere instrumentality of its controlling stock-
holder Ross, and therefore Ross was liable to the appellees for the
debts of the company.156  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court was affirmed in all respects.157
144. Id. at 523-24.
145. 54 P.3d 791 (Alaska 2002).
146. Id. at 792-93.
147. Id. at 794, 796.
148. Id. at 793-94.
149. Id. at 799.
150. Id. at 794.
151. Id. at 796.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 798-99.
155. Id. at 799-800.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 793.
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In Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,158 the supreme court
held that the special verdict correctly established Alyeska’s liability
for breach of implied contract, but that the superior court’s damage
award required modification.159  Reeves developed an idea to build
a visitor center near the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.160  After receiving
assurance from Alyeska’s Fairbanks manager to keep the idea pri-
vate, Reeves orally disclosed this idea to him.161  Despite receiving
assurances that Alyeska would work with Reeves to build the cen-
ter, Alyeska implemented the plan without Reeves.162  Reeves filed
suit, and the jury returned a verdict finding Alyeska liable for
breach of an implied contract and a special verdict addressing
damages and Reeves’s claim for negligent misrepresentation.163
Reeves appealed the trial court’s denial of punitive damages and its
limited award of compensatory damages.164  The supreme court
found that the proper measure of Reeves’s compensatory damages
was the profit Alyeska actually realized from the center rather than
the amount Aleyska might have realized.165  Additionally, the su-
preme court agreed that punitive damages were improper because
there was no finding of negligent misrepresentation.166  Accord-
ingly, the supreme court affirmed the order striking punitive dam-
ages, vacated the compensatory damage award, and remanded for
an entry of modified judgment.167
In Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co.,168 the supreme court upheld the dismissal of contract
and promissory estoppel claims against a prospective purchaser of
a seafood plant when a letter and oral promises were not an une-
quivocal acceptance.169  In 1993, Alyeska began looking for a wild-
life rehabilitation facility for use in case of an oil spill.170  Sea Hawk
Seafoods, Inc. was interested in selling its plant to Valdez Fisheries
so that Valdez could lease it to Alyeska for the rehabilitation cen-
ter.171  Alyeska informed Sea Hawk that Valdez would get the Aly-
158. 56 P.3d 660 (Alaska 2002).
159. Id. at 662-63.
160. Id. at 663.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 664-65.
164. Id. at 665.
165. Id. at 666-67.
166. Id. at 671.
167. Id. at 672.
168. 45 P.3d 657 (Alaska 2002).
169. Id. at 665-70.
170. Id. at 662.
171. Id. at 662-63.
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eska contract and, therefore, utilize the Sea Hawk plant.172  Alyeska
allegedly further promised that it would lease the plant directly
from Sea Hawk if Valdez was unable to buy it.173  Valdez and Sea
Hawk then signed an agreement for the sale of the plant to Valdez,
contingent on Alyeska awarding the contract to Valdez.174  In 1994,
Alyeska informed Valdez that it was selected as the “winning bid-
der” and that Alyeska intended to begin negotiating a contract as
soon as possible.175  Valdez and Sea Hawk implemented their con-
tract for the sale of the plant.176  Alyeska subsequently broke off
negotiations with Valdez.177  Sea Hawk and Valdez both filed com-
plaints against Alyeska, asserting breach of contract and promis-
sory estoppel. 178 The trial court dismissed Valdez’s claims under
Rule 12(b)(6) and awarded Alyeska summary judgment on Sea
Hawk’s claims.179  On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the dis-
missal of the contract claims, finding that Alyeska’s statement that
Valdez was the “winning bidder” did not constitute an unequivocal
acceptance.180  The court also found that Alyeska’s letter was not a
binding agreement to negotiate because it did not contain a specific
way to resolve differences.181  Regarding Valdez’s promissory es-
toppel claim, the court held that the “actual promise” requirement
was analytically identical to the “acceptance” required for a con-
tract.182  Because the court found that Alyeska’s letter did not con-
stitute acceptance, it necessarily followed that the “actual promise”
element of promissory estoppel was not met.183  Regarding Sea
Hawk’s promissory estoppel claim, the court found that Alyeska’s
promises to Sea Hawk were ambiguous as to duration and price
and held that promissory estoppel cannot be used to defeat the
statute of frauds when the oral agreement contained substantial
ambiguity as to key terms.184
172. Id. at 663.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 663-64.
177. Id. at 664.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 665.
181. Id. at 667-68.
182. Id. at 668.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 670.
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IV.  CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Claim and Issue Preclusion
In DeNardo v. Barrans,185 the supreme court held that federal
law required Denardo’s claims in state court be barred under res
judicata after a punitive dismissal of the claims in federal court.186
Denardo’s federal court claims against nine state employees for
wrongful discharge were all dismissed by the federal court.187  Ac-
tions against eight of the defendants were dismissed with prejudice
on summary judgment, and the remaining claim against DeNardo’s
supervisor was dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(b)188 for
Denardo’s failure to abide by court orders.189  In this subsequent
state action involving identical claims against the same defendants,
the court held that all nine of the dismissals represented judgment
on the merits warranting claim preclusion and that federal common
law dictated that a punitive dismissal with prejudice was also on the
merits, warranting the preclusive effect.190  Finally, the court ruled
that the claim preclusion extended to the state agencies even
though the agencies were not included in the original federal suit,
as res judicata may preclude an action against a party not included
in a prior action where the newly included party is “in privity” with
a party to the prior action.191  The court found that sufficient privity
exists between a state agency and its employees for claim preclu-
sion to apply, where the employees were sued “for actions taken in
the course of their employment.”192  Accordingly, Denardo’s claims
against state employees, previously dismissed in a prior federal ac-
tion, as well as against the non-party state agencies for which the
employees worked, were all barred under the doctrine of res judi-
cata.193
In Tru-Line Metal Products, Inc. v. United States Fabrication
and Erection,194 the supreme court reversed a summary judgment
order that was granted on res judicata grounds.195  Tru-Line, a third
tier subcontractor, sued United States Fabrication and Erection
185. 59 P.3d 366 (Alaska 2002).
186. Id. at 267.
187. Id.
188. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
189. Denardo, 50 P.3d at 267.
190. Id. at 269.
191. Id. at 270.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 52 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2002).
195. Id. at 151.
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(USF&E), a second-tier subcontractor, for breach of contract in
federal court.196  The district court dismissed the case due to lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.197  Tru-Line subsequently brought suit
in state superior court, alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and conversion.198  USF&E moved for and was granted summary
judgment on res judicata grounds.199  The supreme court reversed,
holding that the federal court judgment did not constitute a final
judgment on the merits of the case and that therefore res judicata
did not apply.200
In Van Deusen v. Seavey,201 the supreme court held that a prior
final judgment denying the Van Deusens’ request for injunctive re-
lief barred a subsequent claim for injunctive relief under the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel.202  The Van Deusens requested injunc-
tive relief for the removal of sled dogs which were being kept in
their neighbors’ yard and which the superior court had found to be
a nuisance due to their barking.203  In an earlier claim, a final judg-
ment had been issued denying the Van Deusens’ request for in-
junctive relief while awarding money damages for the nuisance.204
In this second action for injunctive relief, the supreme court found
that the Van Deusens failed to demonstrate that conditions had
changed, and therefore collateral estoppel barred the claim.205  The
court did note, however, that res judicada did not bar the claim be-
cause the nuisance was classified as a temporary instead of a per-
manent nuisance.206
B. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
In Fleegel v. Estate of Boyles,207 the supreme court ruled that
both Fleegel and Boyles were entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees.208  Fleegel sued Boyles for damages resulting from an automo-
bile accident.209  The jury awarded compensatory damages to Flee-
196. Id. at 152.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 153.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 154-55.
201. 53 P.3d 596 (Alaska 2002).
202. Id. at 599.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 601.
206. Id. at 600.
207. 61 P.3d 1267 (Alaska 2002).
208. Id. at 1278.
209. Id. at 1269.
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gel and determined that he was entitled to punitive damages, but
awarded zero dollars in punitive damages.210  The trial court then
determined that Boyles, as the prevailing party under Rule 68,211
was entitled to attorney’s fees.212  Fleegel then moved for an award
of attorney’s fees under Alaska Statutes section 09.60.070,213 which
awards “full reasonable attorney fees” to victims of certain
crimes.214  The supreme court affirmed both awards of attorney’s
fees.215  The court determined that a crime victim does not need to
be a prevailing party as defined in Rule 68 to be awarded attor-
ney’s fees because Rule 68 did not address the crime victim’s stat-
ute that was enacted six years earlier.216  Additionally, the court
found that the laws were intended to operate independently.217
In Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States,218 the 9th Cir-
cuit held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees under the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act219 (ANILCA) for
fees incurred during required administrative proceedings.220  The
Village of Quinhagak (the Village) sued the federal government
and the State of Alaska, arguing that the federal government erro-
neously ruled that navigable waters were not protected under
ANILCA (the “where” issue) and that Alaska had no jurisdiction
to regulate such waters (the “who” issue).221  After ten years of liti-
gation, the district court entered a final judgment on the merits in
favor of the Village.222  The Village then filed a motion for attor-
ney’s fees.223  The district court granted the motion only in part,
holding that ANILCA did not authorize recovery of costs incurred
exhausting administrative remedies.224  The State appealed the fee
award, arguing that the Village did not raise the “who” issue in its
case and should not be entitled to costs on that issue.225  The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court properly required fee payment
210. Id. at 1269-70.
211. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68.
212. Fleegel, 61 P.3d at 1270.
213. ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.070 (Michie 2002).
214. Fleegel, 61 P.3d at 1270.
215. Id. at 1278.
216. Id. at 1277.
217. Id.
218. 307 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).
219. 16 U.S.C.  §§ 3101-233 (2000).
220. Quinhagak, 307 F.3d. at 1076.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1078.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1079.
225. Id.
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for the “who” issue as the plaintiffs properly “addressed that issue
as required for resolution of their own case.”226  The Village cross-
appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining that
ANILCA did not authorize pre-litigation fee recovery.227  The
Ninth Circuit held that pre-litigation fees were recoverable under
ANILCA, determining that “providing for recovery of fees pro-
motes Congress’s expressed purpose in enacting” ANILCA.228
C. Miscellaneous
In Cook v. Rowland,229 the supreme court held that a
$7,000,000 default judgment against Kim Michael Cook should be
set aside and remanded for a redetermination of damages before a
different judge.230  The default judgment was the result of a wrong-
ful death suit filed by Rowland for the death of her husband.231
While Cook was served with the complaint the following day, he
failed to respond within the required twenty days, and Rowland
filed for and was granted a default judgment.232  Cook responded,
moving to set aside the default judgment and made a peremptory
challenge to the assigned judge pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule
42(c).233  The peremptory challenge was denied as untimely and the
motion to set aside the judgment was subsequently denied.234  In
setting aside the default judgment, the supreme court found that
Cook’s failure to respond was justified by excusable neglect be-
cause of Cook’s particular circumstances: severe injuries, confine-
ment in a maximum security facility, lack of familiarity with court
rules, and focus on his criminal defense.235  Additionally, the court
found “good cause” to set aside the default judgment based on: (1)
the potential meritorious defense to the amount of damages; (2)
the magnitude of the judgment itself; (3) the insignificant amount
of culpability in Cook’s conduct relating to the entry of default; and
(4) the minimal duration of the default and lack of prejudice to the
plaintiff.236  For these reasons, the court held that the default judg-
226. Id. at 1081.
227. Id. at 1079.
228. Id. at 1083.
229. 49 P.3d 262 (Alaska 2002).
230. Id. at 263.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c); Rowland, 49 P.3d at 263.
234. Rowland, 49 P.3d at 263-64.
235. Id. at 264.
236. Id. at 265-67.
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ment should be vacated and remanded for a new determination of
damages.237
In DeNardo v. ABC Inc. RVS Motorhomes,238 the supreme
court held that the trial court was within its discretion in dismissing
DeNardo’s complaint under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 37,239
and that the dismissal of DeNardo’s complaint did not deny De-
Nardo his constitutional rights.240  ABC fired DeNardo shortly after
he was hired for failure to provide a valid driver’s license and hos-
tile behavior.241  After DeNardo refused to comply with two orders
compelling discovery, the trial court dismissed DeNardo’s lawsuit
under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C).242  The supreme
court found that DeNardo’s failure to comply with the trial court’s
discovery order was willful and that ABC suffered prejudice as a
result of DeNardo’s failure to comply.243  Further, the supreme
court found that the dismissal was sufficiently related to DeNardo’s
violation of the discovery order because the dismissed claims were
related to the information DeNardo refused to supply.244  The su-
preme court held that the dismissal of DeNardo’s lawsuit did not
deny his due process rights or his right to a jury trial and that the
information requested by ABC did not violate DeNardo’s constitu-
tional right to privacy.245
In Kaiser v. Sakata,246 the supreme court held that a pro se liti-
gant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment where he or
she does not make a good faith effort to comply with judicial rules
and procedures and the court makes adequate allowances for the
litigant’s pro se status.247  After being injured in a work-related ac-
cident, Kaiser alleged that his physical therapy treatments were
negligently administered by Sakata and caused him additional inju-
ries.248  In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the supe-
rior court noted that Kaiser failed to respond adequately to discov-
ery requests and did not produce an expert to present
countervailing testimony as to whether Sakata had met the appro-
237. Id. at 267.
238. 51 P.3d 919 (Alaska 2002).
239. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37; DeNardo, 51 P.3d at 922.
240. DeNardo, 51 P.3d at 927.
241. Id.
242. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C); DeNardo, 51 P.3d at 922.
243. Denardo, 51 P.3d at 923-25.
244. Id. at 926.
245. Id. at 927-28.
246. 40 P.3d 800 (Alaska 2002).
247. Id. at 801.
248. Id. at 802.
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priate standard of care.249  On appeal, the supreme court ruled that
where courts relax the procedural requirements for a pro se liti-
gant, such a litigant is expected to make a good faith effort to com-
ply with judicial rules and procedures, and absent this effort, such
leniency properly may be denied.250  The supreme court held that
summary judgment had been properly granted for the defendants
because Kaiser failed to fulfill the Rule 56(e)251 requirement that
the party opposed to the motion respond with affidavits or specific
facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact.252
In Kessey v. Frontier Lodge, Inc.,253 the supreme court held
that requests for continuances based on Alaska Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56(f)254 should be “freely granted” if a party has substan-
tively complied with the rule.255  The superior court denied Kessey’s
Rule 56(f) request because he failed to provide the necessary affi-
davit in support of the request.256  Kessey requested a continuance
in order to perform the depositions necessary to counter Frontier
Lodge’s summary judgment motion.257  In a memorandum opposing
summary judgment, Kessey’s attorney stated that he was out of
town when Frontier Lodge filed its summary judgment motion and
was unable to conduct the depositions when he returned due to
trial preparations for a complex medical malpractice case.258  Be-
cause such requests should not be denied based on a technical rul-
ing, the supreme court found Kessey had substantively satisfied
Rule 56(f).259  Additionally, the court found that Kessey was not
“dilatory” as Frontier alleged, but that Kessey’s counsel had been
actively involved in the litigation.260  Accordingly, the supreme
court reversed the superior court decision granting summary judg-
ment for Frontier Lodge as an abuse of discretion.261
In McCoy v. State,262 the court of appeals, in interpreting
Alaska Appellate Rule 214,263 declared that unpublished opinions
249. Id.
250. Id. at 803.
251. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(e).
252. Kaiser, 40 P.3d at 805.
253. 42 P.3d 1060 (Alaska 2002).
254. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(f).
255. Kessey, 42 P.3d at 1063.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1062.
258. Id. at 1063.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1064.
261. Id.
262. 59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
263. ALASKA R. APP. P. 214.
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may not be given precedential value, but may be brought to the
court’s attention and given persuasive value.264  The court rejected
the argument that Rule 214 should forbid courts or attorneys from
referring to any unpublished decision.265  The supreme court had
previously issued a standing order266 calling for the distribution of
unpublished opinions among judges, lawyers, and members of the
general public.267  The court of appeals found this standing order in-
consistent with the assertion that unpublished opinions should not
be referred to again in the Alaska courts.268  Accordingly, the court
affirmed its prior decision that Rule 214 permitted judges and law-
yers to rely on unpublished opinions for “whatever persuasive
power those decisions might have.”269
In Reich v. Cominco Alaska, Inc.,270 the supreme court held
that Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 47(c)(12),271 which excludes
prospective jurors who have a financial interest in the litigation,
may also exclude stockholders of a corporation who are not a party
to the lawsuit but who may be affected financially by the verdict.272
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant in 1997 alleging
various discrimination claims.273  The defendant operated a mine
under an agreement sharing costs and profits with the owners of
the mine (NANA).274  The agreement allowed the defendant to
subtract from gross revenue its costs of defendant lawsuits and any
judgment against it, unless the judgment was based on gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct.275  At trial, the superior court excluded
for cause all prospective jurors who owned stock in NANA even
though NANA was not a party to the lawsuit.276  The court’s ruling
relied on Civil Rule 47(c)(12) and found that any verdict other than
one holding the defendant liable for gross negligence or willful
misconduct would reduce NANA’s share of the mine’s profits be-
cause the defendant could deduct its defense costs.277  On appeal,
the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision regarding
264. McCoy, 59 P.3d at 754.
265. Id. at 759-60.
266. Alaska Supreme Court, Standing Order No.3 (March 1981).
267. McCoy, 59 P.3d at 760.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 56 P.3d 18 (Alaska 2002).
271. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 47(c)(12).
272. Reich, 56 P.3d at 20.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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the NANA shareholders and held that the per se rule that excludes
stockholders in a company which is a party to a litigation from be-
ing jurors in that litigation also applied to stockholders in a corpo-
ration which is not a party to the litigation but which is financially
interested in the outcome.278  Additionally, the supreme court held
that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
NANA shareholders were financially interested in the outcome of
the litigation.279
In Shook v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,280 the supreme court
held that Shook had standing to appeal the decertification of the
class and that the superior court erred in decertifying the class
without specifying its reasons.281  Shook was a former Alyeska em-
ployee who filed a class-action complaint against Alyeska alleging
violations of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act.282  Originally, the su-
perior court granted certification, but it later decertified the class
following the United States Supreme Court opinion in Auer v.
Robbins.283  Shook moved for an entry of final judgment to allow
him to appeal the order vacating class certification.284  On appeal,
the supreme court agreed that Shook had standing to appeal the
decertification of the class.285  However, the court stated that be-
cause Shook is no longer a member of the class, a new class repre-
sentative should be appointed on remand.286  The supreme court
then remanded the issue of decertification because the superior
court “made no mention of Civil Rule 23, or any of its require-
ments, and instead gave merit-related grounds for its order.”287  The
supreme court ruled that it was an abuse of discretion for the supe-
rior court to reach the merits of the class action in deciding to de-
certify the class.288
In Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. State,289 the supreme court held
that the civil investigative demand (CID) served on Tesoro was not
overbroad, nor were the responsive documents wrongly disclosed
278. Id. at 23.
279. Id.
280. 51 P.3d 935 (Alaska 2002).
281. Id. at 937.
282. Id. at 936.
283. 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Shook, 51 P.3d at 936.
284. Shook, 51 P.3d at 936.
285. Id. at 937.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 938.
288. See id.
289. 42 P.3d 531 (Alaska 2002).
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to outside counsel.290  In the course of investigating Tesoro’s alleged
antitrust violations, the Alaska Attorney General served upon the
company a CID for the production of forty-six documents291 pursu-
ant to Alaska Statutes section 45.50.592.292  The State retained out-
side counsel to review documents and assist the investigation.293
Tesoro petitioned the superior court to modify the CID, arguing
that the demand was overbroad and that disclosure to outside
counsel was impermissible.294  The superior court held that the out-
side counsel was an employee of the State for the purposes of as-
sisting the investigation, and that the CID was not overbroad, but it
did modify the CID slightly to cover only employees with decision-
making authority.295  Reviewing the superior court decision for
abuse of discretion, the supreme court held that the outside counsel
and his firm were authorized employees or designees of the State
and thus permitted to review the responsive documents.296  The
court affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the At-
torney General is granted broad investigative powers and may use
these powers to the extent he deems necessary, and that the term
“designee” in section 45.50.592 includes employees other than
those directly employed by the government.297  Further, the su-
preme court held that under the general policy of allowing “liberal
discovery in antirust cases” the CID, while broad, was not oppres-
sive.298
In Willoya v. State, Department of Corrections,299 the supreme
court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.300
Willoya was incarcerated at Spring Creek Correctional Center
when he was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis that required sur-
gery.301  After his operation, Willoya brought a negligence claim
against the State of Alaska and the individuals who treated him.302
Willoya’s attorney later requested the trial court to allow him to
withdraw from the case because “attorney/client communication
290. Id. at 533.
291. Id. at 534.
292. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.592 (Michie 2000).
293. Tesoro, 42 P.3d at 534.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 534-35.
296. Id. at 535.
297. Id. at 538.
298. Id. at 541-42.
299. 53 P.3d 1115 (Alaska 2002).
300. Id. at 1117.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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had broken down.”303  First, the supreme court held that the trial
court did not err in granting the attorney’s request to withdraw be-
cause Willoya was present at the withdrawal hearing and did not
offer any support for his claim that the trial court abused its discre-
tion.304  Second, the supreme court held that the trial court did not
err in denying Willoya’s request for appointment of a discovery
master because Willoya failed to assert any of the five factors laid
out in Peter v. Progressive Corp.305  Third, the supreme court held
that the trial court did not err in denying Willoya’s request for the
appointment of counsel because there is no right to appointed
counsel in tort cases.306  Fourth, the supreme court also held that
the trial court did not err in denying Willoya’s request for ap-
pointment of an expert because appointment of an expert is discre-
tionary and the issues in the case were not unusually complex.307
Fifth, the supreme court held that it was not error to deny Wil-
loya’s request for appointment of a medical expert advisory panel
because Willoya had earlier waived his right to such an expert advi-
sory panel.308  Sixth, the supreme court held that the trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment for the State because Wil-
loya received proper notice of the requirements of submitting affi-
davits with his opposition to the State’s motion for summary judg-
ment, and he offered no medical expert opinion testimony contrary
to the expert medical opinions offered by the State to establish a
triable case of medical negligence.309  Lastly, the supreme court de-
nied other various claims raised by Willoya because he failed to
raise the claims in the trial court or in his opening brief on appeal.310
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Evans v. State,311 the supreme court held seven tort reform
provisions—“(1)the cap on noneconomic and punitive damages
under Alaska Statutes sections 09.17.010 and .020;312 (2) the re-
quirement that half of all punitive damage awards be paid to the
State under section 09.17.020(j);313 (3) the comparative apportion-
303. Id. at 1118.
304. Id. at 1120.
305. 996 P.2d 865, 870 (Alaska 1999); Willoya, 53 P.3d at 1121.
306. Willoya, 53 P.3d at 1121.
307. Id. at 1122.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1122-24.
310. Id. at 1125-26.
311. 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002).
312. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.010, .020 (Michie 2002).
313. § 09.17.020(j).
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ment of damages under section 09.17.080;314 (4) the revised offer of
judgment procedure under section 09.30.065;315 (5) the limitations
tolling procedure under section 09.10.070(a)(2) and .140;316 (6) the
partial tort immunity for hospitals under section 09.65.096;317 and
(7) the ‘statute of repose’ under section 09.10.055”318—to be facially
constitutional under the Alaska Constitution.319
First, the court ruled that damages caps do not violate the con-
stitutional right to a trial by jury, because “the decision to place a
cap on damages awarded is a policy choice and not a re-
examination of the factual question of damages determined by the
jury.”320  In addition, the damages caps do not violate equal protec-
tion because the plaintiff’s interests in unlimited damages were
merely economic and the State’s interest in tort reform was legiti-
mate—thus, the nexus between the legislative objectives and the
damages caps was adequate to survive an equal protection chal-
lenge.321  The court also ruled that damages caps do not infringe on
the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights322 and that the damages
cap did not violate the separation of powers.323  Moreover, the court
ruled that damages caps do not infringe on the right of access to the
courts because they are not so drastic as to eliminate the tort
remedies that they modify.324  Second, following its own precedent,
the court ruled that Alaska Statutes section 09.17.020, which re-
quires plaintiffs to surrender half of a punitive damages award to
the State does not violate substantive due process rights,325 does not
effect a taking without just compensation under the United States
and Alaska Constitutions,326 and does not violate the right to a jury
trial.327  Third, the court ruled that the allocation of fault to non-
parties provision is not void for vagueness, because although there
are some ambiguities in the statute, they are “not so conflicting and
confused that it cannot be given meaning in the adjudication proc-
314. § 09.17.080.
315. § 09.30.065.
316. § 09.10.070(a)(2), .140.
317. § 09.65.096.
318. § 09.10.055; Evans, 56 P.3d at 1049.
319. Evans, 56 P.3d at 1048.
320. Id. at 1051.
321. Id. at 1054.
322. Id. at 1055.
323. Id. at 1055-56.
324. Id.at 1057.
325. Id. at 1058.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1059.
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ess.”328  Also, the allocation of fault to non-parties provision does
not violate the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, because
the statute reasonably relates to a legitimate governmental purpose
by providing three procedural safeguards to preclude failure to join
responsible parties.329  Fourth, the court held that section 09.30.065
does not violate the right of access to the courts or the right to a
jury trial, and is thus facially constitutional.330  Fifth, inspecting the
plain language of the statute, the court held that the disparate
treatment for minors in the limitations tolling procedure is facially
constitutional because it is rationally based on legitimate state in-
terests of limiting stale tort claims.331  Sixth, the court held that sec-
tion 09.65.096, granting partial tort immunity to hospitals, is facially
constitutional because “the legislature has the power to modify
common law.”332  Seventh, the court held the statute of repose to be
facially constitutional because there is no differential treatment
and the legislature is free to modify or abolish the common law.333
Finally, the court held that the entire act promulgating these provi-
sions does not violate the “one subject” rule of article II, section 13
of the Alaska Constitution because although the act concerns many
different matters, “they are all within the single subject of ‘civil ac-
tions.’”334
In Fraiman v. State, Department of Administration, of Motor
Vehicles [sic],335 the supreme court affirmed that Fraiman did not
have standing to allege a Fourth Amendment violation.336  Alaska
State Trooper Tracy attempted to pull over Fraiman after noticing
that Fraiman’s taillights were not functioning properly, but Frai-
man continued driving to a friend’s house.337  Without the owner’s
explicit permission, Tracy searched and found Fraiman in the loft
of his friend’s cabin.338  Fraiman challenged the suspension of his
license at an administrative hearing, claiming an illegal search un-
der the Fourth Amendment.339  The supreme court affirmed that
328. Id. at 1062 (quoting Williams v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99, 105
(Alaska 1995)).
329. Id. at 1063.
330. Id. at 1063-64.
331. Id. at 1064-66.
332. Id. at 1066-67.
333. Id. at 1068.
334. Id. at 1069-70.
335. 49 P.3d 241 (Alaska 2002).
336. Id. at 242.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 243.
339. Id.
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Fraiman had no standing to allege a Fourth Amendment violation
because he was not an overnight guest and could not have had a
“legitimate expectation of privacy” in the cabin.340  In addition, the
court ruled that Tracy’s conduct did not fall under either the “gross
or shocking” or “deliberate violation” standing exceptions of
Waring v. State.341
In Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility,342 the supreme court
held that Midgett’s claims that his constitutional rights were vio-
lated by an officer’s actions to stop a fight between Midgett and
another prisoner were barred by collateral estoppel.343  Midgett
claimed that failure of the officer to follow standard operating pro-
cedures, resulting in the other prisoner not being handcuffed, vio-
lated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.344  The court
upheld the lower court’s summary judgment determining that these
constitutional claims were barred by collateral estoppel, as they
have been adjudicated and dismissed in federal court. 345  Midgett
also claimed a violation of due process because he was not ap-
pointed counsel; the court determined there was no violation of
due process because no right to counsel exists for a civil trial and
Midgett does not satisfy any of the exceptions to this general rule.346
Requiring Midgett to participate telephonically also did not violate
his due process rights because such participation did not bar rea-
sonable access to the court, such participation did not prejudice his
claim, and the costs for his transportation would have been sub-
stantial.347  Further, Midgett failed to meet the burden of proof that
the defendants were negligent and that this negligence was the le-
gal cause of Midgett’s harm.348  Midgett’s claim of breach of con-
tract for failing to comply with the Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) was also dismissed, as the court found that the SOPs did
not constitute a contract between Cook Inlet and Midgett.349  Addi-
tionally, the court found no medical malpractice for treatment of
340. Id. at 245.
341. Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 363 (Alaska 1983); Fraiman, 49 P.3d at 245.
342. 53 P.3d 1105 (Alaska 2002).
343. Id. at 1108.
344. Id. at 1108-09.
345. Id. at 1110.  The federal judge held that there was no deliberate indiffer-
ence with respect to Midgett’s medical needs, the force taken by the officers to
break up the fight was applied in good faith, and there was no “conscious indiffer-
ence.”  Id.
346. Id. at 1111-12.
347. Id. at 1113.
348. Id. at 1113-14.
349. Id. at 1114.
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the injury Midgett incurred while fighting with the other prisoner;350
Midgett failed to follow his doctor’s advice in caring for his ankle,
and surgery became necessary as a result.351
In Valdez v. Rosenbaum,352 the Ninth Circuit held that the con-
stitutional rights of a federal detainee in the Alaska Cook Inlet
Pretrial Facility were not violated by imposing restrictions on his
telephone access during his four-and-a-half months of pretrial de-
tention.353  After being convicted for drug trafficking and sentenced
to thirty years in prison, Valdez filed a pro se civil rights action
against certain state officials alleging that his pretrial telephone re-
strictions violated a number of his constitutional rights.354  On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit held that Valdez’s procedural due process
claims failed because Alaska law did not create a liberty interest in
using a telephone during his pretrial confinement.355  Similarly,
Valdez’s substantive due process claims failed because the restric-
tion did not constitute punishment as it was intended to prevent
Valdez from tipping off his co-conspirators about the recently is-
sued indictments, ensuring their capture with minimal danger to
the arresting officers, and thus did not constitute punishment.356
Additionally, the court held that the telephone restriction did not
violate Valdez’s rights to freedom of speech because a prisoner’s
First Amendment right to telephone access is subject to reasonable
security limitations.357  Finally, the court held that Valdez’s Sixth
Amendment claim was not cognizable in non-habeas corpus litiga-
tion and that his equal protection challenge was waived because he
did not raise it on appeal.358
VI.  CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
In Beaudoin v. State,359 the court of appeals affirmed the de-
fendant’s murder conviction.  Beaudoin was found “guilty but men-
tally ill” for the murder of his mother in September 1997.360  On the
350. Id. at 1114-15.
351. Id. at 1109.
352. 302 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1043.
355. Id. at 1045.
356. Id. at 1046-47.
357. Id. at 1047.
358. Id. at 1049.
359. 57 P.3d 703 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
360. Id. at 705.
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night of the murder, Beaudoin confessed to a number of people
that he was responsible for stabbing his mother.361  On appeal,
Beaudoin argued that his confessions should have been suppressed
because the first confession he made to an Alaska State Trooper
was made before he was given his Miranda warnings.362  The court
found that Beaudoin’s un-Mirandized confession was a “minor in-
terruption in what was otherwise a stream of legally obtained con-
fessions” and therefore the subsequent confessions were not
tainted and should not have been suppressed.363
In Hamilton v. State,364 the court of appeals rejected a murder
defendant’s claim that a traffic stop leading to his arrest was ille-
gal.365  Rebecca Dixon awoke one night to find someone stabbing
her husband.366  News of the stabbing was quickly broadcast to the
police.367  Upon hearing the news, a state trooper stopped a car
traveling in the opposite direction and radioed Fairbanks officers,
asking them to record the license plate number so that the driver
could later be contacted.368  One of the officers followed the car, but
the license plate was covered in snow.369  Stopping the car on the of-
ficer’s supervisor’s order, the police officer discovered that it was
Hamilton and found evidence that was used against him in his con-
viction for first-degree murder.370  On appeal, the court of appeals
declined to consider whether it violated the Alaska Constitution
for the police to use a minor violation, an obstructed license place,
as a pretext for making a traffic stop.371  Instead, the court held that
stopping Hamilton’s car was justified because “a prompt investiga-
tion” was required “as a matter of practical necessity.”372
In Paul v. State,373 the court affirmed a denial of a motion to
suppress evidence procured by a private party and used by the po-
lice to obtain a search warrant.374  P.B. and his minor cousin C.P.
broke into Alfred Paul’s, P.B.’s uncle’s, room and viewed a portion
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 707.
364. 59 P.3d 760 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
365. Id. at 762.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 763.
368. Id. at 763-64.
369. Id. at 764.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 765-66.
372. Id. at 767 (quoting Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976)).
373. 57 P.3d 698 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
374. Id. at 703.
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of a videotape depicting Paul having sex with C.P.375  P.B. gave the
videotape to the police.376  The police viewed this videotape in its
entirety and obtained a search warrant on this basis.377 Paul claimed
that the viewing of the videotape by the police violated his Fourth
Amendment rights and moved to suppress the evidence.378  The
court determined that the test for a “warrantless government
search following a private search,” as established in Walter v.
United States379 and United States v. Jacobsen,380 “is the degree to
which the government’s invasion of the privacy interest exceeds the
scope of the private search.”381  The court ruled that Paul’s privacy
interest had been destroyed by P.B.’s viewing of the videotape,
even though P.B. did not view the entire tape and the police did,
because the portion P.B. viewed was sufficient to find evidence of
wrongdoing.382  Furthermore, Alfred Paul claimed that the illegal
procurement of the tape by a private party prevented the police
from being able to use it as evidence.383  In rejecting this argument,
the court stated that “it has . . . been settled . . . that a wrongful
search or seizure conducted by a private party does not . . . deprive
the government of the right to use evidence that it has acquired
lawfully.”384
In State v. Boceski,385 the court of appeals found that a cocaine
dealer had a diminished expectation of privacy when conducting a
drug deal in another person’s home such that a police officer’s
eavesdropping did not violate the cocaine dealer’s Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy.386  Confidential informant L.H.
informed the police that Boceski was a cocaine dealer.387  Sergeant
Rayme Grubbs arranged for a drug sale between L.H. and Boceski
at L.H.’s residence.388  Grubbs eavesdropped and recorded the con-
versation and arrested Boceski once the deal had taken place.389
After being arrested, Boceski sought suppression of “Grubb’s ob-
375. Id. at 699.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 700.
379. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
380. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
381. Paul, 57 P.3d at 702.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 703 (citing Walter, 447 U.S. at 656 (citations omitted)).
385. 53 P.3d 622 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
386. Id. at  625.
387. Id. at 623.
388. Id.
389. Id.
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servations, the audiotape recording and all of the evidence seized
following Boceski’s arrest, including Boceski’s Mirandized state-
ments.”390  The trial court suppressed the evidence and granted Bo-
ceski’s motion to dismiss.391  On appeal, the court of appeals found
that although Boceski had an expectation of privacy for a private
conversation, this expectation was not reasonable in the circum-
stances.392 The court found Boceski had a diminished expectation of
privacy that is not protected by the Fourth Amendment because
Grubbs overheard the conversation from a place where he had a
right to be, used his unaided, natural senses and did not rely on the
tape recorder, and was in a place where Boceski would anticipate
someone might be.393  The court reversed the order suppressing the
evidence and remanded the case to the superior court for a deter-
mination of evidence to be suppressed for illegal tape recording.394
In State v. Smith,395 the supreme court held that Smith was not
in custody for Miranda purposes during police questioning, and
thus his confession during questioning could not be suppressed.396
Smith had contacted the police when his friends told him he re-
sembled a police sketch of a rapist published in a local newspa-
per.397  Because Smith sounded suspicious, the police tracked Smith
down and questioned him in a police car.398  After making some in-
criminating statements, Smith left the car only to be arrested two
hours later.399  At trial, Smith was convicted of kidnapping, sexual
assault, and sexual abuse of a minor, but the court of appeals re-
versed, finding that Smith was in Miranda custody once the police
questioning had become accusatory.400  Examining the details of the
interrogation and events before and after the interrogation, the su-
preme court ruled that the questioning was noncustodial based on
the fact that (1) Smith had initiated contact with the police, (2)
Smith voluntarily talked with the police in the police car, (3) the
questioning was by a single police officer occurring in the middle of
the day and lasting only thirty minutes, (4) one of Smith’s friends
passed by during questioning, (5) the tone of the interview was
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 624-25.
393. Id. at 625.
394. Id. at 625-26.
395. 38 P.3d 1149 (Alaska 2002).
396. Id. at 1161.
397. Id. at 1151.
398. Id. at 1151-52.
399. Id. at 1152.
400. Id.
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noncustodial, and (6) Smith was informed that he was free to
leave.401  The supreme court concluded, on balance, that a reason-
able person would have felt free to leave even though some of
questions were accusatory, the interview took place in a police car,
and Smith was arrested shortly after the interview.402  Accordingly,
Smith’s conviction was reinstated.403
B. General Criminal Law
In Beatty v. State,404 the court of appeals concluded it was
proper for the trial judge to exclude Beatty’s proposed jury instruc-
tion of a lesser included offense because Beatty failed to present
sufficient evidence for its inclusion.405  Beatty was convicted of first-
degree robbery and conspiracy to commit first degree robbery.406
He argued that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser
included offense of attempted first degree robbery.407  While
agreeing with the final result, the court of appeals rejected the trial
court’s reasoning that attempted robbery did not exist separately
under Alaska law.408  Instead, the court of appeals found that the
first degree robbery statute was intended to “criminalize unsuccess-
ful takings of property to the same extent as successful takings of
property,” and not include “anticipatory acts in preparation of a
robbery.”409  Therefore, attempted robbery did exist in the Alaska
statutes through the general attempts statute when a person takes a
“substantial step towards the commission of that crime.”410  The
court found this could have been shown if Beatty intended to rob
the victim but did not use force or threaten the use of force.411
However, Beatty failed to produce any such evidence; therefore,
the trial judge was correct in excluding the proposed instruction.412
Accordingly, the lower court’s decision was affirmed.413
401. Id. at 1159.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1161.
404. 52 P.3d 752 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
405. Id. at 753.
406. Id. at 754.
407. Id. at 753.
408. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.500(a) (Michie 2002).
409. Beatty, 52 P.3d at 755.
410. § 11.31.100(a).
411. Beatty, 52 P.3d at 757.
412. Id. at 757-58.
413. Id.
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In Blair v. State,414 the court of appeals held that Blair had the
right to be present during the playback of audiotape testimony
during jury deliberations, and that allowing the playback to pro-
ceed in Blair’s attorney’s absence was an error requiring the rever-
sal of his conviction and a new trial.415  Blair was tried for assaulting
his wife.416  His attorney requested that he be present for playbacks
of testimony during jury deliberations.417  Blair’s attorney was out
of his office at the time the judge called to inform him of the jury’s
request, and was not present at the playback.418  Blair was con-
victed, and his attorney moved for a new trial; the trial court de-
nied the motion.419  The court of appeals reversed the conviction
and granted a new trial.420  The court held that the State had not
met the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, as it was possible that the verdict was affected by
holding the playback in counsel’s absence.421  Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed Blair’s conviction and granted him a new
trial.422
In Brewer v. State,423 the court of appeals held that the trial
judge properly denied the defendant’s eleventh-hour request for
self-representation and compelled the defendant to proceed with a
revocation hearing with the counsel of a public defender.424  Analo-
gizing to Gottschalk v. State425 and following the Second Circuit’s
holding in United States, ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno,426 the court
held that “a trial judge may deny a defendant’s last-minute request
for self-representation when granting the request would necessarily
delay the trial and the tardiness of the request is due to the defen-
dant’s lack of diligence in pursuing the issue of self-
representation.”427  The court also rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment that the State should be estopped from seeking to revoke his
probation because of its failure to grant him a “speedy petition”
reasoning that the defendant never raised the issue at trial, and the
414. 42 P.3d 1152 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
415. Id. at 1153-54.
416. Id. at 1153.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1153-54.
421. Id. at 1154.
422. Id. at 1156.
423. 55 P.3d 749 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
424. Id. at 749-50.
425. 602 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1979).
426. 348 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1965)
427. Brewer, 55 P.3d at 753.
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defendant’s argument was moot since the defendant failed to prove
that he was prejudiced by the delay.428  Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the superior court’s judgment.429
In Busby v. State,430 the court of appeals upheld a conviction
for driving with a revoked license.431  After having his license re-
voked in Alaska, Busby moved to Nicaragua, where he obtained an
international driving permit under the provisions of the United Na-
tions Convention on Road Traffic.432  Upon his return to Alaska, he
was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently charged with,
and later convicted of, driving with a revoked license.433  On appeal,
Busby claimed that even though his license was revoked, he was
still entitled to drive in Alaska under the terms of his international
driving permit.434  The court of appeals held that Busby’s pre-
existing license revocation was a sufficient reason for the State of
Alaska to deny Busby the right to use his international driving
permit on Alaska’s roads.435  Additionally, the court of appeals held
that the State’s authority to prohibit a driver with a pre-existing li-
cense revocation from driving on Alaska’s roads does not depend
on whether the State has initiated new proceedings against the
driver or the international driving permit, nor does it depend on
whether the State has required the driver to physically surrender
the permit.436
In Butts v. State,437 the court of appeals interpreted the phrase
“bodily impact” in Alaska’s robbery statute438 to include indirect
contacts where the defendant does not actually touch the victim
but, instead, exerts impact on property that is attached to the vic-
tim or that the victim is holding onto.439  Butts accosted a woman in
a parking lot and attempted to snatch her purse.440  The woman re-
sisted and during the ensuing struggle the woman fell to the ground
before relenting and allowing Butts to pull the purse from her
grasp.441  In affirming the trial court’s conclusion that Butts had
428. Id. at 755.
429. Id.
430. 40 P.3d 807 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
431. Id. at 818.
432. Id. at 808; Convention on Road Traffic, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008.
433. Id. at 809.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 812.
436. Id. at 815.
437. 53 P.3d 609 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
438. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(26) (Michie 2002).
439. Butts, 53 P.3d. at 613-14.
440. Id. at 611.
441. Id.
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forcibly taken the purse, the court of appeals reasoned that “bodily
impact” includes indirect contact—impact upon property attached
to the victim rather than impact directly upon the person.442  Addi-
tionally, the court held that in order to count as prior felony convic-
tions for purposes of presumptive sentencing under Alaska’s repeat
offender provisions,443 prior out-of-state convictions need only be
pursuant to laws similar, and not identical, to an Alaska counter-
part.444  Thus, the court held that Butts’s previous convictions in
Oklahoma for burglary and assault were under statutes sufficiently
similar to Alaska laws to justify their use in presumptive sentencing
even though the Oklahoma statutes were more narrowly defined
than their Alaska counterparts.445
In Carpentino v. State,446 the court of appeals overruled Car-
pentino’s conviction for sexual abuse because testimony of the vic-
tim’s siblings was improperly admitted into evidence.447  The vic-
tim’s brother had testified that Carpentino had climbed into bed
with him and fondled his genitals, and the victim’s mother testified
that the victim’s younger sister had said that Carpentino had
climbed into bed with her.448  The superior court judge allowed this
evidence to show Carpentino’s “plan” or “scheme” to get into bed
with young children.449  The court of appeals concluded that under
Rule 404(b)(1)450 Carpentino’s prior actions were only relevant if
they were seen as precursors to sexual abuse, so the testimony was
inadmissible because its only purpose would have been to “prove
that [Carpentino] is a person who . . . engages in such wrongful
acts” and is therefore likely to have acted in the same way towards
the victim.451  In addition, the “lewd disposition” exception recog-
nized in Soper v. State452 does not apply to Carpentino because his
behavior consisted of one or two instances of abuse, not the “con-
tinued pattern of sexual abuse” present in Soper.453
442. Id. at 613.
443. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145 (Michie 2002).
444. Butts, 53 P.3d. at 614-15.
445. Id. at 615-17.
446. 38 P.3d 547 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
447. Id. at 549.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
451. Carpentino, 38 P.3d at 550.
452. 731 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
453. Carpentino, 38 P.3d at 552.
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In Cathey v. State,454 the court of appeals held that the fact that
an armed robbery victim did not expressly tell the 911 dispatcher
that the defendant was armed did not constitute exculpatory evi-
dence that the prosecution was required to disclose to a grand
jury.455  Defendant Cathey and an accomplice broke into an apart-
ment and robbed the two residents at gunpoint; Cathey was con-
victed of first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and two counts
of third-degree assault.456  Cathey asserted on appeal that because
the victim did not expressly mention to the 911 dispatcher that the
robbers were armed, that constituted exculpatory evidence that
should have been presented to the grand jury.457  The court of ap-
peals rejected this argument because the victim’s exact words dur-
ing the 911 call were unclear.458  Moreover, the court held that re-
gardless of what the victim told the 911 dispatcher, the 911 tape did
not rise to the level of exculpatory evidence, that is, “evidence that
tends, in and of itself, to negate the defendant’s guilt,” and thus the
prosecution was not required to present the 911 tape to the grand
jury.459  Additionally, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly denied Cathey’s motion for a new trial because it found
that Cathey’s newly discovered evidence was dubious, and further,
was not likely to produce a different verdict.460  Thus, the judgment
of the trial court was affirmed.461
In Dayton v. State,462 the court of appeals remanded the case to
the superior court to resolve whether the Athabascan database was
the type of data reasonably relied upon by experts who analyze the
frequency of genetic profiles.463  Dayton, an Athabascan Indian, al-
legedly sexually assaulted a sixty-seven-year-old woman.464  The
police obtained a DNA sample from the victim and test results
showed that Dayton’s DNA matched the DNA from the sperm
sample taken from the victim.465  However, the forensic serologist
could not calculate a DNA profile frequency for Athabascan Indi-
454. 60 P.3d 192 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
455. Id. at 195.
456. Id. at 193.
457. Id. at 194.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 195.
460. Id. at 198-99.
461. Id.
462. 54 P.3d 817 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
463. Id. at 820-21.
464. Id. at 818.
465. Id.
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ans necessary to validate the results of the DNA test.466  Dayton re-
ceived a mistrial and the crime lab created an Athabascan database
before the second trial.467  Dayton objected to the use of the
Athabascan database because the State had not established its reli-
ability.468  Dayton further asserted that the State had to disclose the
donors’ individual names so that he could make sure they were not
related to him.469  The court of appeals agreed with Dayton’s first
contention because the trial judge made no findings as to whether
the Athascaban database had been collected and analyzed in such a
manner that experts would reasonably rely on it.470  However, the
court of appeals did not grant Dayton’s motion to disclose the do-
nors’ individual names because this did nothing to help Dayton’s
case.471
In Dobberke v. State,472 the court of appeals reversed the con-
viction of a man who retained a rental car after the written and oral
agreement had lapsed.473  In August 1998, Dobberke rented a car
for three days from VanZee, owner of a Hertz Rent-A-Car fran-
chise.474  He kept the car beyond the initial rental period, but was
allowed to extend the rental agreement on several occasions.475
Dobberke informed VanZee that he intended to buy the car after
he obtained financing.476  VanZee prepared a purchase order
agreement to assist Dobberke in receiving financing,477 but Dob-
berke never paid for the car.478  On February 6, 1999, the police lo-
cated Dobberke, and VanZee repossessed the car.479  Dobberke
was convicted of first-degree vehicle theft after a jury trial.480  On
appeal, the court of appeals held that first-degree vehicle theft
must involve an initial trespassory taking; otherwise, first-degree
vehicle theft would completely subsume second-degree theft, which
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 819.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 820.
471. Id. at 820-21.
472. 40 P.3d 1244 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
473. Id. at 1248.
474. Id. at 1245.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 1245-46.
480. Id. at 1246.
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makes it illegal to retain a vehicle beyond the time specified in a
written contract.481
In Garay v. State,482 the court of appeals reversed a superior
court decision and allowed a criminal defendant to withdraw his
plea.483  The defendant had been indicted for first-degree sexual as-
sault and accepted a plea bargain in the face of strong evidence.484
Before officially entering the plea, however, the district attorney’s
office received an additional police report and witness interviews
suggesting that the victim of the assault may not have been trust-
worthy.485  This information was sent to the defense attorney, who
neglected to read it.486  The defendant subsequently entered his ne-
gotiated plea.487  Later that year, the defendant’s new attorney dis-
covered the documents and asked the superior court to allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea.488  The superior court agreed that
the original attorney’s failure to review the documents amounted
to ineffective assistance of counsel but denied the motion because
the defendant failed to show any prejudice that resulted thereby.489
The court of appeals reversed, holding that if an attorney is to rep-
resent a criminal defendant competently during plea negotiations,
the attorney must know the facts of the case.490  In this case, the at-
torney’s failure to read documents placed directly in his inbox
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.491  Furthermore,
there was at least a reasonable possibility that the new information
either would have changed the attorney’s advice to the defendant
or would have changed the defendant’s decision to accept the plea
bargain.492  Accordingly, the court of appeals allowed the defendant
to withdraw the plea.493
In Hammock v. State,494 the court of appeals upheld a trespass
conviction despite the defendant’s arguments that the trial court
failed to dismiss prejudicial jurors.495  Defendant Hammock was re-
481. Id.
482. 53 P.3d 626 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
483. Id. at 629.
484. Id. at 627.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 628.
492. Id. at 629.
493. Id.
494. 52 P.3d 746 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
495. Id. at 747.
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peatedly asked to leave a bar because he was with an underage
person and had a conflict with another patron.496  He left each time,
only to return soon thereafter.497  Before his trial for second-degree
trespass, he challenged two prospective jurors for cause on the
grounds that they were predisposed to infer his guilt if he refused
to testify at trial.498  The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s de-
cision to deny the challenge of one of the jurors as a valid recogni-
tion of the juror’s change of heart on inferring Hammock’s guilt.499
The court of appeals held that the lower court abused its discretion,
however, in denying Hammock’s challenge of the other juror,
Blankenship, who had repeatedly stated that he might disregard
the court’s instructions to apply the law impartially because no one
would know he had done so.500  Nonetheless, the court of appeals
found that Hammock was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal
to dismiss Blankenship because Hammock ultimately used a per-
emptory challenge to dismiss the juror.501
In Johnson v. State,502 the court of appeals held that denial of a
rehabilitated convict’s motion to seal his criminal records is proper
where the court reasonably determines that the public policy of
allowing public access to criminal records outweighs the individ-
ual’s reasons for sealing his records.503  Nine years after the comple-
tion of his sentence for a conviction for kidnapping and rape, John-
son moved to have the record of his criminal convictions sealed.504
Johnson argued that he was fully rehabilitated and that public ac-
cess to his files had adversely affected his life in many ways (e.g.,
harassing phone calls, vandalism of his shed and truck, false accusa-
tions of threats, and negative attitudes towards him.)505  The court
of appeals ruled that open access to criminal records is an impor-
tant and long-standing public policy which can only be overridden
in exceptional circumstances.506  The court of appeals thus applied a
balancing test, weighing the public’s interest in disclosure against
the privacy and reputation interests of the rehabilitated convicts,
while keeping in mind the legislature’s bias in favor of public dis-
496. Id. at 748.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 749.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 750.
502. 50 P.3d 404 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
503. Id.
504. Id. at 405.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 405-06.
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closure.507  Affirming the superior court’s denial of his motion, the
court of appeals held that the superior court could reasonably have
concluded that Johnson had not presented such extraordinary cir-
cumstances.508
In McGee v. State,509 police discovered evidence against McGee
by intercepting a Federal Express package addressed to him and
testing it with an ion mobility spectrometer (“Itemiser”).510  The
Itemiser revealed traces of a controlled substance and led the offi-
cers to obtain a search warrant.511  The package revealed seven
ounces of cocaine and prompted further investigation of McGee
and his eventual arrest.512  At trial, McGee pleaded no contest to
drug charges in order to preserve his right to appeal the superior
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.513  On appeal, the
court of appeals held that the police must have reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity before they can temporarily detain a pack-
age for the purpose of subjecting it to the Itemiser.514  The court of
appeals subsequently remanded the case to the superior court in
order to address the reasonable suspicion question.515
In Miller v. State,516 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s decision that Miller failed to prove that his conviction of at-
tempted second-degree sexual abuse of a minor was mitigated.517
Miller pled no contest to a reduced charge of attempted second-
degree sexual abuse of a minor.518  During sentencing, he argued
that his sentence should be mitigated because his conduct was
among the least serious within the offense, but the superior court
ruled that Miller failed to prove this by clear and convincing evi-
dence.519  On appeal, Miller first argued that he engaged in only
minimal misconduct.520  However, the supreme court found that
under the offense of attempted sexual contact, even minimal
touching fell within the offense’s core definition.521  Second, Miller
507. Id. at 406.
508. Id.
509. 51 P.3d 970 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
510. Id. at 970.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 971.
515. Id.
516. 44 P.3d 157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
517. Id. at 160.
518. Id. at 158.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id.
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argued that his conduct was factually closer to attempted third-
degree sexual assault, so therefore, his conduct was among the least
serious of attempted second-degree sexual abuse.522  The supreme
court rejected this argument because of the differences between
the actus reus of sexual assault and the actus reus of sexual abuse
of a minor.523  The court found that Miller’s belief that the victim
was asleep only led to the possibility of his committing the addi-
tional crime of attempted third-degree sexual assault (a charge de-
signed for “insensible” victims) and did not mitigate the crime of
attempted second-degree sexual assault of a minor.524  Accordingly,
the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that Miller
did not prove the mitigating factor.525
In Morgan v. State,526 the court of appeals clarified the condi-
tions under which a defendant charged with sexual assault can pre-
sent evidence of prior false accusations by the accuser.527  Frederick
Morgan, Jr., was charged with engaging in sexual penetration with
a woman while she was intoxicated so as to be incapacitated or un-
aware that a sex act was occurring.528  The trial judge, relying on
Covington v. State,529 denied Morgan’s request to be allowed to pre-
sent testimony that the woman had previously accused men of sex-
ual assault only to admit later that these accusations were false.530
Clarifying Covington, the court held that (1) if a defendant proves
that a complaining witness has made prior false accusations of sex-
ual assault, the defendant can both cross-examine the witness and
present extrinsic evidence on this point,531 and (2) the defendant
need not show that the prior accusations had been adjudicated
false by a court, but rather can rely on normal evidentiary methods
to prove the prior false accusations by a preponderance of the evi-
dence to the judge at a foundational hearing.532  The court then re-
manded the case to the superior court so that the foundational
hearing could be held.533
522. Id.
523. Id. at 158-59.
524. Id. at 159.
525. Id. at 160.
526. 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
527. Id. at 336-39.
528. Id. at 333-34.
529. 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
530. Morgan, 54 P.3d at 334.
531. Id. at 336.
532. Id. at 334, 338-39.
533. Id. at 340.
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In Murray v. State,534 the court of appeals ruled that the physi-
cal proximity between a firearm and drugs is not evidence alone of
a nexus sufficient to find second-degree weapons misconduct.535
Murray was convicted of second-degree weapons misconduct after
police found a gun in his bedroom and drugs in his living room.536
Vacating Murray’s conviction, the court held that the required
nexus between gun possession and a drug offense is that the fire-
arm must aid, advance, or further the commission of the drug of-
fense.537
In Ostlund v. State,538 the court of appeals held that the trial
court’s decision not to bifurcate defendant’s trial for driving while
intoxicated (DWI) was an abuse of discretion.539  William Ostlund
was charged with felony DWI for driving while intoxicated while
having two prior DWI convictions within the past year.540  Before
the trial, Ostlund argued that evidence of his prior convictions
would be prejudicial and agreed to stipulate to the prior convic-
tions for sentencing purposes if convicted.541  The trial court denied
Ostlund’s request and instructed the jury regarding the prior con-
victions.542  The jury convicted Ostlund.543  On appeal, Ostlund ar-
gued that the trial court erred in refusing to let the jury first decide
on Ostlund’s guilt in the current offense, and then decide the issue
of his prior convictions.544  The court of appeals noted that it had
previously recommended bifurcation of DWI trials in order to
“preserve both parties’ right to a jury determination of all issues,
while at the same time avoiding potential for unfair prejudice”
against the defendant.545  Because the trial court failed to adopt the
recommended procedures, the court of appeals determined that it
abused its discretion.546  Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed
Ostlund’s conviction.547
534. 54 P.3d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
535. Id. at 824.
536. Id. at 823.
537. Id. at 824-25.
538. 51 P.3d 938 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
539. Id. at 939.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id. at 941.
545. Id. (citing Ross v. State, 950 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)).
546. Id. at 942.
547. Id. at 943.
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In Pearce v. State,548 the court of appeals held that the trial
court judge was not clearly erroneous in ruling that the defendant
had no subjective expectation of privacy with respect to his hand-
written suicide note.549  Pearce attempted to abduct a woman as she
rollerbladed down the highway.550  During the investigation of the
crime, the police obtained a search warrant for Pearce’s boat to
search for guns and related accoutrements.551  During the search,
the police lifted a duffel bag off a table and saw a suicide note that
Pearce had written, which first addressed Pearce’s family and then
went on to ask whomever found the note to contact his family.552
Before the trial, Pearce asked the superior court to suppress the
note because it was not included in the search warrant.553  The su-
perior court concluded that Pearce had no expectation of privacy
as the note was intended to be read by third persons.554  On appeal,
the court of appeals deferred to the superior court’s findings of
fact, 555 and held that Pearce’s subjective expectation of privacy was
not reasonable.556  Pearce’s plea that the reader of the note call his
family, and the fact that he purposely left the note on the table of
his boat strongly suggested that he wanted the note read by third
parties.557
In Richardson v. State,558 the court of appeals held that felony
defendants who receive unsuspended terms of imprisonment ex-
ceeding two years can appeal any aspect of their sentences, includ-
ing the revocation of a driver’s license.559  Richardson was convicted
of murder after a drunk-driving incident in which he killed two
people and seriously injured two others.560  Richardson disobeyed a
warning from a park service employee not to drive and struck an-
other vehicle head on.561  The trial judge sentenced Richardson to
twenty-eight years of imprisonment and revoked his license for
twenty years.562  Richardson appealed the license revocation and
548. 45 P.3d 679 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
549. Id. at 684.
550. Id. at 680.
551. Id. at 681.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 682.
556. Id. at 684.
557. Id. at 683.
558. 47 P.3d 660 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
559. Id. at 664.
560. Id. at 660.
561. Id. at 661.
562. Id.
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the State contended that Richardson did not have the right to ap-
peal this aspect of his sentence because of Alaska Statutes section
12.55.120(a), which the State contended allows only an appeal of
the term-of-imprisonment aspect of a sentence.563  The court held
that the State’s interpretation of the statute would present many
difficulties, and that the legislature did not intend to make the deci-
sion of a sentence appeal so difficult.564  The court of appeals af-
firmed the license revocation as a reasonable exercise of judicial
authority in light of the seriousness of Richardson’s offense.565
In Riley v. State,566 the court of appeals affirmed Riley’s two
convictions for first-degree assault.567  Richard Riley and Edward
Portalla seriously wounded two people when they opened fire on a
crowd.568  The State was unable to determine which of the defen-
dants wounded the two people.569  The jurors found Riley guilty as
an accomplice after being instructed that “they should decide
whether Riley acted as a principal . . . or, if they could not decide
beyond a reasonable doubt which man fired the shots, they should
decide whether Riley acted as an accomplice . . . .”570  In Echols v.
State,571 however, the court of appeals had held that accomplice li-
ability was established only if the State proved that the defendant
“acted intentionally with respect to the prohibited result.”572  In
Riley, the court of appeals overturned Echols because hypotheti-
cally it would preclude a finding of manslaughter for both Riley
and Portalla as the State could not prove that either party acted as
the principal.573  Accordingly, the court provided the following new
rule: “[w]hen a defendant solicits, encourages, or assists another to
engage in conduct, and does so with the intent to promote or facili-
tate that conduct, the defendant becomes accountable under
Alaska Statutes section 11.16.110(2)574 for that conduct.”575  Thus,
563. Id. at 661-62.
564. Id. at 664.
565. Id. at 664-65.
566. 60 P.3d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
567. Id. at 223.
568. Id. at 205.
569. Id. at 206.
570. Id.
571. 818 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
572. Riley, 60 P.3d at 206.
573. Id. at 209.
574. ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110(2) (Michie 2002) (stating that “[a] person is le-
gally accountable for the conduct of another constituting an offense if with intent
to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, the person (A) solicits the
other to commit the offense; or (B) aids or abets the other in planning or commit-
ting the offense”).
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the State was required to prove that Riley “acted recklessly with
respect to the possibility that serious physical injury would be in-
flicted on another person” either through his conduct or that of
Portalla.576  The court also found that the jury instruction under the
Echols rule did not constitute plain error because Riley’s attorney
“clarified and corrected” the ambiguity in the jury instruction dur-
ing his summation.577  The court affirmed Riley’s conviction be-
cause the jury found that Riley “intended to inflict serious physical
injury” which met the “reckless” requirement of section
11.81.610(c).578  The court also affirmed Riley’s ten-year sentence
despite the fact that Portalla received a lesser sentence because
Portalla had admitted to his participation and assisted the state
troopers in the investigation.579  Additionally, the judge had deter-
mined that Riley was the leader in the action.580
In State v. District Court (In re Phillips),581 the court of appeals
held that a trial judge could not reject a plea agreement between
the State and a defendant because the judge felt “the State could
have proved a more serious charge.”582  Thomas Phillips was
charged with first-degree failure to register as a sex offender, a fel-
ony.583  The failure to register was first-degree because Phillips had
a prior conviction for failing to register.584  Nevertheless, the State
enetered into a plea agreement on second-degree failure to regis-
ter, a misdemeanor of which a prior conviction is not a compo-
nent.585  The district court rejected the plea agreement on the
grounds that the legislature had determined that the defendant’s
conduct constituted a felony, not a misdemeanor.586  Reversing, the
court of appeals held that the executive branch has the authority to
exercise its discretion in determining what criminal charges will be
levied against a defendant as long as such discretion is “exercised
within constitutional bounds.”587  Additionally, the executive
branch has the discretion to reduce charges to lesser offenses.588
575. Riley, 60 P.3d at 207.
576. Id.
577. Id. at 208.
578. Id. at 221.
579. Id. at 222.
580. Id.
581. 53 P.3d 629 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
582. Id. at 634.
583. Id. at 630.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 631.
588. Id. at 634.
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Therefore, the court held that the trial judge had no authority to
reject the plea on this basis.589
In State v. Felix,590 the court of appeals held that Criminal Rule
35(a)591 which allows judges to grant “periodic imprisonment” does
not permit judges to grant furloughs, which are solely within the
authority of the executive branch.592  Felix was granted two short
releases by the trial court as well as a release from custody so she
could serve the rest of her sentence in a treatment facility.593  Two
other prisoners, Fain and Buchanan, were granted short-term re-
leases from the trial court so that they could attend to personal
matters.594  On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the leg-
islature intended Criminal Rule 35(b) to deprive courts of ongoing
authority to monitor Department of Corrections treatment and
placement decisions throughout a defendant’s term of imprison-
ment.595  The court of appeals therefore held that a judge’s modifi-
cation of a sentence is proper if premised on codified sentencing
goals, rather than a defendant’s short-term needs.596  The court of
appeals reasoned that once a defendant has been sentenced and
committed to the custody of the executive branch, the executive
branch assumes primary responsibility for the custody and care of
the defendant.597  The court of appeals concluded that the trial
court exceeded its authority in all three instances.598  Therefore, the
court of appeals reversed the sentence modifications ordered by all
three trial courts.599
In State v. Hawkins,600 the court of appeals held that the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA)601 imposes a continuing
obligation to register upon certain sex offenders physically present
within the State, that Hawkins was under a duty to so register, and
that the imposition of criminal sanctions for failure to comply
would not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause.602  After being
charged with failure to register as a sex offender, Hawkins moved
589. Id.
590. 50 P.3d 807 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
591. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
592. Felix, 50 P.3d at 816.
593. Id. at 809-10.
594. Id. at 809.
595. Id. at 814.
596. Id. at 816.
597. Id. at 815.
598. Id. at 818.
599. Id.
600. 39 P.3d 1126 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
601. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010-.100 (Michie 2002).
602. Hawkins, 39 P.3d at 1128-29 (citing U.S. Const., art. 1, § 10).
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to dismiss asserting that ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.603  The magistrate judge agreed and granted the motion.604
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, except as to the con-
clusion that Hawkins had a duty to register under ASORA.605  First,
the court of appeals found that the magistrate’s interpretation was
based on ASORA as it was originally enacted, not as it had been
amended.606  Second, the court concluded that the magistrate’s nar-
row interpretation defeated the legislative intent to ensure compli-
ance by imposing criminal penalties on certain sex offenders failing
to register in order.607
In State v. Judson,608 the court of appeals ruled that Judson was
entitled to “Nygren credit”609 for time spent in court-ordered treat-
ment even though Judson himself had requested the treatment.610
Judson pled guilty to driving while intoxicated and asked the court
to order him to a residential treatment facility as a condition of his
release.611  Judson subsequently received twenty-one days of credit
to his sentence for the time spent at the facility.612  The court ruled
that such credit was properly applied because the facility subjected
Judson to jail-like conditions and Judson was under court order to
undergo the treatment and therefore could not leave.613  In addi-
tion, the court affirmed that the time spent in the facility could be
used to satisfy the minimum jail time requirements of the DWI
statute, as it imposed both inpatient treatment and confinement
beyond the twenty-day statutory minimum if circumstances re-
603. Id. at 1128.
604. Id.  The magistrate concluded that failing to register was not a continuing
offense under ASORA and that although Hawkins had a duty to register, he could
not be punished for failing to register by July 1, 1994, consistent with the federal
Ex Post Facto Clause.  Id.  The court of appeals observed that the magistrate
premised his decision on the conclusion that the Department of Public Safety had
exceeded its authority in passing a regulation extending, for certain sex offenders,
the deadline for initial registration.  Id.
605. Id. 1129-30.
606. Id. at 1128.
607. Id. at 1128-29.  The court concluded that since ASORA had been
amended to extend the registration deadline for certain sex offenders to January
31, 1996, and because Hawkins was charged with failure to register on January 28,
1998, there was no Ex Post Facto violation.  Id.
608. 45 P.3d 329 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
609. See Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 146 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
610. Judson, 45 P.3d at 333.
611. Id. at 330.
612. Id. at 331.
613. Id. at 332.
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quired.614  Lastly, the court ruled that Alaska’s bail release statute615
is aimed at preventing needless detention, and thus does not man-
date that courts consider flight risk and potential danger of the de-
fendant “before imposing a rehabilitative condition that the defen-
dant requests.”616
In State v. Malloy,617 the supreme court held that Alaska Stat-
ute section 12.55.125(a)(3),618 which requires, under a clear and
convincing evidence standard, that a defendant be sentenced to
ninety-nine years without eligibility for parole for first-degree
murder if the defendant was found to have substantially physically
tortured the murder victim, was not unconstitutional.619  The State
gave notice of intent to seek such sentencing under section
12.55.125(a)(3) after Malloy was convicted by a jury of first-degree
murder, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence.620  Malloy chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that the
State had not been required to prove the aggravating element of
torture beyond a reasonable doubt and torture was not an element
of the offense.621  The superior court rejected Malloy’s claim and
stated that Malloy would have been sentenced to the maximum
term even without the mandatory statutory requirement.622  Under
section 12.55.115,623 judges have “authority to deny eligibility for
discretionary parole regardless of whether the court finds one of
the aggravating circumstances that trigger a mandatory maximum
term under [section] 12.55.125(a)(1)-(3).”624  The court of appeals
vacated the sentencing requirement denying parole eligibility be-
cause the court found section 12.55.125(a) to be unconstitutional.625
Relying on Donlun v. State,626 the court of appeals found that Mal-
loy had not been charged or convicted for the substantial physical
torture claim and as such was being subject to “a new, harsher pen-
alty” than the usual “maximum” penalty, which was defined as a
ninety-nine year prison term, regardless of parole eligibility.627
614. Id. at 333.
615. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (Michie 2002).
616. Judson, 45 P.3d at 334.
617. 46 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2002).
618. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a)(3) (Michie 2002).
619. Malloy, 46 P.3d at 950.
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.115 (Michie 2002).
624. Id. at 951.
625. Id.
626. 527 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1974).
627. Malloy, 46 P.3d at 953.
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Since the court of appeals decision, the U.S. Supreme Court had
addressed this issue in Apprendi v. New Jersey628 and held that, un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to increase a sentence
beyond the maximum statutory requirement, the aggravating factor
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and given to the jury.629
The supreme court noted that Apprendi validated the court of ap-
peals’ view that Donlun is grounded on constitutional principles.630
However, the supreme court found that Donlun was incorrectly
applied to Malloy.  The court held that because the sentencing
judge had the discretion to sentence Malloy to ninety-nine years
without eligibility for parole without the torture finding, sentencing
Malloy to the same sentence with the substantial physical torture
finding did not exceed the maximum sentence.631  The court held
that under both Donlun and Apprendi, a sentence must fall “out-
side the outer limits of the range of sentences that the court could
otherwise impose” to exceed the maximum sentence.632  The court
also rejected Malloy’s claim that the aggravating factor must be
charged as an element of the offense and given to the jury as hav-
ing no basis in the Alaska Constitution and contradicting Donlun.633
Under Donlun, when the sentence with the aggravating factor is
within the maximum sentence for the original crime, then the ag-
gravating factor does not need to be included in the charge.634  Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals decision was vacated and the case
was remanded to the superior court for resentencing.635
In State v. Prince,636 the court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s dismissal of Prince’s indictment and remanded the case for
further proceedings.637  Police found two men asleep or passed out
in a boat that was partially beached on land within the municipality
of St. Mary’s and partially in the Andreafsky River.  The officers
found over 100 bottles of alcohol in the boat.638  Prince and a co-
defendant were charged for importing and intending to sell alcohol
in a municipality that had banned alcoholic beverages within the
628. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
629. Malloy, 46 P.3d at 953 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
630. Id. at 954.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 955.
633. Id. at 956-57.
634. Id. at 957.
635. Id.
636. 53 P.3d 157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
637. Id. at 165.
638. Id. at 159.
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community pursuant to state law.639  The superior court dismissed
the indictment, finding that the municipality did not have jurisdic-
tion over the land where the boat was found because the land was
owned by the State.640  The court of appeals reversed, holding that
because the State had not limited municipal authority to enforce
ordinances on state-owned land, the land could be subject to mu-
nicipal authority.641  Further, the court held that the municipal ban
in question did not conflict with state law, so it could be enforced
by state law.642  Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was
reversed.643
In Tuttle v. State,644 the court of appeals held: (1) that the de-
fendant’s possession of a firearm in a robbery is not an element of
the offense to be proved to the jury at trial, but is rather a factor to
be proven to the court at sentencing; (2) that the judge was entitled
to rely on out-of-court statements made by co-defendants because
the defendant did not offer testimonial denial of the State’s asser-
tion that he possessed a firearm; and (3) that the State is obliged to
prove the fact of the defendant’s possession of a firearm beyond a
reasonable doubt.645  Under Malloy v. State,646 the court ruled that
although “any factor which increases the maximum punishment for
an offense is an element of the offense that must be proved [sic] to
a jury[,] . . . this rule does not apply to the factors that trigger the
various presumptive terms specified in Alaska Statutes section
12.55.125.”647  Then, following the Court of Appeals of Maryland’s
decision in Boyd v. State,648 the court ruled that the judge can prop-
erly rely on the content of co-defendants’ out-of-court statements,
but he must decide each case on its own merits; he cannot rely on
personal knowledge of matters outside the judicial record.649  The
question remained open whether the judge in this case violated this
rule when he relied on a co-defendant’s demeanor from a different
trial to resolve an evidentiary dispute at Tuttle’s sentencing hear-
639. Id. at 158.
640. Id. at 161.
641. Id. at 162-63.
642. Id. at 164.
643. Id. at 165.
644. No. A-8077, No. 1801, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 90, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 3, 2002).
645. Id. at *10-*11.
646. 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
647. Tuttle, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 90, at *9.
648. 581 A.2d 1 (Md. 1990).
649. Tuttle, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 90, at *6.
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ing.650  The court declined to resolve this issue of law because it va-
cated the judge’s ruling for failing to apply the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard when determining the factual issue of
whether Tuttle possessed a firearm.651  For these reasons, the court
vacated the judge’s ruling and remanded the case to determine
whether Tuttle possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt
and, if so, to re-sentence Tuttle using a seven-year presumptive
term as the starting point.652
In Wassilie v. State,653 the court of appeals held that where a
witness claims not to remember the substance of a prior statement
at trial, the witness’ trial testimony is considered inconsistent with
the prior statement for purposes of Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A),
regardless of whether the claimed memory loss is genuine or
feigned, as the lack of memory at trial is inconsistent with the wit-
ness’ earlier claim to remember.654  One of the victims of the al-
leged assault could not remember key details about the assault, de-
tails which he had previously testified about.655  First, the court
ruled that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted a witness’ prior inconsistent statement without meeting
the full foundational requirements of McMaster v. State.656  Ulti-
mately, following Richards v. State,657 Van Hatten v. State,658 and
several federal cases, the court ruled that regardless of whether
memory loss is feigned or genuine, it is nevertheless inconsistent
with a prior statement of remembrance.659  Therefore, the court af-
firmed the judgment of the superior court.660
In Wright v. State,661 the court of appeals held that the tardiness
of a peremptory challenge may not be excused where, once the de-
fendant has counsel, the defendant and counsel fail to diligently
pursue the potential peremptory challenge.662  After being arrested
for DWI and refusing to submit to a breath test, Wright was ar-
raigned and his case was assigned to a trial judge.663  Three months
650. Id. at *7.
651. Id. at *8-9.
652. Id. at *11.
653. 57 P.3d 719 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
654. Id.
655. Id. at 720-21.
656. Id. at 722; see 512 P.2d 879 (Alaska 1973).
657. 616 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1980).
658. 666 P.2d 1047 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
659. Wassilie, 57 P.3d at 722-23.
660. Id. at 723.
661. 38 P.3d 545 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
662. Id. at 547.
663. Id. at 546
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after the arraignment, Wright’s attorney filed a peremptory chal-
lenge of the assigned trial judge.664  The trial judge ruled that the
challenge was untimely.665  While the court of appeals recognized
that Riley v. State666 excuses tardy peremptory challenges where the
defendant has not had a chance to consult with counsel, it con-
cluded that the defendant did not qualify for the exception.667  The
record showed that Wright had received notice of the trial judge
assigned to his case nearly two months prior to contacting his law-
yer and that the lawyer had filed an entry of appearance on August
8, 2001.668  Nevertheless, Wright argued that his lawyer did not be-
come aware of the trial judge’s assignment until August 30, 2001,
and that, therefore, the five-day filing clock should have been
deemed to have begun on that date.669  The appellate court rejected
this argument as a basis upon which to excuse the tardy peremp-
tory challenge, noting that either Wright did not tell his lawyer
about the trial judge assignment or that the attorney failed to ask.670
In either case, neither Wright nor his attorney acted diligently, a
circumstance which Riley does not excuse.671
VII.  EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Labor Law
In Barnica v. Kenai Peninsula Borough School District,672 the
supreme court held that Barnica was not entitled to a judicial rem-
edy because his claim was subject to an agreement to arbitrate.673
The dispute began when Barnica resigned from his position as a
custodian for the school district in August 1995; he sued the district
eight months later pursuant to the Human Rights Act, Alaska
Statutes section 18.80.220,674 alleging sex discrimination.675  The
school district requested summary judgment, claiming that Barnica
had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies that were con-
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. 608 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1980).
667. Wright, 38 P.3d at 546-47.
668. Id. at 546.
669. Id.  If the clock were deemed to begin running on August 30, 2001, then
the filing of the challenge on September 7, 2001, would have been timely.  Id.
670. Id. at 547.
671. Id.
672. 46 P.3d 974 (Alaska 2002).
673. Id. at 977.
674. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2002).
675. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 975.
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tained in his collective bargaining agreement.676  The superior court
granted summary judgment in favor of the district.677  The supreme
court affirmed.678  First, the court found that by enacting the Public
Employment Relations Act,679 the Alaska legislature had specifi-
cally provided for certain grievance procedures to be followed with
arbitration as the final step.680  Next, the court found that both
common law and state statutes suggest a “strong public policy in
favor of arbitration” and “support[] giving primacy to contractual
grievance/arbitration clauses.”681  Furthermore, the court found that
nothing in the Human Rights Act682 prohibits the waiver of judicial
remedies.683  The court also compared state law with federal law to
provide history and context to the issue and concluded that the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.684 “more accurately reflects Alaska policy
favoring arbitration” than its decision in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.685  Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the sum-
mary judgment.686
In DeSalvo v. Bryant,687 the supreme court held that claims im-
plicating the Alaska Wage and Hour Act688 (AWHA) are precluded
from private settlement.689  In 1997, a year after being hired, five
mining operation employees sued their employers claiming dam-
ages for, among other things, failure to pay overtime.690  Two years
later, the employees, without notifying their attorney, entered into
a settlement agreement claiming to release all involved from any
liability arising from employment at the mine.691  The superior court
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 977.
679. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210(a) (Michie 2002).
680. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 977-78.
681. Id.
682. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2002).
683. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 978.
684. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (establishing a rule that unless Congress showed an in-
tent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, then agreements to arbitrate would
supercede statutory judicial remedies).
685. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that an employee was not barred from bring-
ing a discrimination suit under the Civil Rights Act after an unfavorable arbitra-
tion decision); Barnica, 46 P.3d at 980.
686. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 981.
687. 42 P.3d 525 (Alaska 2002).
688. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.10.050-.150 (Michie 2002).
689. DeSalvo, 46 P.3d at 526.
690. Id. at 527.
691. Id.
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later dismissed the action with prejudice while simultaneously de-
nying the plaintiffs’ attorney’s request for fees.692  The attorney ap-
pealed the judgment and the denial of fees.693  Reviewing for abuse
of discretion, the supreme court remanded.694  First, it concluded
that, because the legislature required court supervision in cases in-
volving overtime claims made under AWHA, the trial court was
required to make factual findings regarding whether, under the
facts, the AWHA applied.695  Second, it held that even if the
AWHA did not apply, the superior court should nevertheless have
deployed the catalyst approach696 in order to determine whether,
under that theory, plaintiffs’ attorney was entitled to fees.697
In Fairbanks Fire Association, Local 1324 v. Fairbanks,698 the
supreme court, after determining that it could consider the merits
of the moot dispute under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine, found that the Alaska Labor Relations Agency
(ALRA) had jurisdiction to determine if an issue is subject to arbi-
tration.699  The union filed grievances against the city on behalf of
two ex-firefighters, claiming that the city “improperly refused to
rehire [the men] for positions that were open in the fire depart-
ment.”700  The trial court found that the ALRA did not have juris-
diction to hear the case.701  The union appealed.702  Because only the
reasoning behind the trial court decision was being challenged and
the relief requested by the appealing party had already been
granted by the trial court, the supreme court held that the appeal
was moot.703  However, the court found the appeal met the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine: “[T]he issue [was]
likely to repeat itself,”704 “the issue [would] continually evade court
review,”705 and “the issues [were] sufficiently important to the pub-
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id. at 528.
695. Id. at 528-29.
696. The catalyst approach is a two step inquiry requiring a plaintiff to show a
causal connection between the filing of the suit and defendant’s action and that
the defendant’s action was required by law.  Id. at 530.
697. Id. at 530-31 (stating that if a plaintiff prevails under the catalyst theory,
the court should award attorneys fees under ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(2)).
698. 48 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2002).
699. Id. at 1170.
700. Id. at 1166.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Id. at 1167-68.
704. Id. at 1168.
705. Id. at 1168-69.
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lic interest to merit consideration.”706  The supreme court held that
Alaska Statutes section 23.40.210(a)707 gave the ALRA the power
to decide if an issue was arbitrable.708 The agency was subject to
much greater review of its jurisdiction decisions and therefore had
greater power than individual arbitrators in determining when is-
sues are subject to arbitration.709  Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the holding of the trial court.710
In Nunez v American Seafoods,711 the supreme court held that
an employment contract forum selection clause was invalid because
it denied Nunez his right, as provided by the Jones Act,712 to sue in
any eligible forum.713  Nunez was employed by American Seafoods
on a fishing boat.714  He severely injured himself as a result of a fall
on the job and brought suit against his employer alleging admiralty
jurisdiction under the federal saving to suitors clause715 and the
Jones Act.716  American Seafoods moved to dismiss on the basis of
a forum selection clause in Nunez’s contract.717  The superior court
upheld American Seafoods’s motion and dismissed the claim.718
Reviewing the validity of the forum selection clause and the deci-
sion to dismiss de novo, the supreme court reversed.719  First, the
supreme court drew a distinction between general maritime law, on
one hand, and the saving to suitors clause and the Jones Act on the
other.720  Only in general maritime law is there a strong presump-
tion in favor of the validity of forum selection clauses.721  The Jones
Act and the saving to suitors clause modify the general maritime
law, conferring distinct rights upon injured seamen.722  After ex-
amining the history of the Jones Act, the supreme court concluded
that under its provisions Congress intended to restrict an em-
ployer’s ability to contractually limit a worker’s substantive
706. Id. at 1169.
707. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210(a) (Michie 2002).
708. Fairbanks Fire Association, 48 P.3d. at 1169-70.
709. Id. at 1170.
710. Id.
711. 52 P.3d 720 (Alaska 2002).
712. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000).
713. Nunez, 52 P.3d at 721.
714. Id.
715. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).
716. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (2000).
717. Nunez, 52 P.3d at 721.
718. Id.
719. Id. at 721, 724.
720. Id. at 721-22.
721. Id. at 721.
722. Id. at 722.
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rights.723  Accordingly, the supreme court held that the forum selec-
tion clause violated Nunez’s rights and reversed the lower court.724
B. Workers’ Compensation
In a per curiam opinion in Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,725
the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s affirmation of the
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board for the reasons contained in
the superior court’s opinion.726  Brock Bauder injured his back
while working for Alaska Airlines in 1993.727  He filed a workers’
compensation claim that was eventually reduced by the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Board and controverted by Alaska Air-
lines.728  Bauder subsequently filed suit in superior court, claiming
that he was entitled to increased benefits, penalties, and attorney’s
fees; he also alleged that Alaska Airlines’ controversion of his
workers’ compensation claim was frivolous or unfair.729  The supe-
rior court affirmed the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation
Board, holding that the Board’s conclusions (reducing Bauder’s
benefits, denying penalties and attorney’s fees, and finding that the
controversion was not frivolous or unfair) were supported by sub-
stantial evidence.730
In Bustamante v. Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board,731 the
supreme court held that a trial court has discretion to waive costs
associated with the preparation of transcriptions on an administra-
tive appeal.732  Bustamante filed a complaint with the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Board claiming that he was injured while
working at Space Mark.733  The Board held that Bustamante did not
suffer a compensable injury in the course and scope of his employ-
ment.734  Bustamante appealed the decision to the superior court
and requested a court-appointed attorney.735  The trial court re-
fused his request for an attorney and eventually dismissed Bus-
tamante’s claim because he failed to pay for the preparation of the
723. See id. at 723.
724. Id. at 724.
725. 53 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002).
726. Id. at 168.
727. Id. at 169.
728. Id. at 171-73.
729. Id. at 173-74.
730. Id. at 180-82.
731. 59 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2002).
732. Id. at 272-73.
733. Id. at 271.
734. Id.
735. Id. at 272.
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transcripts from the compensation board hearings.736  Bustamante
appealed and the supreme court held that the trial court erred be-
cause it did have discretion to waive the costs of preparing a tran-
script on administrative appeals as “financial hardship should not
preclude access to the courts.”737  However, the court held that Bus-
tamante was not entitled to a court-appointed attorney because
“the private interest of a litigant to have counsel in a worker’s
compensation case is not nearly as strong as the interest in cases
where litigants are already afforded appointed counsel.”738  Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s denial of
Bustamante’s request for appointed counsel, reversed the order of
dismissal, and remanded the case for the trial court to “exercise its
discretion regarding the preparation of a transcript.”739
In Dougan v. Aurora Electric Inc.,740 the supreme court af-
firmed the superior court’s finding that the Alaska Worker’s Com-
pensation Board properly denied penalties and interest on com-
pensation payments to Randy Dougan.741  Dougan injured his lower
back while working as an electrician for Aurora Electric.742  Dou-
gan saw multiple doctors, was placed on disability, and received
pay from Aurora.743  Dougan filed a petition to the Alaska Work-
ers’ Compensation Board alleging misconduct in handling his
claims.744  After adverse rulings at the board level and on appeal in
superior court, Dougan appealed to the supreme court.745  The su-
preme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling about the penal-
ties and interest, finding that Aurora controverted the claims in
good faith and that Dougan was not entitled to penalties or inter-
est.746  The supreme court also found that although the superior
court erred in dismissing thirteen of his fifteen claims, eleven of the
claims were without merit.747  Thus, the supreme court remanded
the remaining two claims to the superior court for factual determi-
nation.748 Finally, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s
736. Id.
737. Id. at 273.
738. Id. at 274.
739. Id. at 275.
740. 50 P.3d 789 (Alaska 2002).
741. Id. at 794.
742. Id. at 791.
743. Id. at 791-92.
744. Id. at 792.
745. Id. at 793.
746. Id. at 794-95.
747. Id. at 795.
748. Id. at 791.
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remand of the compensation rate adjustment and held that the
Gilmore test is no longer necessary when the Board’s initial deter-
mination of compensation is based on the amended version of
Alaska Statutes section 23.20.220.749
In Gaede v. Saunders,750 the supreme court held that private
common law employees may not recover under the Worker’s
Compensation Act751 because such employees are not employed
“‘in connection with a business or industry.’”752  The supreme court
affirmed the Worker’s Compensation Board’s denial of Gaede’s
claim for worker’s compensation benefits, because Gaede was
merely hired by the Saunders to build an addition to their home
when he fell off the ladder and was injured.753  The supreme court
ruled that the Worker’s Compensation Act754 entitles employees to
recover benefits in the event of work-related disability or death
only where the employer is “the state or its political subdivision or
a person employing one or more persons in connection with a busi-
ness or industry.”755  Following the court’s earlier decisions in Kroll
v. Reeser756 and Nickels v. Napolilli,757 the court further ruled that
the Saunders’ building project was not “a business or industry” be-
cause it was not a profit-making enterprise “with a view toward
producing goods,”758 but instead was merely intended for their per-
sonal consumption.  Thus the Saunders were not employers, and
Gaede was not an employee entitled to recovery under the Act.759
In Justice v. RMH Aero Logging, Inc.,760 the supreme court
held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly ad-
justed an employee’s compensation rate after he applied for a ret-
roactive adjustment.761  Dan Justice began working at RMH Aero
Logging, Inc. (“RMH”) in February 1993.762  On June 3, 1993, Jus-
tice injured his foot while on the job and—because the injury did
not heal—was unable to work after June 30.763  Following the in-
749. Id. at 797; ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.220 (Michie 2002).
750. 53 P.3d 1126 (Alaska 2002).
751. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395 (Michie 2002).
752. Gaede, 53 P.3d at 1127 (quoting § 23.30.395(13)).
753. Id. at 1126.
754. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395 (Michie 2002).
755. Gaede, 53 P.3d at 1127 (quoting § 23.30.395(13)).
756. 655 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1982).
757. 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).
758. Gaede, 53 P.3d at 1127.
759. Id.
760. 42 P.3d 549 (Alaska 2002).
761. Id. at 551.
762. Id.
763. Id.
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jury, Justice received temporary total disability (TTD) payments764
from July 10, 1993, until August 9, 1994, at which point he reached
“medical stability” and began receiving only payments for his per-
manent partial impairment (PPI).765  On October 13, 1997, Justice
was injured again after his injured foot spasmed while he was
working on the roof of his house and caused him to fall.766  RHM
responded by reinstating his TTD benefits, effective September 1,
1997.767  In December 1997, Justice filed a workers’ compensation
claim with the Workers’ Compensation Board.768  He amended the
complaint in May 1998 to seek a retroactive adjustment of the
original TTD payments, claiming that the calculation of his pay-
ment was incorrect because his income in 1992 was “aberrationally
low and did not accurately predict his future lost wages.”769  The
Compensation Board granted the adjustment, based on Gilmore v.
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board,770 and RMH appealed to
the superior court which affirmed the Compensation Board’s ret-
roactive adjustment.771  In reviewing the decision of the Compensa-
tion Board,772 the supreme court analyzed the application of Gil-
more to Justice’s claim.773  First, the court applied the four Byayuk774
factors to decide whether the Gilmore decision should apply to Jus-
tice’s claim since Gilmore was decided after Justice’s original in-
jury.775  The court concluded that Gilmore did apply to claims like
764. The payment amount was $153 per week which was calculated based on
Justice’s gross income from the two previous years; his tax returns indicated that
he made $16,589 in 1992 and $4,305 in 1991.  Id.
765. Id.
766. Id. at 552.
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. 882 P.2d 992 (Alaska 1994) (holding that former Alaska Statutes section
23.30.220(a) violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution as it was
applied to Gilmore).
771. Justice, 42 P.3d at 552.
772. Id. (“[The supreme court] independently review[s] the merits of an agency
determination when a superior court acts as an intermediate court of appeal.”)
773. Id.
774. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Byayuk, 684 P.2d 114 (Alaska
1984).  The four factors are: (1) whether the holding either overrules prior law or
decides an issue of first impression; (2) whether the purpose and intended effect of
the new rule of law is best accomplished by a retroactive or prospective applica-
tion; (3) the extent of reasonable reliance upon the old rule of law; and (4) the ef-
fect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule of
law.  Justice, 42 P.3d at 554.
775. Justice, 42 P.3d at 554.
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Justice’s so long as the claim was “open to adjudication” and the
issue had been preserved for appeal.776  As to Justice’s claim, the
court held that the claim was open for adjudication because RMH
waived its statute of limitations defense since it had received notice
of the claim but failed to object at the initial hearing.777  Finally, the
court found the Compensation Board properly granted the rate
adjustment because it focused its inquiry on whether Justice’s past
earnings were an “accurate predictor of his future lost earnings”
and had substantial evidence to support its determination that Jus-
tice’s past employment history was not an accurate predictor.778
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the portion of the supe-
rior court decision that affirmed the Compensation Board’s deci-
sion and reversed and remanded—with instructions to affirm—the
portions which did not affirm the Compensation Board.779
In Robertson v. American Mechanical, Inc.,780 the supreme
court held that Robertson’s amended workers’ compensation claim
was unlawful claim-splitting barred by the doctrine of res judi-
cata.781  The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board dismissed Rob-
ertson’s initial report of occupational injury based upon his lower
back condition.782  Robertson then filed an amended report of oc-
cupational injury that was functionally identical to his first report
but signified an earlier injury date.783  The Board dismissed this
claim on the basis of res judicata.784  The supreme court affirmed,
finding Robertson’s amended claim was based upon the same in-
jury and the same “core set of facts” as his initial claim, and thus
both claims should have been brought at the same time.785
In Williams v. Abood,786 the supreme court affirmed the Work-
ers’ Compensation Board’s disposition of a workers’ compensation
claim.787  The plaintiff injured his knee while working for the defen-
dant.788  He received workers’ compensation and medical benefits
during his treatment and recovery.789  He later developed an addic-
776. Id. at 556.
777. Id. at 557.
778. Id. at 557-58.
779. Id. at 558.
780. 54 P.3d 777 (Alaska 2002).
781. Id. at 780.
782. Id. at 778.
783. Id.
784. Id.
785. Id. at 780.
786. 53 F.3d 134 (Alaska 2002).
787. Id. at 136.
788. Id.
789. Id. at 136-37.
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tion to painkillers and various psychological problems following his
procedure.790  He eventually brought a variety of claims against the
defendant and reached a compromise and release of virtually all of
his workers’ compensation claims originating prior to July 1,
1997.791  However, in 1998, the plaintiff sued again and requested a
number of additional workers’ compensation benefits.792  The
Workers’ Compensation Board denied most of the plaintiff’s
claims.793  The Board also severely limited the plaintiff’s request for
attorney’s fees for both his new attorney and his previous attor-
ney.794  The previous attorney submitted an affidavit regarding his
services to the plaintiff and had attempted to supplement his initial
affidavit with oral testimony and two late-filed, supplemental affi-
davits.795  The Board refused to consider the late-filed affidavits and
awarded the statutory minimum for the attorney’s services.796  The
plaintiff subsequently appealed to the supreme court, which af-
firmed the Board in all respects.797  Specifically, the supreme court
held that a majority of the plaintiff’s claims were disposed of by the
compromise and release, that the compromise and release was
valid, that the plaintiff was not entitled to any penalties or claims
for unfair or frivolous controversion of benefits against the defen-
dant, that there was no misconduct by the Board’s panel during the
hearing, and that the Board’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for re-
consideration was valid.798  Additionally, the supreme court re-
versed the superior court and held that the Board had the right to
punish the prior attorney for late filing and thus to exclude the late-
filed affidavits.799  Finally, the supreme court held that the plaintiff’s
new attorney was entitled to only one-half of his fees in recognition
of the fact that most of the plaintiff’s claims were denied.800
In Wollaston v. Schroeder Cutting, Inc.,801 the supreme court
overturned a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Board that
there was substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of
790. Id. at 137.
791. Id.
792. Id. at 138.
793. Id.
794. Id.
795. Id.
796. Id.
797. Id. at 136, 139.
798. Id. at 139-48.
799. Id. at 140.
800. Id. at 148.
801. 42 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2002).
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compensability for a logger’s ankle injury.802  Plaintiff Wollaston
was working as a logger for defendant Schroeder Cutting, Inc.,
when he injured his ankle after stepping in a hole.803  Wollaston was
diagnosed with a mild ankle sprain that would need seven to ten
days to heal.804  Over six months later, Wollaston obtained a second
opinion that he was still unable to work and had suffered a perma-
nent partial impairment of four percent.805  A year before the in-
jury, Wollaston had injured that same ankle while playing basket-
ball, and co-workers had noticed that he subsequently walked with
a limp.806  In a workers’ compensation action brought by Wollaston,
the Board, relying on the original diagnosis, found that for the ten
day period immediately following the injury there was substantial
evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability.807  On
appeal, the supreme court noted that the statutory presumption of
compensability808 may be rebutted by presenting a qualified expert
who testifies that, in his opinion, the claimant’s work was probably
not a substantial cause of the disability.809  The court held that the
testimony of the original diagnosis did not satisfy this burden be-
cause it did not (1) exclude the work-related injury as a cause of
Wollaston’s continuing problems, (2) directly eliminate the possi-
bility that the work-related injury had consequences beyond the
ten days following the injury, and (3) contain the doctor’s opinion
that Wollaston’s disability was probably not substantially attribut-
able to the work-related injury.810
C. Miscellaneous
In Charles v. Interior Regional Housing Authority,811 the su-
preme court reversed the trial court in holding that the plaintiff had
alleged sufficient facts to survive defendant’s summary judgment
motion.812  Charles, after resigning from Interior Regional Housing
Authority, sued for constructive discharge and breach of the im-
802. Id. at 1066, 1068-69.
803. Id. at 1065.
804. Id.
805. Id.
806. Id. at 1066.
807. Id.
808. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120(a) (Michie 2002).
809. Wollaston, 42 P.3d at 1067 (citing Big K Grocery v. Gibson, 836 P.2d 941,
942 (Alaska 1992)).
810. Id. at 1067-68.
811. 55 P.3d 57 (Alaska 2002).
812. Id. at 63.
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plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.813  Charles claimed he
was threatened by a co-worker, was subjected to unwarranted criti-
cism, had responsibilities reassigned, was excluded from meetings,
had his travel plans canceled, and was falsely accused of nepo-
tism.814  Charles was forced to clean out his desk six days after he
had given thirty days notice of his resignation.815  The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority,
holding that Charles had not presented sufficient evidence to cre-
ate an issue of fact as to whether to impute these actions to the
Housing Authority.816  On appeal, the supreme court held that
Charles had alleged facts sufficient to impute the harassment to the
Housing Authority.817  Charles’s allegation that his supervisor knew
or should have known about the harassment and failed to take rea-
sonable steps to prevent it raised an issue of fact as to whether
Charles was constructively discharged.818  Further, because Charles
alleged that the Housing Authority “failed to treat similarly situ-
ated employees alike” regarding the nepotism policy, the supreme
court held that there was a sufficient issue of fact as to whether the
Housing Authority breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.819
In Pitka v. Interior Regional Housing Authority,820 the supreme
court ruled that Pitka’s complaint for wrongful discharge was un-
able to withstand a motion for summary judgment.821  After the
successful resolution of her grievance, Pitka alleged that IRHA had
demoted her from a Grade 4 to a Grade 3 position, even though
she had previously been paid at the Grade 3 level.822  After the su-
perior court granted summary judgment in favor of IRHA, Pitka
appealed the decision and raised new issues of procedural impro-
priety by IRHA.823  After dismissing the new procedural issues,824
the supreme court affirmed the holding of the superior court.825  No
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was found
813. Id. at 59-60.
814. Id.
815. Id.
816. Id. at 59.
817. Id. at 63.
818. Id. at 61-62.
819. Id. at 62-63.
820. 54 P.3d 785 (Alaska 2002).
821. Id. at 790.
822. Id. at 787.
823. Id. at 788.
824. Id. at 788-89.
825. Id. at 790.
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because Pitka left on her own volition, she was not, in fact, de-
moted, and IRHA “went out of its way to accommodate Pitka.”826
The court also denied Pitka’s claims of constructive discharge,
stating that mere criticism of job performance does not create in-
tolerable working conditions, and pointing to the absence of any
campaign forcing Pitka to resign.827
VIII.  FAMILY LAW
A. Child Support
In Fernau v. Rowdon,828 the supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s calculation of income for former spouses used to determine
the proper amount of child support payments.829  First, the supreme
court held that an individual’s income calculation should not be re-
duced due to temporary changes in income.830  The supreme court
found that Fernau’s “historical ability to earn well over $100,000
annually” as a physician justified his inclusion in the highest possi-
ble income category even though his income had been reduced in
recent months due to the costs of setting up a private medical prac-
tice.831  Next, the supreme court held that Rowdon’s income should
not include alimony from Fernau.832  However, rent payments or
proceeds from the lease or sale of property she received in the di-
vorce must be included in her income for child support purposes,
even though the payments were characterized as “uncertain” or
“sporadic.”833  The supreme court also found it was proper to cal-
culate only a part-time income for Rowdon because she was cur-
rently seeking job-training.834  The supreme court also affirmed the
trial court’s decision to vary the amount of child support upward
pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(c)835  Under Rule
90.3(c), a court may vary a child support award “for good cause
upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice
would result if the support award were not varied.”836  The court
found that “the nature of [the] hybrid custody situation, including
826. Id. at 789-90.
827. Id. at 790.
828. 42 P.3d 1047 (Alaska 2002).
829. Id. at 1053-57.
830. Id. at 1053-54.
831. Id.
832. Id. at 1054.
833. Id. at 1055.
834. Id.
835. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(c); Fernau, 42 P.3d at 1057-58.
836. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(c)(1).
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the additional time the children were to spend with the mother, . . .
the disparity in earning potential, and [Rowdon]’s need to pursue a
career opportunity while caring for three children” made this an
unusual case in which variance was proper.837  Additionally, the su-
preme court found that awarding Rowdon rehabilitative alimony to
help pay for her education was proper, given that she met the re-
quirements set out by the court. 838  Rowdon had met these re-
quirements by identifying “her choice to become a teacher, the
costs, and the time required for her education” while Fernau had
largely accepted the need for the education.839  Finally, the supreme
court held that given the disparity in the economic situation be-
tween the two parties, as well as the small size of the marital estate,
the awarding of attorney’s fees to Rowdon was not an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion.840
In Hubbard v. Hubbard,841 the supreme court held that the
stepfather of a child was equitably estopped from having his pater-
nity disestablished because the financial harm element of estoppel
had been satisfied.842  The supreme court found that the custodial
parent of the child had proven that the stepfather, in urging the
natural mother of the child to terminate child support proceedings
against the child’s natural father, had taken positive action in re-
moving the obligation of the natural father to support the child.843
With the child and his natural mother facing the uncertain cost and
success of reestablishing child support obligations against the natu-
ral father, the supreme court found the financial harm element of
estoppel had been satisfied.844  Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court holding that the stepfather was equitably estopped from
disestablishing paternity was affirmed.845
In Laybourn v. Powell,846 the supreme court affirmed the supe-
rior court’s decision to impute income to Laybourn for purposes of
determining the amount of his child support payments.847  The court
held it was proper to impute income to Laybourn in the amount of
an estimation as to his earning capacity and not based on an actual
837. Fernau, 42 P.3d at 1057.
838. Id. at 1058.
839. Id.
840. Id. at 1060.
841. 44 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2002).
842. Id. at 154-55.
843. Id. at 157.
844. Id.
845. Id.
846. 55 P.3d 745 (Alaska 2002).
847. Id. at 746.
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accounting of his income because the court found that Laybourn
had underreported his income and was actively concealing his ac-
tual earnings.848  The court also held that the trial judge was not bi-
ased against Laybourn in warning him of the compelling nature of
Powell’s evidence prior to Laybourn presenting his case.849  The
trial judge instead was proper in warning Laybourn prior to the
presentation of his case of the possible consequences of presenting
false testimony and evidence to the court.850  Finally, the awarding
of enhanced attorney’s fees was not manifestly unreasonable where
the trial judge made a finding, supported by the record, of bad faith
or vexatious conduct by a party.851
In Olmstead v. Ziegler,852 the supreme court held that modifica-
tion of child support was not warranted where the responsible
party was voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed and where
his earning capacity was unchanged.853  Olmstead and Ziegler, both
attorneys, were divorced in 1994, and Olmstead agreed to pay their
daughter’s daycare and education expenses.854  However, in 1996,
Olmstead’s legal partner left and forced him to become a solo prac-
titioner.855  Although he actively sought other employment, Olm-
stead’s earnings decreased, leading him to choose to return to
school to become a teacher.856  In 1999, Olmstead filed a motion for
an order modifying child support which was subsequently denied.857
On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court had not
abused its broad discretion in denying Olmstead’s motion and
agreed with the trial court that Olmstead had voluntarily reduced
his workload as an attorney even before he changed careers.858  The
supreme court also held that the trial court properly considered
factors other than Olmstead’s decreased earnings such as the rea-
son for the lower earnings and the impact of Olmstead’s career
choice on the child.859  Finally, the supreme court held that the trial
848. Id. at 747.
849. Id. at 748.
850. Id.
851. Id.
852. 42 P.3d 1102 (Alaska 2002).
853. Id. at 1103.
854. Id.
855. Id. at 1103-04.
856. Id. at 1104.
857. Id.
858. Id. at 1105.
859. Id. at 1106.
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court had adequately supported its findings that Olmstead’s earn-
ing capacity had not decreased.860
In Osmar v. Mahan,861 the supreme court held that children’s
insurance benefits should not be included in a mother’s income
when calculating child support.  Mindy Lynn Osmar and Chris Os-
mar married and had one child, Ashley.862  Chris became disabled
and later died.863  Mindy received Social Security children’s insur-
ance benefits (CIB) because of Chris’s disability and death.864
Mindy later married Gary Mahan, with whom she had one son,
Steele Mahan, before getting a divorce.865  In determining the
amount of child support Mindy would receive from Gary, the supe-
rior court included in Mindy’s income the CIB payments that
Mindy received on Ashley’s behalf.866  The supreme court reversed,
finding that Mindy was constrained by federal law from using the
CIB payments for anything other than Ashley’s maintenance and
care.867  Because the money was not available to Mindy to support
Steele while Mindy and Gary were still married, the court held that
it should not be included in Mindy’s income for purposes of calcu-
lating child support.868  Additionally, the court cited Alaska Civil
Rule 90.3869 for the proposition that child support is not income.870
The court found that the CIB payments were a substitute for Ash-
ley’s father’s child support and thus were more appropriately char-
acterized as child support than as income for Ashley.871
B. Child Custody
In Atkins v. Vigil,872 the supreme court held that Alaska was a
child’s home state, thus giving Alaska jurisdiction to hear the child
custody dispute.873  Julian Atkins was born to Veronica Vigil and
Tracy Atkins in 1996.874  In 2001, Julian went to stay with Veron-
860. Id. at 1107.
861. 53 P.3d 149 (Alaska 2002).
862. Id. at 149.
863. Id.
864. Id.
865. Id.
866. Id. at 150.
867. Id. at 151.
868. Id.
869. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3.
870. Id.
871. Osmar, 53 P.3d at 151.
872. 59 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2002).
873. Id. at 258.
874. Id. at 256.
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ica’s mother, Julie Roby, who resided in California.  Less than six
months after Julian went to stay with her, Roby filed a petition in
California to be Julian’s guardian.875  Tracy Atkins objected to
Roby’s petition in Alaska.876  The Alaska superior court held that it
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because California was
Julian’s home state.  Alternatively, it held that even if there was ju-
risdiction, California’s proceeding still preempted Alaska’s jurisdic-
tion.877  The supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision.
The supreme court held that Julian’s home state was Alaska be-
cause Roby commenced the California proceeding less than six
months after Julian came to stay with her.878  Since a child must re-
side in a state for at least six months for it to be the child’s home
state, Julian’s stay with Roby did not satisfy this requirement.879
Furthermore, the supreme court held that Alaska had jurisdiction
to hear the dispute because a child’s home state has exclusive juris-
diction in child custody cases.880
In Fardig v. Fardig,881 the supreme court held that a modifica-
tion of custody order was properly granted in favor of the minor’s
father, because (1) evidence of the mother’s drug abuse was not
precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel, (2) her move to
another state was a substantial change in circumstances,882 and (3) a
grant of custody to the father was in the child’s best interests.883
Owen (the mother) and Fardig (the father) were divorced in 1995,
and custody was granted to Owen.884  One year later, Fardig moved
for modification of custody, claiming that Owen’s drug usage im-
paired her ability to properly parent her child.885  His motion was
granted, and the judge held that Owen’s recent move to California
constituted a “substantial change in circumstances.”886  The su-
preme court held that evidence of Owen’s drug use was not barred
by earlier custody litigation regarding domestic violence, as a “mo-
tion to modify custody does not relitigate a past decision.”887  Al-
875. Id.
876. Id.
877. Id. at 257.
878. Id.
879. Id.
880. Id. at 258.
881. 56 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2002).
882. Id. at 11.
883. Id. at 12.
884. Id. at 11.
885. Id.
886. Id.
887. Id. at 12.
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though Owen claimed that her move to California was temporary,
enough evidence was presented that this move constituted a sub-
stantial change in circumstances.888  Finally, Owen’s drug use was
among several factors upon which it was reasonable to conclude
that custody by Fardig would be in the best interests of the child.889
Pursuant to Alaska law, a nine-factor test is used to determine
what is in the best interests of the child, and includes accounting for
the physical and emotional needs of the child and the capability of
each parent.890  In this case custody was properly awarded to Far-
dig.891
In Hamilton v. Hamilton.,892 the supreme court held that the
trial court did not err in making its factual findings nor did it abuse
its discretion by transferring primary physical custody from the
mother to the father.893  Initially, each parent was awarded joint le-
gal custody with primary physical custody being awarded to the
mother.894  However, the father moved to change primary physical
custody because his ex-wife prevented him from visiting the chil-
dren according to the child custody agreement and then moved
out-of-state without notice to the father.895  The trial court, in
granting the father’s motion to modify the custody, held that “the
desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving fre-
quent relationship between the child and the other parent” was the
most important statutory factor in determining the best interests of
the children.896  The supreme court found that the factual findings
behind this decision satisfied the applicable standard of review and
were not clearly erroneous.897  The supreme court also affirmed the
trial court decision, finding the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in modifying the custody order to award custody to the father
because the ex-wife’s move out-of-state constituted a substantial
change in circumstances,898 and a change in custody was in the best
interests of the children.899 Additionally, the supreme court found
888. Id.  The evidence suggested that her move might potentially be long-term.
Id.
889. Id. at 12-13.
890. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (Michie 2002).
891. Fardig, 56 P.3d at 14.
892. 42 P.3d 1107 (Alaska 2002).
893. Id. at 1110.
894. Id.
895. Id. at 1111.
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. Id. at 1114-15.
899. Id. at 1115.
YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC 04/22/03  12:57 PM
150 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:1
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the need for
the children to have a more open and loving relationship with their
father outweighed the need for stability in their relationship with
their mother, finding that the father was acting to pull the children
to himself rather than away from their mother.900  Finally, the su-
preme court affirmed the trial court’s discretion in addressing  both
the religious and cultural needs of the children.901
In Kelly v. Joseph,902 the supreme court held that a modifica-
tion of a child custody order was appropriate because there was
sufficient evidence of “changed circumstances” to meet the statu-
tory requirements of Alaska Statutes section 25.20.110(a),903 and
the evidence showed that the change would be in the best interests
of the children under Alaska Statutes section 25.24.150(c).904  The
custody agreement for the three children was first established in
October 1999.905  In December 2000, Kelly moved to modify the
custody and visitation provisions of the agreement that were in-
tended to give Kelly contact with the children via telephone and
during holidays.906  The superior court modified the custody agree-
ment and granted primary physical custody of two of the children
to Kelly in early 2001.907  The supreme court upheld the decision of
the superior court regarding the modifications of the custody
agreement.908  The court found that evidence of Joseph’s interfer-
ence with Kelly’s custodial visitation rights was sufficient to show
“changed circumstances” required by section 25.20.110(a) for the
modification of a child custody agreement.909  The court found that
the superior court had adequately conducted a “best interest analy-
sis” because it had considered the children’s need for professional
mental health care and how relocating might affect their educa-
tional opportunities.910
In Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch,911 the supreme court held
that the superior court failed to comply adequately with the re-
mand instructions included in the supreme court’s prior opinion re-
900. Id. at 1116.
901. Id. at 1116-18.
902. 46 P.3d 1017 (Alaska 2002).
903. Id. at 1017 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.110(a) (Michie 2002)).
904. Id. at 1018-19 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (Michie 2002)).
905. Id. at 1016.
906. Id.
907. Id. at 1016-17.
908. Id. at 1019.
909. Id. at 1017-18.
910. Id. at 1018.
911. 53 P.3d 152 (Alaska 2002).
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garding the parents’ custody dispute.912  In the initial proceeding,
the superior court awarded both parents legal custody of their son,
awarding the mother primary physical custody with the caveat that
she was not allowed to relocate the son more than sixty-five miles
from the father’s residence.913  Wishing to relocate to Florida, the
mother appealed.914  In its remand instructions, the supreme court
instructed the superior court to determine what would be in the
best interests of the son, assuming that the mother would move to
Florida, and whether the mother’s proposed move was motivated
by a desire to make visitation more difficult for the father.915  On
remand, the superior court modified the joint custody order, giving
the father sole legal authority to decide where the son attended
school.916  The superior court maintained the mother’s primary
physical custody as long as she resided within a reasonable distance
of the father’s choice of schools, but giving the father primary
physical custody if she should move beyond that distance.917  On
appeal, the mother argued that the modified joint legal custody
award had the same effect of preventing her from moving to Flor-
ida, and that ordering an automatic shift in custody if she should
move to Florida failed to assume that such a move would take
place and precluded any determination as to her motives for mov-
ing.918  However, the supreme court ruled that because the superior
court’s decision was primarily motivated by an attempt to give the
son frequent contact with both parents, it was clear that the supe-
rior court had failed to assume that the mother would move to
Florida and had not determined the mother’s motives for moving.919
For that reason, the supreme court vacated the superior court’s or-
der and remanded for further proceedings.920
In Potter v. Potter921 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s modification of child support, yet reversed the modification
of visitation privileges.922  David Potter and Shelly Brewster re-
ceived a divorce in 1990 which allowed for shared physical custody
912. Id. at 153.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. Id.
916. Id. at 154.
917. Id.
918. Id.
919. Id. at 156-57.
920. Id. at 157.
921. 55 P.3d 726 (Alaska 2002).
922. Id. at 730.
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of their daughter and for David to pay child support.923  Over the
years, the parties amicably shared custody and visitation, yet as
time went on, Potter saw less of his daughter as she primarily lived
with Brewster.924  As a result, Brewster filed a motion to increase
child support and to modify visitation. 925  However, the court stated
that the trial would be confined to the child support issue.926  At
trial, the superior court increased child support payments and
modified the visitation agreement.927  On appeal, the supreme court
reversed the modification of visitation because Potter was not
given notice that it would be an issue in the evidentiary proceed-
ings and thus the superior court’s order did not satisfy due proc-
ess.928  At a minimum, due process under the Alaska Constitution
requires that the parties be notified of the subject of proceedings so
that they will have a reasonable opportunity to be heard.929  Ac-
cordingly, the notice requirement was not satisfied and the visita-
tion modification was reversed.
In Velasquez v. Velasquez,930 the supreme court held that it was
proper to consider the manner in which the mother left the mar-
riage in determining whom to award custody of the couple’s three
minor children.931  In 1998, Cindy Velasquez abruptly left her mari-
tal home without notifying the family of her whereabouts and
failed to maintain contact with her children afterwards.932  The trial
court awarded custody of the minor children to Joe Velasquez,
concluding that the manner in which Cindy left the residence and
her lack of contact with her children was indefensible.933  Reviewing
the trial court’s holding for abuse of discretion, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court properly considered Cindy’s depar-
ture without notice, her avoidance of the children and the effect
her conduct had upon the children in making its custody determi-
nation.934  Such consideration was in accordance with Alaska Stat-
utes section 25.24.150(c),935 which requires the court to consider the
923. Id. at 727.
924. Id.
925. Id.
926. Id. at 728.
927. Id.
928. Id.
929. Id.
930. 38 P.3d 1143 (Alaska 2002).
931. Id. at 1149.
932. Id. at 1145.
933. Id.
934. Id. at 1146-47.
935. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.250(c) (Michie 2002).
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best interests of the children when awarding custody.936  The court
found that the effect of Cindy’s abandonment upon the emotional
welfare of her children goes directly to the issue of the children’s
best interests.937  Accordingly the award of custody of the minor
children to Joe was affirmed.938
C. Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights
In E.A. v. State, Division of Family & Youth Services,939 the su-
preme court held that the State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that it made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the
child’s family,940 and that the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the child would likely suffer serious emotional harm if
he was returned to his mother’s custody.941  E.A., a mother of five
children,942 had a history of substance abuse.943  She relinquished her
parental rights to her eldest three children as well as her young-
est.944  Her fourth child, H.O., an Indian child, was removed from
E.A.’s custody, and the trial court later terminated E.A.’s parental
rights to H.O. upon findings under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)945 and §
1912(f).946  E.A. argued on appeal that the State did not make “ac-
tive efforts” because it failed to obtain an updated psychological
evaluation of E.A and failed to make active remedial efforts for a
period of seven months.947  E.A. also challenged the trial court’s
holding that her custody of H.O. would likely cause him serious
emotional harm.948  The supreme court held that the trial court did
not err in finding that an additional psychological evaluation of
E.A. would have been of “marginal value.”949  In reaching its deci-
sion, the supreme court specifically cited E.A.’s inability to over-
come her substance abuse problems950 and her “demonstrated lack
936. Velasquez, 38 P.3d at 1147.
937. Id.
938. Id. at 1149.
939. 46 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2002).
940. Id. at 988.
941. Id.
942. Id. at 988 n.1.
943. Id. at 988.
944. Id. at 988 n.1.
945. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
946. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2000).
947. E.A., 46 P.3d at 990.
948. Id. at 991.
949. Id. at 990.
950. Id.
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of willingness to participate in treatment.”951  The supreme court
further held that the State’s failure to make active efforts to pre-
vent a breakup of the family was insignificant in light of the exten-
sive remedial efforts the State had provided throughout its in-
volvement with E.A.’s children apart from the seven-month
period.952  Additionally, the supreme court held that the expert tes-
timony of H.O.’s therapist and a clinical psychologist, in combina-
tion with “substantial evidence in the record,” supported the trial
court’s finding that H.O. would likely suffer serious emotional
harm if returned to E.A.’s custody.953
In J.A. v. State, Division of Family & Youth Services,954 the su-
preme court held that expert testimony as to the serious degree of
harm J.A.’s children would likely suffer if they were returned to
J.A.’s custody was sufficiently related to the facts and issues of the
case, despite the fact that the experts based their opinions on hypo-
thetical situations and a limited review of the family’s case file.955
In response to reports of sexual abuse and neglect, the Alaska De-
partment of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and
Youth Services (DFYS) obtained temporary legal custody of each
of J.A.’s three children.956  Subsequently, DFYS filed, and the supe-
rior court granted, a petition to terminate both parents’ parental
rights.957  On appeal, J.A. asserted three arguments under the In-
dian Child Welfare Act:958  (1) that the experts’ testimony was im-
properly based on hearsay reports of sexual abuse;959 (2) that the
experts’ testimony that the children would likely suffer serious
harm if returned to J.A. was insufficiently related to the facts of the
case;960 and (3) that the superior court over-relied on the experts’
testimony in reaching its ultimate verdict that the children would
suffer serious harm if returned to J.A.’s custody.961  The supreme
court ruled that each of J.A.’s arguments failed.  First, the supreme
court ruled that Alaska Rule of Evidence 703962 and Alaska case
law explicitly allow experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible evi-
951. Id. at 991.
952. Id. at 990.
953. Id. at 991.
954. 50 P.3d 395 (Alaska 2002).
955. Id.
956. Id. at 398.
957. Id.
958. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23, 1951 (2000).
959. J.A., 50 P.3d at 399.
960. Id. at 400.
961. Id. at 402.
962. ALASKA R. EVID. 703.
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dence as long as the experts reasonably rely upon evidence that ex-
perts in their particular field typically rely upon in forming opin-
ions or inferences upon such a subject.963  Second, the court ruled
that each expert’s testimony was sufficiently grounded in the facts
and issues of the case because the experts were apprised of the
facts by their review of selected DFYS records and DFYS summa-
ries of relevant facts and the testimony of other witnesses.964  Third,
the court ruled that the trial court did not over-rely on the expert
testimony because there was substantial evidence in addition to the
experts’ testimony that supported the trial court’s ultimate conclu-
sion that J.A.’s substance abuse and resulting neglect placed his
children at significant risk of emotional and physical harm.965  For
these reasons the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ter-
mination of J.A.’s parental rights.966
In J.S. v. State,967 the supreme court held that “active efforts”
to rehabilitate J.S. and prevent the breakup of an Indian family
were not required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),968
and therefore upheld the termination of J.S.’s parental rights.969
The Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) removed J.S.’s
sons from his care due to reports of sexual abuse.970  J.S. was subse-
quently tried and convicted of sexual abuse and sentenced to nine-
teen years, and DFYS petitioned to terminate J.S.’s parental
rights.971  The superior court found that termination was appropri-
ate, but allowed the State to develop a treatment plan for J.S.,
which he had to accept in order to retain his parental rights.972  J.S.
rejected the proposal and his parental rights were terminated.973
J.S. appealed, arguing that the treatment plan did not comply with
the ICWA requirement that the State take “active efforts” to pre-
vent the breakup of an Indian family.”974  The supreme court con-
cluded that the State’s duty was properly discharged by Jack’s con-
viction for sexual abuse.975  The supreme court further held that
963. J.A., 50 P.3d at 399-400 (citing Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God
Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1217 (Alaska 1991)).
964. Id. at 401.
965. Id. at 403.
966. Id. at 404.
967. 50 P.3d 388 (Alaska 2002).
968. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
969. J.S., 50 P.3d at 389.
970. Id. at 389-90.
971. Id. at 390.
972. Id.
973. Id. at 390-91.
974. Id. at 391 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000)).
975. Id. at 392.
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DFYS did take all measures required under the ICWA976 to place
the children with one of J.S.’s relatives or other family, and did not
err by placing the children outside of these guidelines.977  Finally,
the supreme court held that placement with J.S. would likely cause
the children physical or emotional damage because J.S. was crimi-
nally convicted of sexually abusing them.978  Accordingly, J.S.’s pa-
rental rights were terminated.979
In M.J.S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Di-
vision of Family & Youth Services,980 the supreme court held (1)
that a child’s godfather did not meet the statutory definition of a
guardian for the purposes of determining child abandonment,981
and (2) that a parent’s habitual substance abuse resulted in sub-
stantial risk of emotional harm to the child.982  Spencer, a mother of
four children, had a criminal history and was a habitual substance
abuser.983  She had named Martin Shultz, a friend, as the godfather
of her third child, Janet, and would often place Janet in Shultz’s
care during Spencer’s substance abuse relapses.984  The trial court
subsequently terminated Spencer’s parental rights to Janet.985
Spencer argued on appeal that she had implemented a plan to have
Shultz named Janet’s legal guardian, thereby precluding the trial
court from finding that Spencer had abandoned Janet under
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.013(a)(4),986 which required proof
that Spencer failed to participate in a plan to reunite the child with
a parent or guardian.987  Spencer also challenged the trial court’s
holding that her habitual substance abuse exposed Janet to a “sub-
stantial risk of harm.”988  The supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that Shultz, although Janet’s godfather, did not meet
the statutory definition of a guardian because he had not been le-
gally appointed as Janet’s guardian by the court.989  The supreme
court also upheld the trial court’s finding that Spencer’s habitual
substance abuse exposed Janet to a substantial risk of harm be-
976. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2000).
977. J.S., 50 P.3d at 393-94.
978. Id. at 394.
979. Id. at 395.
980. 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002).
981. Id. at 1125.
982. Id. at 1126.
983. Id. at 1124.
984. Id.
985. Id. at 1124-25.
986. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.013(a)(4) (Michie 2002).
987. M.J.S., 39 P.3d at 1125.
988. Id. at 1126.
989. Id. at 1125-26.
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cause Spencer’s substance abuse prevented Janet from forming a
stable bond with her mother.990  The supreme court explained that
the risk of harm to the child need not necessarily be a risk of physi-
cal danger, but that emotional harm may also justify termination of
parental rights.991
In P.M. v. State, Department of Health & Human Services, Di-
vision of Family & Youth Services,992 the supreme court held that
the superior court did not err in refusing to grant new counsel, ter-
minating a father’s parental rights, or refusing to place the child
with the father’s parents.993  In 1996, the superior court adjudicated
J.M.H. and his half brother children in need of aid after they were
found with their mother in a wooded area.994  The Division of Fam-
ily and Youth Services (DFYS) placed them in the home of
J.M.H.’s half-brother’s father, who later expressed a desire to
adopt J.M.H.995  P.M., J.M.H.’s father, had a history of criminal ac-
tivity and anger management problems.996  In 1999, DFYS prepared
case plans for P.M. to integrate him into his son’s life, but P.M. did
not comply and DFYS filed for termination of parental rights.997
P.M. was appointed counsel by the court twice, but both attorneys
were allowed to step down after P.M. harassed them and refused to
cooperate.998  P.M. continued pro se and the superior court subse-
quently terminated his parental rights.999  On appeal, P.M. argued
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel1000 and that his
due process rights were therefore violated.1001  The supreme court
held that he was not denied effective assistance of counsel because
his counsels’ decisions were within the range of reasonable ac-
tions.1002  Further, given P.M.’s prior behavior towards his counsel,
the supreme court held that P.M.’s due process rights were not
violated by the superior court’s decision to forego appointing new
counsel.1003  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s termi-
990. Id. at 1126.
991. Id. at 1126 n.12.
992. 42 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2002).
993. Id. at 1137.
994. Id. at 1129.
995. Id.
996. Id.
997. Id. at 1130.
998. Id.
999. Id.
1000. Id. at 1131.
1001. Id. at 1132-33.
1002. Id. at 1131.
1003. Id. at 1133.
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nation of P.M.’s parental rights1004 because P.M. made no attempt to
locate his son for three years1005 and failed to comply with the
DFYS case plans.1006  The supreme court also affirmed the superior
court’s decision to refuse to grant custody to P.M.’s parents be-
cause the court’s obligation to place the child with a blood relative
did not apply to placement for adoptive purposes.1007
In R.G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Divi-
sion of Family & Youth Services,1008 the supreme court held that the
termination of R.G.’s parental rights was appropriate because the
evidence showed that her child, E.G., was a child in need of aid un-
der Alaska Statutes section 47.10.011(11).1009  R.G. had a history of
difficulty raising E.G., originally due to physical ailments.1010  Be-
ginning in late 1997, the Division of Family and Youth Services
(DFYS) intervened by making several petitions for temporary or
emergency custody of E.G.1011  Finally, in September 2000, DFYS
petitioned to terminate R.G.’s parental rights; this petition was
granted by the superior court in March 2001.1012  On appeal, the su-
preme court noted that to terminate parental rights there must be
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child is in need of aid
under section 47.10.011 and (2) the parent did not change the con-
ditions or conduct that placed the child at a substantial risk of harm
within a reasonable time.1013  While R.G. testified that she had
remedied her physical ailment, obtained stable housing and suc-
cessfully participated in an anger management program, R.G. was
unable to dispute the superior court’s finding that her emotional
disturbance hindered her ability to care for E.G.—making E.G. a
child in need of aid.1014  The supreme court held that there was suf-
ficient evidence supporting the superior court’s finding that termi-
nation was proper under section 47.10.011(11).1015  Accordingly, the
superior court’s order was affirmed.1016
1004. Id. at 1136.
1005. Id. at 1134.
1006. Id. at 1136.
1007. Id.
1008. 43 P.3d 145 (Alaska 2002).
1009. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(11) (Michie 2002); R.G., 43 P.3d at 146.
1010. R.G., 43 P.3d at 146-47.
1011. Id. at 147.
1012. Id. at 148.
1013. Id.
1014. Id. at 148-49.
1015. Id. at 149.
1016. Id. at 150.
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In S.B. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Divi-
sion of Family & Youth Services,1017 the supreme court upheld the
superior court’s termination of parental rights.1018  A child was re-
moved from his mother and placed with his paternal grand-
mother.1019  In 1992, the Superior Court of California appointed the
grandmother to be the child’s guardian.1020  When the  grand-
mother’s health declined, the child was sent to Alaska to live with
the mother of his half-siblings.1021  The grandmother sent a nota-
rized letter purporting to transfer guardianship.1022  In 2000, the su-
perior court terminated the parental rights of the child’s natural
mother.1023  The natural mother appealed, claiming that the superior
court had neither subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case nor
personal jurisdiction over her.1024  The supreme court held that the
superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the su-
perior court’s order did not modify a California child custody de-
termination because the California determination terminated with
the death of the paternal grandmother.1025  Further, Alaska had
properly exercised child custody jurisdiction over the case because
Alaska was the child’s home state.1026  Additionally, the supreme
court held that the superior court exercised proper personal juris-
diction over the natural mother because Alaska had more than
“minimum contacts” with her child.1027
In S.H. v. State, Department of Health & Human Services, Di-
vision of Family & Youth Services,1028 the supreme court held that
the trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of S.H.
and R.H. because the parents failed to remedy conduct that put
their children at risk of physical and emotional injury.1029  R.H. and
S.H. are the parents of four children who each have serious psy-
chological and emotional problems.1030  Starting in 1987, ten reports
of child abuse, including physical, verbal, and sexual abuse were
1017. 61 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2002).
1018. Id. at 9.
1019. Id.
1020. Id.
1021. Id.
1022. Id.
1023. Id.
1024. Id. at 8.
1025. Id. at 11.
1026. Id. at 13-14.
1027. Id. at 22.
1028. 42 P.3d 1119 (Alaska 2002).
1029. Id. at 1127.
1030. Id. at 1120-21.
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made to DFYS.1031  The parents failed to respond to any of DFYS’s
efforts to help them and were also reported to be using crack-
cocaine.1032  The supreme court affirmed the holding of the trial
court because S.H. failed to remedy her substance abuse problem
within a reasonable time,1033 termination of their parental rights was
in the children’s best interests,1034 and R.H.’s efforts to remedy his
conduct were too little, too late.1035  Further, the trial court did not
err in holding that DFYS made reasonable efforts to prevent the
break-up of the family.1036
In State, Department of Health & Social Services, Division of
Family and Youth Services v. M.L.L.,1037 the supreme court upheld
the superior court’s decision not to terminate M.L.L.’s parental
rights to her two daughters.1038  A 1999 proceeding had resulted in
the termination of the children’s father’s parental rights, and the
children were placed in foster care.1039  The state subsequently
sought to terminate M.L.L.’s parental rights, but the superior court
ruled that the state did not prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.1040  On appeal, the supreme court held that while the show-
ing was sufficient to terminate parental rights under Children in
Need of Aid requirements,1041 it failed the reasonable doubt stan-
dard under the Indian Child Welfare Act.1042  The State claimed
that the superior court did not consider the harm to the children by
breaking the bonds with the foster mother and returning the chil-
dren to M.L.L.’s care.1043  The supreme court ruled that proper con-
sideration had been given to the bonds between the children and
the foster mother.1044
In V.S.B. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Di-
vision of Family & Youth Services,1045 the supreme court upheld a
termination of parental rights.1046  Vivian, the children’s mother,
1031. Id. at 1121.
1032. Id. at 1122.
1033. Id. at 1124.
1034. Id. at 1124-25.
1035. Id. at 1126.
1036. Id. at 1127.
1037. 61 P.3d 438 (Alaska 2002).
1038. Id. at 439.
1039. Id. at 440-41.
1040. Id. at 441-42.
1041. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.019 (Michie 2002).
1042. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2000).
1043. M.L.L., 61 P.3d at 439.
1044. Id. at 443.
1045. 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002).
1046. Id. at 1208.
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suffered from a long history of mental disease and had been hospi-
talized several times.1047  In 1998, the Alaska Division of Family and
Youth Services (DFYS) took emergency custody of the children,
placed them in foster care, and filed petitions for adjudication of a
child in need of aid on behalf of each child.1048  Although Vivian
agreed to the DFYS program to regain custody, DFYS filed a peti-
tion for termination of parental rights in May 1999.1049  The trial
court terminated Vivian’s parental rights and Vivian appealed the
decision.1050  The supreme court held that the trial court correctly
found that the children were children in need of aid because they
had suffered mental injury, sexual abuse, and substantial risk of
physical harm through Vivian’s actions and inactions.1051  The su-
preme court also held that under the Indian Child Welfare Act,1052
DFYS had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that continued pa-
rental custody was likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child1053 and had proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that reasonable and active efforts had been made to pro-
vide appropriate remedial services to Vivian and had been unsuc-
cessful.1054
D. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Property
In Edelman v. Edelman,1055 the supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over the husband’s
claims from the Exxon Valdez oil spill and to deny the wife’s attor-
ney’s fees and costs for the divorce.1056 First, the wife argued that
the trial court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over the Exxon
claims instead of assigning them to her was incorrect.1057 However,
the court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
retaining jurisdiction because the exact amount and payout of the
Exxon claims was unknown.1058 Second, the wife argued that the
1047. Id. at 1200.
1048. Id. at 1202.
1049. Id.
1050. Id. at 1203.
1051. Id. at 1204.
1052. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (2000).
1053. V.S.B., 45 P.3d at 1205-06.
1054. Id. at 1206-07 (finding that though Vivian did actively participate in the
DFYS program, her parenting skills improved only marginally and were not suffi-
cient to make her an adequate parent).
1055. 61 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2002).
1056. Id. at 2.
1057. Id. at 4.
1058. Id.
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trial court erred in denying her attorney’s fees and costs because it
did not base its decision on the relative economic situations and
earning powers of the parties and her ex-husband’s vexatious con-
duct.1059  The court found that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion because the husband’s economic situation was not signifi-
cantly better than the wife’s, and there was no evidence that his
alleged delay tactics rose to the level of vexatious conduct.1060
In Juelfs v. Gough,1061 the supreme court held modification of a
joint sharing agreement for a dog was proper because, as the trial
court noted, the parties were unable to share custody of the dog
without severe contention.1062  The trial court had modified the
agreement after one incident where Juelfs and Gough argued
about Juelfs’s allotted time with Coho, the dog, and another where
Juelfs’s boyfriend dislocated Coho’s leg while pulling Coho away
from a dog fight.1063  The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s
modification, holding that as circumstances changed, it was in the
best interest to review and modify the joint sharing agreement un-
der Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).1064  The supreme court
also affirmed the trial court’s denial of Juelfs’s request for a change
of judge as untimely and “little more than an expression of [her]
dissatisfaction with the superior court’s ruling.”1065
In Kinnard v. Kinnard,1066 the supreme court ruled that cover-
age under a health insurance policy is a marital asset and that Ber-
nard Kinnard was responsible for either reinstating his wife De-
bra’s coverage or paying for her medical bills.1067  Bernard
unilaterally removed Debra from his health insurance policy after
the judge presiding over the divorce proceedings ordered him not
to dispose of any marital property.1068  The supreme court ruled that
the trial court acted within the scope of its authority in holding
Bernard liable because it placed Debra in the position she would
have occupied had Bernard not violated the order.1069  The supreme
court also affirmed the trial court’s holding that Bernard must
share custody of his biological daughter Kristine with Debra, who
1059. Id. at 4-5.
1060. Id. at 5-6.
1061. 41 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2002).
1062. Id. at 597.
1063. Id. at 594-95.
1064. Id. at 597; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
1065. Juelfs, 41 P.3d at 598 (alteration in original).
1066. 43 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2002).
1067. Id. at 156.
1068. Id. at 155.
1069. Id. at 156-57.
YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC 04/22/03  12:57 PM
2003] YEAR IN REVIEW 163
was Kristine’s stepmother.1070  Using the standard from Turner v.
Pannick,1071 the supreme court agreed with the trial court’s deter-
mination that separating Debra and Kristine would be detrimental
to the child’s welfare.1072
In Korn v. Korn,1073 the supreme court held that neither in-
terim spousal support nor imputed rental value are marital as-
sets.1074 After filing for divorce and separating from her husband,
Paula Korn resided in the marital residence rent-free and received
interim spousal payments for one year.1075  In deciding disputed
property questions, the superior court counted among Paula’s as-
sets the interim spousal payments and an estimated rental value for
living at the marital residence for one year, but provided no factual
findings for including imputed rental value and interim spousal
support as marital assets.1076 The supreme court observed that
spousal support is not marital property.1077  The court also held that
a marital residence is not a marital asset until the trial court divided
the property, and thus no rental value could be imputed.1078  There-
fore, the supreme court vacated the decision and remanded for re-
consideration and appropriate findings.1079
In Nelson-Lizardi v. Lizardi,1080 the supreme court held that
the superior court abused it discretion in ruling on pension rights
despite notice that the wife needed additional information to file a
formal acounting.1081  During the Lizardis’ divorce proceedings, the
superior court did not address the issue of Bob’s pension because
the pension had not vested.1082  Upon retiring, Bob began to receive
pension benefits and filed a motion to modify child support claim-
ing a fifteen percent reduction in income.1083  The superior court or-
dered Jackie to file a request for formal acounting;1084 Jackie instead
filed an “Advice of Counsel” notifying the superior court that she
required additional information in order to determine if a formal
1070. Id. at 154.
1071. 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975).
1072. Kinnard, 43 P.3d at 155.
1073. 46 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2002).
1074. Id. at 1022.
1075. Id.
1076. Id. at 1022, 1023-24.
1077. Id. at 1023.
1078. Id.
1079. Id. at 1024.
1080. 49 P.3d 236 (Alaska 2002).
1081. Id. at 241.
1082. Id. at 236.
1083. Id. at 237.
1084. Id. at 236.
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accounting was necessary.1085  The superior court determined that
Jackie was not entitled to any portion of the interest in the pension
because she failed to file the request for formal accounting.1086  Un-
der the abuse of discretion standard, the supreme court determined
that the superior court erred because it failed to make a ruling on
the merits of the division of the pension when the court and op-
posing counsel had notice that Jackie needed further information
to comply with the court’s order.1087  Accordingly, the case was re-
manded to the superior court to determine the valuation and the
division of the pension.1088
In Manelick v. Manelick,1089 the supreme court held that in the
property division order, the superior court (1) erred by improperly
valuing the goodwill of the wife’s medical practice, (2) failed to in-
clude a debt the parties owed on a piano, and (3) correctly assigned
zero value to a marital car.1090  Reviewing the superior court’s fac-
tual and legal determinations under the clearly erroneous and
abuse of discretion standards, respectively, the supreme court re-
evaluated the valuation of the couple’s assets and liabilities.1091  The
court ruled that the superior court erred in undervaluing the tangi-
ble assets of the medical practice because it did not attempt to ob-
tain accurate financial statements.1092  Further, the court ruled that
the superior court erred in valuing the goodwill of the wife’s prac-
tice because, where no market exists for goodwill, it should be con-
sidered to have no value.1093  Second, the court ruled that the supe-
rior court erred by failing to include all assets acquired during the
marriage1094 including the loan for the piano.1095  Third, the court
ruled that the superior court did not clearly err in valuing a marital
car at zero value instead of a negative value.1096
In Martin v. Martin,1097 the supreme court held that the trial
court in a divorce proceeding did not err in holding that the hus-
band’s food store was marital property.1098  Don Martin bought an
1085. Id. at 238.
1086. Id.
1087. Id. at 240.
1088. Id. at 241.
1089. 59 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2002).
1090. Id. at 260.
1091. Id.
1092. Id. at 263.
1093. Id. at 263-65.
1094. Id. at 265.
1095. Id.
1096. Id. at 265-66.
1097. 52 P.3d 724 (Alaska 2002).
1098. Id. at 726.
YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC 04/22/03  12:57 PM
2003] YEAR IN REVIEW 165
Anchorage health food store, Roy’s Health Foods, before marrying
Melinda.1099  The trial court held that the store was marital property
and divided it evenly between Don and Melinda.1100  On appeal, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s judgment applying the doc-
trine of transmutation, which states that separate property can be-
come marital property if the parties so intend.1101  Here, the su-
preme court found that the Martins intended for Roy’s Health
Foods to become a family business because Don used marital funds
to finance the business and because Melinda worked at the store
for many years without pay.1102
E. Miscellaneous
In H.C.S. v. Community Advocacy Project of Alaska ex rel.
H.L.S.,1103 the supreme court held an adult son was entitled to a
new hearing for a determination whether it would be in his father’s
best interests to remove a corporation as his father’s guardian and
conservator and to appoint the adult son because the son had dem-
onstrated that circumstances had materially changed since the cor-
poration’s appointment.1104  In 1999, the Community Advocacy
Project of Alaska (CAPA) was appointed by the trial court as the
guardian and conservator of H.L.S. due to his Alzheimer’s Disease
and dementia which caused him to suffer lapses in memory and
judgment.1105  At the time the appointment was uncontested by
H.L.S.’s family.1106  In 2000, H.C.S., H.L.S.’s adult son, filed a peti-
tion asking the trial court to modify and terminate the appointment
of CAPA and to appoint H.C.S. as guardian and conservator.1107
H.C.S. alleged several grounds, in particular that CAPA had
caused H.L.S. to be institutionalized away from his family and that
CAPA had mismanaged H.L.S.’s modest assets.1108  The trial court
held a hearing and denied H.C.S.’s petition.1109  H.C.S. argued on
appeal that it was an abuse of discretion to deny his petition with-
out making fact findings to justify deviating from Alaska Statutes
1099. Id.
1100. Id.
1101. Id. at 727.
1102. Id. at 729-30.
1103. 42 P.3d 1093 (Alaska 2002).
1104. Id. at 1094.
1105. Id. at 1095.
1106. Id.
1107. Id.
1108. Id.
1109. Id.
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sections 13.26.1451110 and 13.26.210.1111  The supreme court held that
the standard of review for an order denying or granting a request
to remove a guardian or conservator was an abuse of discretion,
the same standard as for initial selection of a guardian or conserva-
tor.1112  After finding existing statutes regarding modification of ap-
pointments of guardians and conservators to be inapplicable,1113 the
supreme court held that a two-part analysis should apply to peti-
tions to remove or replace guardians or conservators using the pro-
cedure for modifying child custody awards as a model.1114  First, the
petitioner must “show that the circumstances of the ward, guard-
ian, or conservator have changed materially since the guardian or
conservator was appointed.”1115  Second, the court must decide
“whether the existing appointment is in the ward’s best inter-
ests.”1116  The supreme court held that H.C.S. had demonstrated a
material change of circumstances and that it was therefore neces-
sary to hold a hearing to consider whether it was in H.L.S.’s best
interests to remove CAPA as guardian and conservator and re-
place it with H.C.S.1117  The supreme court found that the trial
court’s hearing failed to address several unresolved factual disputes
about CAPA’s treatment of H.L.S. and his assets and remanded
the case for further fact findings with the burden for proving best
interests on H.C.S, the party seeking the modification.1118
In Trapp v. State,1119 the supreme court held that conservators
are not shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity from claims
asserted by their wards.1120 Trapp was found to be partially incapaci-
tated, and the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) was appointed as
her conservator.1121 She brought suit against OPA for a variety of
1110. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145 (Michie 2002) (stating an adult child of an inca-
pacitated person has greater priority for appointment as guardian than a nonprofit
corporation but that the court shall select the person or nonprofit corporation
“that is best qualified and willing to serve”).
1111. § 13.26.210 (stating a conservator appointed by the court is entitled to con-
sideration before an adult child of the protected person but that the “court, for
good cause, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having
less priority or no priority”); H.C.S., 42 P.3d at 1095-96.
1112. H.C.S., 42 P.3d at 1096.
1113. Id. at 1097-98.
1114. Id. at 1099.
1115. Id.
1116. Id.
1117. Id. at 1100-01.
1118. Id. at 1101.
1119. 53 P.3d 1128 (Alaska 2002).
1120. Id. at 1128.
1121. Id.
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claims, and OPA moved to dismiss the suit under absolute quasi-
judicial immunity.1122 The supreme court found that while no con-
sensus exists among jurisdictions about whether conservators pos-
sess absolute quasi-judicial immunity, the conservatorship statute
in Alaska Statutes section 13.26.3051123 precludes such immunity.1124
Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings.1125
IX.  INSURANCE LAW
In United Airlines, Inc., v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Com-
pany,1126 the supreme court determined that indemnification was
properly transferred to United Airlines through a sublease.1127  The
insurance suit arose out of an accident involving Adrian Sanders,
who hit a United Airlines baggage cart train from the rear with his
motorcycle.1128  The accident occurred on property leased from the
State by a husband and wife, the Krogstads, and then subleased to
United Airlines.1129  Because Sanders had threatened litigation
against the State, the State expected the Krogstads to indemnify it
under the terms of the lease.1130  The Krogstads in turn informed
United Airlines of United’s indemnification under the terms of the
sublease.1131  However, this tender was rejected by United Air-
lines.1132  After settling the State’s third-party claim for indemnity
against the Krogstads, State Farm (the Krogstads’s insurer) was
permitted to substitute for the Krogstads in an indemnification suit
against United Airlines and was also permitted to add its own claim
for indemnity.1133  The superior court granted State Farm’s cross-
motion for summary judgment and denied United Airlines’ motion
for summary judgment on the indemnification issues.1134  The su-
preme court found that because the claim arose out of United Air-
lines’ operation of the baggage cart, in accordance with the terms
of the sublease, and did not arise out of the Krogstads’ negligence,
“the plain language of the indemnity clause in the . . . sublease re-
1122. Id. at 1128-29.
1123. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.305 (Michie 2002).
1124. Id. at 1130.
1125. Id. at 1132.
1126. 51 P.3d 928 (Alaska 2002).
1127. Id. at 929.
1128. Id. at 930.
1129. Id.
1130. Id.
1131. Id.
1132. Id.
1133. Id. at 931.
1134. Id.
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quires [United Airlines] to indemnify and defend the Krogstads
against the state’s third-party claim.”1135  The supreme court did not
address the issue of treating non-insurers as insurers.1136
In Wold v. Progressive Preferred Insurance Co.,1137 the supreme
court held that unidentified vehicles are considered uninsured only
when there is a collision, and that Wold’s estate used up all of the
driver’s liability insurance and thus could recover underin-
sured/uninsured (UM/UIM) benefits from Progressive.1138  In 1995,
Smith swerved to avoid an oncoming car, but, in the process, acci-
dentally killed Wold, his passenger.1139  The driver of the oncoming
car was never identified.1140  Smith’s insurance provided both liabil-
ity and UM/UIM coverage, and Wold’s mother had her own
UM/UIM policy through Progressive.1141  Wold’s mother sued both
Smith and the unknown driver for claims of wrongful death and
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and both Wold’s
mother and father sued for loss of consortium.1142  Wold settled with
Smith’s insurer for both Smith’s liability and the unknown driver’s
negligence, and then sought further reimbursement under Wold’s
UM/UIM policy.1143  Progressive argued that it had no duty to re-
imburse Wold because (1) the unknown motorist was not consid-
ered uninsured under Alaska law1144 and (2) Wold had not yet ex-
hausted the policy limits of Smith’s insurance policy.1145  The
supreme court found that both Progressive’s policy and Alaska law
required physical contact with an unknown driver in order for the
unknown driver to be considered uninsured.1146  Therefore, Wold’s
argument that this requirement should not be enforced because it
was undisputed that the accident was caused by a “phantom vehi-
cle” was not persuasive.1147  The supreme court then held that Wold
1135. Id. at 932.
1136. Id. at 934.
1137. 52 P.3d 155 (Alaska 2002).
1138. Id. at 157.
1139. Id.
1140. Id.
1141. Id.
1142. Id.
1143. Id. at 158.
1144. Alaska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, ALASKA STAT. §
28.20.445(f) (Michie 2002) (“payment . . . shall be made only where direct physical
contact . . . has occurred”); Alaska Mandatory Automobile Insurance Act,
ALASKA STAT. § 28.22.201(b) (Michie 2002) (“only where direct contact . . . has
occurred”).
1145. Wold, 52 P.3d at 158.
1146. Id. at 159.
1147. Id. at 159-61.
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had exhausted the limits of Smith’s insurance policy, as “it was er-
ror for the trial court to conclude the settlement used up a portion
of a separate ‘per person’ liability policy limit.”1148  The settlement
with Smith’s insurer covered both Wold’s mother and father pursu-
ant to their loss of consortium claims, categorizing this claim as a
derivative action, not with separate “per person” triggers.1149  As
such the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling on the
physical contact issue, but reversed its ruling on the exhaustion of
Smith’s insurance policy.1150
X.  PROPERTY LAW
In Alaska Railroad Corp. v. Native Village of Eklutna,1151 the
supreme court ruled that Damco Paving Corporation (Damco)
could not operate a quarry leased from the state-owned Alaska
Railroad Corporation (the Railroad) under Anchorage zoning
regulations.1152  In 1989, the Railroad acquired the quarry from the
federal government, which had operated the quarry from the mid-
1940s until 1985.1153  Eklutna successfully enjoined the operation of
the quarry pursuant to Anchorage zoning regulations.1154  The su-
preme court affirmed, declaring that when mineral resource opera-
tions are at issue, Anchorage Municipal Code 21.55.0901155 over-
rides more general sections of the code.1156  In addition, the court
held that the federal government’s continued operation of the
quarry after the enactment of the AMC did not confer conditional-
use status on the quarry because the AMC could not be enforced
against the federal government due to supremacy immunity.1157
Furthermore, after the transfer of the quarry to the Railroad, there
was no transfer of conditional-use rights, since the federal govern-
ment never followed the proper procedures to establish the
rights.1158  The court also ruled that the supremacy immunity from
zoning did not transfer from the Railroad to Damco because the
Railroad’s supremacy immunity is not a transferable property
1148. Id. at 165.
1149. Id. at 165-66.
1150. Id. at 166.
1151. 43 P.3d 588 (Alaska 2002).
1152. Id. at 589.
1153. Id. at 590.
1154. Id.
1155. ANCHORAGE, AK., MUNICIPAL CHARTER, CODE AND REGULATIONS §
21.55.090 (1996).
1156. Alaska Railroad, 43 P.3d at 593.
1157. Id. at 596.
1158. Id.
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right.1159  In addition, the court found that no unconstitutional tak-
ing occurred because Damco was a state agency, not a private
landholder.1160  Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the supe-
rior court’s summary judgment and order enjoining the quarrying
activities.1161
In AVCP Regional Housing Authority v. R.A. Vranckaert
Co.,1162 the supreme court held that a claim for indemnity for pas-
sive negligence was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel
and that the landlord’s claims for express and implied contract in-
demnity, breach of contract, and negligence were properly dis-
missed.1163  In 1991, Vranckaert installed gas kitchen ranges in
twelve apartments for the Association of Village Council Presi-
dents Regional Housing Authority (AVCP).1164  From 1992 to 1995,
numerous tenants complained that the ranges did not work prop-
erly and later called the fire department complaining of nausea,
headaches, gas odors, and warnings from carbon monoxide
alarms.1165 A group of tenants, the Nilsson plaintiffs, sued ACVP
and Vranckaert, claiming injury as a result of exposure to carbon
monoxide.1166  AVCP filed a cross-claim against Vranckaert seeking
equitable apportionment of damages.1167  Both AVCP and
Vranckaert settled.1168  AVCP then sought to amend its complaint
against Vranckaert to include a claim of equitable indemnity.1169
Judge Curda denied the motion and dismissed the complaint rea-
soning that AVCP had not stated a viable cause of action.1170
Rather than appeal, AVCP filed a new lawsuit against Vranckaert,
asserting express and implied contractual indemnity, indemnity for
passive negligence, breach of contract, and negligence.1171  Judge
Hunt granted Vranckaert’s summary judgment motion on the
ground that the new claims were barred by res judicata.1172
Shortly thereafter, a second group of tenants, the Engler plain-
tiffs, sued AVCP and Vranckaert for the same grounds as the Nils-
1159. Id. at 597.
1160. Id.
1161. Id. at 598.
1162. 47 P.3d 650 (Alaska 2002).
1163. Id. at 660.
1164. Id. at 652.
1165. Id.
1166. Id. at 653.
1167. Id.
1168. Id.
1169. Id.
1170. Id.
1171. Id.
1172. Id.
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son plaintiffs.1173  AVCP again filed a cross-claim against
Vranckaert.1174  Both AVCP and Vranckaert settled with the Engler
plaintiffs.1175  In ruling on Vranckaert’s summary judgment motion,
Judge Steinkruger allowed AVCP’s claims of implied contractual
indemnity, breach of contract, and negligence, but dismissed its
claims of passive negligence and express contractual indemnity.1176
On appeal, AVCP’s Nilsson and Engler cross-claims were con-
solidated.1177  First, the supreme court affirmed both dismissals of
AVCP’s passive negligence claim, reasoning that the claim was
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.1178  The supreme
court then affirmed Judge Steinkruger’s ruling for Vranckaert on
AVCP’s claim of express contractual indemnity because the con-
tract between AVCP and Vranckaert did not indemnify AVCP
from AVCP’s own negligence.1179  The supreme court reversed
Judge Steinkruger’s ruling allowing AVCP’s claim of implied con-
tractual indemnity because to hold that Vranckaert must indemnify
AVCP while Vranckaert was still liable to the plaintiffs “would
lead to the unjust result that the indemnitor would face double li-
ability.”1180  The court also reversed Judge Steinkruger’s ruling al-
lowing AVCP’s claims for breach of contract and negligence “be-
cause they are, in essence, implied contractual indemnity
claims.”1181  Finally, the supreme court affirmed Judge Hunt’s dis-
missal of all five claims.1182
In Barr v. Goldome Realty Credit Corp.,1183 the supreme court
held that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the mort-
gagee and its dismissal of the mortgagor’s counterclaim were erro-
neous because there were factual disputes with regard to whether
the mortgagor’s loan was current and whether an overpayment was
available to apply to the mortgagor’s account.1184  Mortgagee
Donna Barr had assumed ownership of property subject to a deed
of trust.1185  Nationsbanc, as beneficiary, initiated foreclosure pro-
1173. Id.
1174. Id.
1175. Id.
1176. Id. at 654.
1177. Id. at 653.
1178. Id. at 655.
1179. Id. at 656.
1180. Id. at 658.
1181. Id. at 659.
1182. Id. at 660.
1183. 46 P.3d 1004 (Alaska 2002).
1184. Id. at 1006-08.
1185. Id. at 1005.
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ceedings in January 1998 because it believed the underlying note
was in default as no loan payments had been made after October
1997.1186  Barr counterclaimed, claiming that Nationsbanc failed to
credit surplus funds in her escrow account.1187  The trial court
granted partial summary judgment to Nationsbanc and dismissed
Barr’s counterclaim with prejudice.1188  The supreme court held on
appeal that the evidence presented by Barr could be admissible for
the purposes of summary judgment,1189 and further created a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether the loan was current in Oc-
tober 1997, the month of the last loan payment.1190  The supreme
court also held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Nationsbanc could have applied any escrow surplus to
Barr’s monthly payments in November and December 1997 and
January 1998.1191  Lastly, the supreme court held that the trial
court’s dismissal of Barr’s counterclaim was erroneous because Na-
tionsbanc did not conclusively show that an escrow surplus did not
exist and that therefore “the genuine factual dispute that requires
us to reverse Nationsbanc’s summary judgment motion also re-
quires us to reverse the dismissal of Barr’s counterclaim.”1192  The
supreme court reversed the partial summary judgment, vacated the
findings of fact and law, and remanded.1193
In Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,1194 the Alaska Supreme
Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kenai
Peninsula Borough, and ruled that a transfer of land under the Ka-
nai Peninsula Borough Code1195 (the Code) may be at less than fair
market value if the transfer is “in the best public interest.”1196  The
Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly (Assembly) had exchanged a
forty-acre parcel of land appraised at $33,700 for a twenty-acre
parcel appraised at $24,500.  Neighbors of the forty-acre parcel
sued, claiming that the parcel was not exchanged at fair market
value and therefore was exchanged in violation of the Code.1197  The
1186. Id.
1187. Id. at 1006
1188. Id.
1189. Id at 1007-08.
1190. Id. at 1008.
1191. Id.
1192. Id. at 1009.
1193. Id.
1194. 50 P.3d 798 (Alaska 2002).
1195. KENAI PENINSULA BOROUGH, AK., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.10.100.
(1998).
1196. Cabana, 50 P.3d at 803.
1197. Id. at 801.
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court found that the Assembly acted properly in approving the
transfer and ruled that the Assembly was in the best position to de-
termine whether the transfer was in the Borough’s best interest.1198
In addition, the court stated that the plaintiffs must do more than
“point[ ] out anomalies” in the land transaction to overcome the
strong presumption of government propriety.1199  The court also
ruled that the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights were not
violated because there is a “fair and substantial relationship be-
tween . . . the land exchange and the legitimate governmental goals
of reducing land use conflicts and protecting public health and
safety.”1200
In Cizek v. Concerned Citizens of Eagle River Valley, Inc.,1201
the supreme court affirmed the enjoinment of the use of an air-
strip.1202  The property’s continual suitability for use as an airstrip
and its sporadic unauthorized use did not maintain its status as a
continuing nonconforming use under Anchorage zoning laws.1203
The airstrip originated when the land was an unrestricted zoning
area.1204  Although the land was rezoned to prohibit the airstrip, the
airstrip owner continued to allow two of his friends to use the air-
strip infrequently.1205  Following the sale of adjacent land, the new
owners petitioned for and were granted a conditional use of the
airstrip.1206  When the Cizeks then purchased the adjacent land, they
planned to build a home with an attached hangar and to use the
airstrip.1207  The Concerned Citizens of Eagle River Valley claimed
that the nonconforming use right had lapsed and sought to enjoin
the use of the airstrip.1208  The supreme court rejected the Cizek’s
argument that the land’s usability as an airstrip sufficed to continue
an existing nonconforming use.1209  The court held that actual use is
required to continue nonconforming uses and that the intermittent,
unauthorized use by the friends of the airstrip owner was insuffi-
cient to continue the nonconforming use.1210  The court also rejected
1198. Id. at 804.
1199. Id. at 803.
1200. Id. at 805.
1201. 49 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2002).
1202. Id. at 229.
1203. Id.
1204. Id.
1205. Id. at 230.
1206. Id.
1207. Id.
1208. Id.
1209. Id. at 232.
1210. Id.
YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC 04/22/03  12:57 PM
174 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:1
the Cizek’s statute of limitations argument, finding that a cause of
action “accrued each day that the property violated the zoning
laws.”1211  The supreme court held that neither estoppel nor laches
barred the action.1212  The supreme court also held that the Cizeks
waived their claim for Rule 37 sanctions because they never re-
quested a hearing.1213  The supreme court additionally ruled that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Cizek’s mo-
tion for a new trial because it was the Cizek’s tactical miscalcula-
tion that prejudiced them and not the trial court’s ruling.1214  Lastly,
the supreme court found that the Cizeks should not be enjoined
from storing airplanes on the property because such storage is
permitted under zoning laws.1215  Accordingly, the supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s enjoinment of the use of the airstrip,
but directed the superior court to amend the injunction to allow the
Cizeks to store airplanes on their property.1216
In Griswold v. City of Homer,1217 the supreme court affirmed
the superior court’s holding that COB, Inc. could continue to use
its property for vehicle maintenance and repair as lawful noncon-
forming uses.1218  COB owned property located within an area sub-
ject to Homer’s zoning regulations.1219  These zoning regulations
prohibited COB from using its property for automobile repair and
maintenance unless those uses were “grandfathered in.”1220  These
types of uses are “grandfathered in” if they have not been discon-
tinued for more than a year.1221  COB petitioned the Homer Advi-
sory Planning Commission to approve of its nonconforming uses on
its property.1222  Griswold, one of COB’s competitors, objected to
the petition.1223  The Commission concluded that COB lost the right
to use the property for a public garage but sustained the right to
use of the property for vehicle maintenance and repair.1224  The su-
preme court affirmed this holding because COB documented many
instances of vehicle repair and maintenance on its property since
1211. Id. at 233.
1212. Id. at 233-34.
1213. Id. at 234.
1214. Id. at 235.
1215. Id.
1216. Id.
1217. 55 P.3d 64 (Alaska 2002).
1218. Id. at 67.
1219. Id. at 66.
1220. Id.
1221. Id.
1222. Id.
1223. Id.
1224. Id. at 67.
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1991.1225  The supreme court further held that the nonconforming
use was for “commercial” automotive service and repair and also
that members of the Commission were not biased.1226
In Guttchen v. Gabriel,1227 the supreme court held (1) that the
trial court erred in nullifying the Guttchens’ judgment lien based
upon the discharge of the underlying debt in the Gabriels’ bank-
ruptcy,1228 and (2) that the record established “just and sufficient
reasons” for execution of the Guttchens’ judgment lien more than
five years after the judgment.1229  In July 1989, the Guttchens were
awarded $7,526 in attorney’s fees and costs against the Gabriels.1230
The Guttchens recorded the judgment in July 1989 and perfected a
lien on a 1.5 acre parcel of land owned by the Gabriels.1231  While an
appeal was pending, the Gabriels filed for personal bankruptcy.1232
The bankruptcy court discharged the Gabriels’ debts in September
1990.1233  The supreme court first held, following Johnson v. Home
State Bank,1234 that a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish a
valid lien on real property.1235  Thus, the supreme court held that it
was error for the trial court to deny the Guttchens’ motion for
leave to execute the judgment lien on the ground that the Gabriels’
bankruptcy extinguished both the underlying debt and the lien.1236
The supreme court next held that the record established “just and
sufficient reasons” for late execution of the Guttchens’ judgment
lien.1237  The supreme court considered that the 1.5 acre parcel was
the only property of the Gabriels subject to execution, the Gabriels
controlled the process of subdividing the property, and the Gab-
riels did not timely act upon the trial court’s order to subdivide.1238
Additionally, the supreme court considered that as soon as an ap-
plication was filed by the Gabriel family in 1999 to obtain permis-
sion to subdivide, the Guttchens promptly filed their motion for
leave to execute.1239  Accordingly, the supreme court vacated the
1225. Id. at 68.
1226. Id. at 69-73.
1227. 49 P.3d 223 (Alaska 2002).
1228. Id. at 226.
1229. Id. at 227.
1230. Id. at 224.
1231. Id.
1232. Id.
1233. Id.
1234. 501 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1991).
1235. Guttchen, 49 P.3d at 225.
1236. Id. at 226.
1237. Id. at 227.
1238. Id.
1239. Id.
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trial court’s judgment and remanded with directions to enter a
judgment granting the motion for late execution of the judgment
lien.1240
In Holta v. Certified Financial Services, Inc.,1241 the supreme
court held that the statute of limitations did not bar Holta from
bringing a non-judicial foreclosure action against Certified Finan-
cial’s property.1242  Holta acquired an interest in a note originally
calling for payment on November 15, 1989, secured by the property
known as the Essex Square subdivision now owned by Certified
Financial.1243  The recorded deed of trust referred to the underlying,
unrecorded note but did not contain in itself a maturity date.1244
Alaska law establishes a ten year statute of limitations for actions
relating to notes that contain no maturity date.1245  The supreme
court found that because the instrument that contained the No-
vember 1989 maturity date was unrecorded, the ten year statute of
limitations must be followed in accordance with the purpose of the
Alaska statute to “provide subsequent purchasers with record
knowledge and reasonable certainty regarding the vitality of liens
recorded against the property.”1246  The supreme court also held
that Holta’s deed of trust was not extinguished by the municipal tax
foreclosure proceedings that occurred.1247  In the municipal tax pro-
ceedings, only the right of redemption of the then-current owner,
was sold.1248  Therefore federal law extinguishing liens on property
deeds after a IRS tax foreclosure sale1249 was not applicable.1250  Ac-
cordingly, the judgment of the superior court was reversed, and the
case was remanded for further proceedings.1251
In Hurst v. Victoria Park Subdivision Addition No. 1 Home-
owners’ Ass’n,1252 the supreme court affirmed the summary judg-
ment decision of the court below regarding a dispute about a re-
strictive covenant.1253  On September 14, 1998, the Victoria Park
Subdivision Addition Number 1 Homeowners’ Association (Asso-
1240. Id.
1241. 49 P.3d 1104 (Alaska 2002).
1242. Id. at 1105.
1243. Id. at 1105-06.
1244. Id. at 1107.
1245. ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.150(a) (Michie 2002).
1246. Holta, 49 P.3d at 1107.
1247. Id. at 1110.
1248. Id.
1249. 26 U.S.C. § 6339(c) (2000).
1250. Holta, 49 P.3d at 1110.
1251. Id. at 1111.
1252. 59 P.3d 275 (Alaska 2002).
1253. Id. at 276.
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ciation) notified the Hursts that it intended to build a split rail
fence along the border of the Hurst’s property.1254  The Hursts filed
a complaint alleging that the fence violated the terms of a restric-
tive covenant because it was a permanent structure.1255  The supe-
rior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association,
finding that the fence did not violate the covenant because the pur-
pose for the fence was in line with the purpose of the covenant to
set aside land for “non-intensive recreational and park pur-
poses . . . .”1256  On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s decision.  The court did not rely on case law from other ju-
risdictions to determine whether the fence was a permanent struc-
ture.1257  Instead, the court focused on how to construe the restric-
tion to effectuate the intent of the parties; thus, it considered what
the purpose of the restriction was and the nature of the fence.1258  It
concluded that the purpose of the covenant was to protect the lot
owned by the Association, not to protect the view of the lot for the
Hursts.1259  Accordingly, the supreme court held that the fence was
not in violation of the restrictive covenants and affirmed the deci-
sion of the court below.1260
In Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Trust v. State,1261 the su-
preme court held that because the State did not announce a con-
crete intention to use or condemn specific parcels of the plaintiffs’
property, no de facto taking occurred.1262  The plaintiffs owned
property which was projected to be part of a right-of-way acquisi-
tion planned by the Department of Transportation (DOT).1263  In
1997, plaintiffs instituted an inverse condemnation suit against the
State, arguing that a de facto taking of property occurs when pre-
condemnation public announcements of a proposed acquisition re-
duces the economic values of the property, even if the property is
never actually condemned.1264  The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision and concluded that the “concrete intention”
1254. Id. at 277.  The adjoining property, Lot 43, was owned by the Association.
Covenants on that property required that the lot be used for non-intensive recrea-
tional and park purposes.  The Association wanted to erect the fence to help man-
age access to and use of the lot.  Id.
1255. Id.
1256. Id.
1257. Id. at 277-78.
1258. Id. at 278.
1259. Id. at 279.
1260. Id. at 280.
1261. 54 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2002).
1262. Id. at 295.
1263. Id.
1264. Id. at 296-97.
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test, whereby the State must show a present and certain intent to
condemn the specific property, was the appropriate test, and that
the DOT’s announcements did not demonstrate such intent.1265  Al-
though in some cases the court has required compensation to
homeowners because of the government’s pre-condemnation ac-
tivities by finding that a temporary taking had occurred,1266 a pres-
ent concrete indication of intent to condemn that property is re-
quired.1267  At the time the parties sought summary judgment, it was
still undetermined whether the project would proceed or which
parcels would be acquired if it did proceed.1268  Further, the prop-
erty owner must prove that the State acted improperly in delaying
the actual condemnation following an announcement of such intent
and that as a result the property value diminished.1269  Here, the
State did not interfere with the landowner’s economic or physical
use and enjoyment of the property.1270
In Leisnoi, Inc., v. United States,1271 the Ninth Circuit held that
it had jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of Stratman’s mo-
tion to intervene and that Stratman’s motion was moot.1272  This
dispute began when Leisnoi, an Alaska Native Village corporation,
received land pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act.1273  However, an action was filed by Stratman, a rancher,
claiming that Leisnoi never properly qualified as a Native Village
and that the land should be returned to the government.1274  To
quiet the title, Leisnoi brought an action against the United
States.1275  Stratman sought to intervene, however, the United
States filed a disclaimer and the district court quieted title in Leis-
noi and dismissed Stratman’s motion as moot.1276  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding because the plain terms of
1265. Id. at 297-98.
1266. E.g., Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 791 P.2d 610, 614
(Alaska 1990) (allowing recovery to the owners of a parcel of land designated as a
potential school site).
1267. Jackovich Revocable Trust, 54 P.3d at 298.
1268. Id. at 297.
1269. Id. at 298.
1270. Id. at 303.
1271. 313 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
1272. Id. at 1184.
1273. Id. at 1182.
1274. Id. at 1183.
1275. Id.
1276. Id.
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U.S.C. § 2409a(e)1277 deprived the district court of jurisdiction once
the United States filed its disclaimer.1278
In Madden v. Alaska Mortgage Group,1279 the supreme court
held that a new payment on a promissory note extended a lender’s
right to recover its entire debt through foreclosure, even though
the debtor had lost title to the property.1280  Additionally, the su-
preme court held that fees expended in suing to establish the
amount of a debt were not recoverable under a deed because they
were not expenses of foreclosure.1281  A debtor gave Alaska Mort-
gage a promissory note and secured the note by granting a second
deed of trust on two lots (the Iliaska Subdivision).1282  Three years
later, the debtor defaulted on his first deed of trust and lost title to
the Iliaska Subdivision;1283 he continued, however, to make pay-
ments on the second deed of trust.1284  Subsequently, the Maddens
were granted a third deed of trust (subject to Alaska Mortgage’s
deed) in order to secure a loan.1285  Within a year, the original
debtor stopped making payments on his note and made no pay-
ments for nine years,1286 causing Alaska Mortgage to commence
foreclosure proceedings.1287  The Maddens attempted to block the
foreclosure sale, stating that Alaska Mortgage had overstated the
amount due on its deed because many of the original debtor’s late
payments were barred by a six-year statute of limitations.1288
Alaska Mortgage responded by filing suit and seeking to establish
the amount due under its deed.1289  Before a court could rule on the
matter, however, the original debtor sent another payment on the
note.1290  Alaska Mortgage then moved for summary judgment,
claiming that the new payment had revived any portion of the debt
barred by the statute of limitations.1291  Entering judgment in favor
of Alaska Mortgage, the superior court ruled that the new payment
had revived all installments under the promissory note and the
1277. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(e) (2000).
1278. Leisnoi, 313 F.3d at 1184.
1279. 54 P.3d 265 (Alaska 2002).
1280. Id. at 266.
1281. Id.
1282. Id.
1283. Id.
1284. Id.
1285. Id. at 267.
1286. Id.
1287. Id.
1288. Id.
1289. Id.
1290. Id.
1291. Id.
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deed of trust.1292  On appeal, the supreme court held that, even
though the debtor was technically out of possession of the Iliaska
Subdivision at the time he made his new payment, he maintained
an interest in the mortgaged property to the extent that the mort-
gage secured the non-time-barred installments.1293  Furthermore,
the court held that a subsequent grantee who has notice of a valid
and enforceable prior lien assumes the risk of an extension.1294  Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court held that allowing the debtor to re-
vive the time-barred installments simply returned the Maddens to
holding subsequent to Alaska Mortgage’s deed,1295 and remanded
the case for reduction of attorney’s fees to reflect only the fees in-
curred in performing the actual foreclosure sale.1296
In Miller v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough1297 the supreme court
held (1) that a borough ordinance which allocated paving special
assessments to residential lots on a per lot basis did not conflict
with state law, and (2) a borough ordinance limiting special assess-
ments to twenty-five percent of the lots’ tax-appraised value did
not apply to the local improvement district in question.1298 The Ma-
tanuska-Susitna Borough Assembly enacted an ordinance which
assessed the cost of road improvements equally to each lot within
the scope of the newly created improvement district.1299 The Millers
owned nine lots within the improvement district and argued that
the borough acted contrary to state law by assessing the cost of im-
provement equally on a per-lot basis.1300 State law provides a de-
fault method of assessing improvement costs “against property in
proportion to the benefit received.”1301 However, Alaska law also
authorizes municipalities to prescribe special assessment proce-
dures if they so choose.1302 Noting that the per-lot method of as-
sessing improvement costs was presumptively valid, the court held
that since the Millers had not shown that the benefit to their prop-
erty was grossly disproportionate compared to the benefit con-
ferred upon other assessed properties, the per-lot method was not
1292. Id.
1293. Id. at 269.
1294. Id.
1295. Id. at 270.
1296. Id. at 271.
1297. 54 P.3d 285 (Alaska 2002).
1298. Id. at 287.
1299. Id. at 288.
1300. Id.
1301. Id. at 289; ALASKA STAT. § 29.46.060 (Michie 2002).
1302. Id. at 289-90.
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irrational and therefore valid.1303 Finally, the court held that the or-
dinance at issue supplanted older procedures for improvement as-
sessments and that, consequently, a twenty-five percent limit on as-
sessments did not apply.1304
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Suzuki,1305 the supreme court
held that Alaska Statutes section 09.55.2751306 requires municipali-
ties to seek replat approval when the municipality seeks an ease-
ment which results in a “boundary change.”1307  The municipality
sought easements for the properties of Dong Joon Lim and Lisa
Suzuki which required the destruction of a part of Lim’s property
and either the destruction or movement of part of Suzuki’s prop-
erty.1308  The superior court consolidated the cases and found that
the requests for easements on both properties constituted a bound-
ary change in accordance with section 09.55.275.1309  The supreme
court held that “an easement that is not coextensive with the prop-
erty owner’s property line and that functionally interferes with the
landowner’s exclusive use is a boundary change under section
09.55.275.”1310  The court first concluded that excluding easements
from “boundary change” would render sections of the statute
meaningless.1311  The court then concluded that the legislative intent
favored a broader interpretation of “boundary change” in order to
require coordination between state and local governments.1312  Be-
cause the two easements constituted a “boundary change,” the su-
preme court affirmed the superior court decision to require replat-
ting for both easements.1313
In Ogar v. City of Haines,1314 the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s summary judgment decision that the city was not
equitably estopped from requiring Ogar to remove structures that
were in violation of the city right-of-way.1315  In 1990, the previous
owners of the Ogars’ property requested an appropriate vacation,
but failed to complete the vacation process and built a residential
1303. Id. at 291-92.
1304. Id. at 292.
1305. 41 P.3d 147 (Alaska 2002).
1306. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.275 (Michie 2002).
1307. Suzuki at 149.
1308. Id.
1309. Id. at 149-50.
1310. Id. at 150.
1311. Id. at 151-52.
1312. Id. at 153.
1313. Id. at 154.
1314. 51 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2002).
1315. Id. at 333.
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garage which encroached on the city’s right-of-way.1316  The en-
croachment did not come to the attention of the Ogars until
1997.1317  At that point, Ogar applied for a thirty-foot vacation for
the garage, a ten-foot overhang extension, and an adjacent fuel
tank.  The city planning commission approved a fifteen-foot vaca-
tion for the original garage but required Ogar to remove the over-
hang, remove the fuel tank, and have the property surveyed, replat-
ted, and paid at the current value.1318  Ogar complied with most of
the city’s conditions but never removed the overhang or the
tank.1319  Instead, Ogar filed suit against the previous owners and
the city.  Ogar’s amended complaint alleged that the city negli-
gently failed to correct the encroachment by failing to inspect the
property and requested that the city be equitably estopped from
requiring her to remove the overhang and fuel tank.1320  In review-
ing the grant of summary judgment, the supreme court noted that
four elements must be proven to make out a claim for equitable es-
toppel: (1) “[A]n assertion of position by conduct or word”; (2)
“reasonable reliance thereon”; (3) resulting prejudice; and (4) en-
forcement of the estoppel to the extent that justice requires.1321  The
court held, however, that the city never made any assertions either
to Ogar or the previous property owner which would satisfy this
requirement.1322  Nor did the court find that the city’s failure to
“prevent or cure the encroachment” was sufficient to show equita-
ble estoppel.1323  As the first of the four elements was not met, the
court found that there was no basis for the equitable estoppel and
affirmed the summary judgment.1324
In Rockstad v. Global Finance & Investment Co.,1325 the su-
preme court held that a renewed default provision was not trig-
gered when the lessee attempted to pay late rent before he re-
ceived written notice of default.1326  Rockstad operated a dry
cleaning business on commercial property leased from Global Fi-
nance and Investment Company (Global).1327  Although the lease
1316. Id. at 334.
1317. Id.
1318. Id.
1319. Id.
1320. Id. at 335.
1321. Id.
1322. Id.
1323. Id. at 336.
1324. Id.
1325. 41 P.3d 583 (Alaska 2002).
1326. Id. at 589.
1327. Id. at 584.
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provided that rent was due on the first day of each month, Global
commonly accepted payments on the tenth.1328  In August 1999,
Rockstad failed to tender the amount due for more than ten days
after Global had sent written notice.1329  In September 1999, Rock-
stad went to pay the rent on the tenth day of the month, but arrived
at the office at 5:10 PM after the office closed.1330  Rockstad left a
message explaining that he attempted to pay the rent.1331  Global re-
turned the call refusing late payment and sent Rockstad notice to
vacate the premise immediately.1332  The notice stated that Rock-
stad’s failure to pay timely rent was his second default in two
months and that Global was exercising its power under the Re-
newed Default provision of the lease to terminate the lease.1333
When Rockstad refused to vacate, Global filed suit.1334  The supe-
rior court concluded that Rockstad had breached the lease, but that
the breach was not material as Rockstad had attempted delivery
within minutes of the deadline.1335  The superior court declined to
evict Rockstad if he paid the late rent, interest, and the reasonable
costs of the proceeding.1336  Rockstad appealed.1337  The supreme
court reversed the superior court’s decision holding that the Re-
newed Default provision had not been triggered as Global did not
send written notice of the second default before Rockstad at-
tempted to cure.1338  The supreme court determined that the provi-
sion was ambiguous as to whether written notice was required.1339
The court reasoned that the provision did require written notice in
order to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the contracting
parties, to render none of the disputed provisions superfluous, to
favor continuing the lease, and to disfavor the lessor and drafting
party.1340
1328. Id.
1329. Id.
1330. Id.
1331. Id.
1332. Id.
1333. Id.
1334. Id.
1335. Id. at 584-85.
1336. Id. at 585.
1337. Id. at 584.
1338. Id. at 589.
1339. Id. at 587.
1340. Id. at 588-89.
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XI.  TORT LAW
In Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Anderson,1341 the
supreme court reduced the jury’s award for lost earnings but af-
firmed the punitive damage award for claims involving constructive
retaliatory discharge, promissory estoppel and defamation.1342  An-
derson’s suit alleged that Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Associa-
tion (“Association”) and its president had wrongfully discharged
her in retaliation for her investigation of misappropriation of Asso-
ciation funds and that both the president and the Association made
defamatory statements regarding Anderson’s reason for dis-
charge.1343  At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Anderson on two
theories of wrongful termination and awarded money for back pay
and lost future wages.  The jury also awarded her money for emo-
tional distress and loss of reputation resulting from the deprivation.
It then awarded punitive damages against the Association’s presi-
dent and the Association itself.1344  On appeal, the Association ar-
gued that the economic damages award was in error and the puni-
tive damages award was excessive.1345  Regarding the economic
damages, the supreme court found that the jury’s verdict was incor-
rect because it failed to rely on the amount and duration of the
contract that Anderson actually expected.1346  Accordingly, the
court recalculated the award to reflect only a one-year loss of
earnings.1347  As to the punitive damages, however, the court was
unwilling to reverse the jury’s finding.  First, the court concluded
that the discussion of corruption in Anderson’s closing argument
was appropriate.1348  Next, it determined that while the trial court
should not have instructed the jury about the statutory cap on puni-
tive damages, the instruction was harmless error, particularly since
the court instructed the jury not to use the cap as a gauge for the
award and because the award was much less than the statutory
cap.1349  Finally, the court held that the trial court properly refused
to remit the jury’s punitive damages award.1350  The court deter-
mined that the jury properly considered both common law factors
1341. 54 P.3d 271 (Alaska 2002).
1342. Id. at 275.
1343. Id. at 275-76.
1344. Id. at 276-77.
1345. Id. at 277.
1346. Id. at 278.  In this case, she only expected a one year contract for $60,000-
$65,000 a year.  Id.
1347. Id.
1348. Id. at 279-80.
1349. Id. at 281-82.
1350. Id. at 282.
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and statutory factors in calculating the award,1351 and it concluded
that the jury’s award also met the guidelines suggested by the
United States Supreme Court.1352  Accordingly, the decision of the
court below was reversed in part and affirmed in part.1353
In Fenner v. Municipality of Anchorage,1354 the supreme court
declined to adopt a “substantial certainty” standard for intentional
tort actions involving the workers’ compensation system.1355  Fenner
was injured while driving a plow truck for the city.1356  Fenner re-
ceived workers’ compensation but sued the city alleging that a
combination of its actions rose to the level of an intentional tort.1357
The supreme court recognized that although the workers’ compen-
sation system is generally the exclusive remedy for employees in-
jured in the workplace, it does not apply in cases of intentional
torts.1358  Fenner argued that the court had adopted the substantial
certainty standard for intentional torts in an earlier case, but the
supreme court dismissed his argument, reasoning that where the
claim arises in the workers’ compensation environment, specific in-
tent is required.1359  On this basis, the court held that Fenner had
failed to submit any evidence that the municipality specifically in-
tended to injure him and affirmed the trial court’s entry of sum-
mary judgment.1360
In Fernandes v. Portwine,1361 the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s decision of a nuisance case under Alaska Statutes
section 09.10.0501362: (1) requiring the plaintiffs to prove nuisance
by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) applying a six-year statute
of limitations; (3) denying defendant’s request for a jury view; (4)
refusing to enjoin plaintiffs’ plumbing business; and (5) denying
both parties’ attorney’s fees.1363  The Portwines’s brought suit
against Joaquim Fernandes claiming that he created a nuisance and
sought to enjoin him from the disputed activities.1364  Fernandes
counterclaimed that the Portwines defamed him and that they used
1351. Id. at 282-83.
1352. Id. at 284.
1353. Id. at 285.
1354. 53 P.3d 573 (Alaska 2002).
1355. Id. at 577.
1356. Id. at 574.
1357. Id.
1358. Id. at 575.
1359. Id. at 576-77.
1360. Id. at 577-78.
1361. 56 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2002).
1362. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (Michie 2002).
1363. Id. at 3.
1364. Id.
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their land for non-permitted industrial uses.1365  First, the court held
that because the plaintiffs were suing under standard nuisance stat-
utes, the superior court correctly used the preponderance of the
evidence standard.1366  Second, the court upheld the superior court’s
determination that a six-year statute of limitations governs this
case.1367  The court ruled that in a statute of limitations context, the
meaning of trespass in the statute is interpreted broadly to encom-
pass any unlawful interference with one’s person, property, or
rights.1368  Third, reviewing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
request for a jury view, the court held that the trial judge did not
abuse his broad discretion under this permissive rule.1369  Fourth,
the court held that given the scant testimony presented at trial, the
superior court did not err in finding defendant’s cross-claim “was
not established at trial.”1370  Finally, reviewing the application for
attorney’s fees, the court upheld the superior court’s judgment that
where there is no prevailing party, each party should bear its own
costs and attorney’s fees.1371  For these reasons, the court affirmed
the superior court’s decision in its entirety.1372
In Hinsberger v. State,1373 the supreme court held that the plain-
tiff would be unable to demonstrate breach of preexisting duty and
therefore had no claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED).1374  Hinsberger sued the State, alleging negligence based
on the delay of medical treatment while he was incarcerated and
NIED.1375  The State subsequently moved for summary judgment
on both claims and the superior court granted the State’s mo-
tions.1376  Hinsberger appealed the NIED judgment.1377  While he
conceded that he did not have a physical injury as a result of the
NIED, he claimed that the preexisting duty exception applied.1378
The supreme court rejected this argument, reasoning that because
Hinsberger did appeal the superior court’s judgment regarding
negligence, then as a matter of law the State did not breach its
1365. Id. at 3-4.
1366. Id. at 5.
1367. Id. at 6.
1368. Id.
1369. Id. at 7.
1370. Id.
1371. Id. at 8-9.
1372. Id. at 9.
1373. 53 P.3d 568 (Alaska 2002).
1374. Id. at 569.
1375. Id. at 570.
1376. Id.
1377. Id.
1378. Id at 571.
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duty, and Hinsberger would be unable to establish the breach of
duty required for the NIED claim.1379  For these reasons, the court
affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment.1380
In Kallstrom v. United States,1381 the supreme court held that a
cause of action for NIED does not exist for an “unwitting instru-
ment” - a plaintiff who becomes a participant in the infliction of
another’s injuries through the negligence of the defendant.1382  At a
public dance hall, Kallstrom retrieved a drink for a nine-year-old
girl from a pitcher sitting next to the sink, which she believed to
contain fruit juice.1383  “In fact, the pitcher contained a lye-based
caustic detergent that caused severe, permanent internal injuries to
[the girl] when she drank it.”1384  After the federal district court
granted the government’s motion to dismiss on Kallstrom’s claim
for NIED, Kallstrom appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.1385  In turn, the circuit court certified the case to the Alaska
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 407(a) of the Alaska Rules of
Appellate Procedure1386 because the facts of the case were not ade-
quately covered by Alaska case law.1387  The supreme court ruled
that “[g]enerally, damages are not awarded for NIED in the ab-
sence of physical injury”1388 and identified two exceptions to this
rule: “the bystander exception” and “the preexisting duty excep-
tion.”1389  Kallstrom was precluded from recovering under “the by-
stander exception” because she had no blood relation to the victim
and had only passing involvement with her prior to the injury.1390
She was precluded from recovering under “the preexisting duty ex-
ception” because she did not have a contractual or fiduciary duty
with the government.1391  The court also declined to recognize a
duty of care to protect “unwitting instruments” from emotional
harm because the harm to such plaintiffs is not reasonably foresee-
able and plaintiffs in the “unwitting instrument” scenario vary too
1379. Id at 572.
1380. Id. at 573.
1381. 43 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2002).
1382. Id. at 163.
1383. Id. at 164.
1384. Id.
1385. Id.
1386. ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(a).
1387. Kallstrom, 43 P.3d at 164.
1388. Id. at 165.
1389. Id. at 165-66.
1390. Id. at 165.
1391. Id. at 166.
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widely to allow a court to meaningfully distinguish legitimate
claims.1392
In Kava v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,1393 the supreme
court held that: (1) a manufacturer’s evidence of comparative risk
was admissible; (2) the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on issues
not already litigated when the superior court sua sponte declared a
mistrial as to one claim; (3) determination of a new trial was in the
superior court’s discretion; and (4) evidence of an indemnification
agreement was properly excluded.1394  Abner Gologergen died after
losing control of his Honda three-wheel ATV.1395  His estate filed a
wrongful death action against Honda and Sitasuak, Honda’s local
distributor, on behalf of the estate’s dependants.1396  On appeal, the
estate first argued that the superior court erred in admitting
Honda’s evidence of comparative risk.1397  The supreme court held
that the evidence was admissible and revelvant because it went to
the issue of punitive damages.1398  The estate also argued that it
should have been granted a new trial because the superior court
sua sponte declared a mistrial on the negligence claim.1399  Though
the supreme court agreed that the superior court had acted sua
sponte, it held that the estate was not entitled to a new trial on all
claims because it would relitigate issues that the jury had already
decided.1400  However, the court held that a new trial was necessary
for the issue of comparative fault because, had the jury found
Honda negligent, they could have assessed greater comparative
fault.1401  The supreme court also remanded the issue to be deter-
mined under the correct standard: whether, in the superior court’s
discretion, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.1402
Finally, the supreme court held that the superior court properly ex-
cluded evidence of Honda’s indemnity agreement as the there was
no deceptive appearance of adversity between Honda and Sitasuak
which might cause an appearance of bias.1403
1392. Id. at 167-68.
1393. 48 P.3d 1170 (Alaska 2002).
1394. Id. at 1174, 1176, 1177, 1179.
1395. Id. at 1172.
1396. Id.
1397. Id. at 1174.
1398. Id.
1399. Id. at 1175.
1400. Id. at 1176.
1401. Id.
1402. Id. at 1177.
1403. Id. at 1179.
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In Laidlaw Transit, Inc., v. Crouse,1404 the supreme court held
that Laidlaw, a school bus company, was vicariously liable for a bus
driver’s actions because she was acting within the course and scope
of employment.1405  Shawn Crouse was injured when the bus on
which he was riding slid off the road and rolled over.1406  A post-
accident drug test revealed marijuana in the driver’s blood.1407  Af-
ter trial, the jury awarded Crouse compensatory damages as well as
$3.5 million in punitive damages.1408  The trial court modified the
punitive damages award to $500,000.1409  On appeal, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the bus driver’s outra-
geous conduct occurred in the course and scope of her employ-
ment, rendering Laidlaw vicariously liable.1410  Additionally, the su-
preme court held that evidence of Laidlaw’s financial resources was
relevant to a punitive damages award and the remittitur of punitive
damages award was warranted based on the difference between
punitive and compensatory damages, the relatively minor injuries
sustained by Crouse, and the low annual revenues of Laidlaw from
its Alaska operations.1411
In Liimatta v. Vest,1412 the supreme court held that exclusion of
evidence regarding Vest’s documented pre-accident drug seeking
behavior was an abuse of discretion.1413  In 1997, Liimatta struck
Vest with her truck while Vest was riding a bicycle.1414  Vest suf-
fered broken bones, trauma to her teeth and face, as well as bruises
and abrasions.1415  At trial, the superior court excluded evidence of
Vest’s pre-accident drug seeking behavior, concluding that, al-
though relevant, it was redundant and highly prejudicial.1416  A jury
later awarded Vest $97,287.26 in damages.1417  Liimatta appealed
1404. 53 P.3d 1093 (Alaska 2002).
1405. Id. at 1096.
1406. Id.
1407. Id.
1408. Id. at 1097.
1409. Id.
1410. Id. at 1099.
1411. Id. at 1103-04.
1412. 45 P.3d 310 (Alaska 2002).
1413. Id. at 312-13.  Drug seeking behavior is “a pattern of seeking narcotic pain
medication or tranquilizers with . . . complaints of severe pain without an organic
basis.”  Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
1414. Id. at 312.
1415. Id.
1416. Id. at 313 (noting that the trial court applied Alaska Evidence Rule 403
which may allow evidence to be excluded if the probative value is outweighed by
the prejudicial effect).
1417. Id. at 312.  The superior court set final damages at $119,219.91.  Id.
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and Vest cross appealed.1418  Reviewing the trial court’s decision for
abuse of discretion, the supreme court reversed and remanded.1419
First, the court concluded that the evidence of Vest’s pre-accident
drug seeking behavior was highly relevant to Vest’s claim for loss
of enjoyment of life, to the issue of causation, and to Vest’s credi-
bility, and therefore, its probative value was not outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.1420  Second, recognizing that Wasserman
v. Bartholomew1421 permits evidence to be excluded as cumulative,
the court held that the standard set forth in Wasserman had not
been satisfied and, therefore, afforded no basis upon which to ex-
clude the evidence.1422  Third, the court stated that the medical tes-
timony provided at trial established an adequate foundation upon
which to admit the evidence.1423  Concluding, therefore, that exclu-
sion of the evidence was an abuse of discretion, the court further
ruled that it could not, as required by Alaska Civil Rule 61,1424 say
with fair assurance that the exclusion of evidence did not sway or
affect the jury.1425  Consistent with this ruling, the court reversed
and remanded for a new trial.1426
In Moody v. Delta Western, Inc.,1427 the supreme court held that
the Firefighter’s Rule applies in Alaska.1428  The Firefighter’s Rule
bars firefighters and police officers from recovering from injuries
caused by the negligence of others in situations that required their
presence.1429  An employee of Delta Western left a fuel truck un-
locked and with the keys in the ignition.1430  An intoxicated man en-
tered the truck and drove recklessly around the town.1431  Moody,
the police chief, responded to reports of the recklessly driven fuel
1418. Id.
1419. Id.
1420. Id. at 313-15.
1421. 923 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1996).
1422. Liimatta, 45 P.3d at 315 (citing Wasserman, 923 P.2d at 813 (stating that
evidence is excludable as cumulative where it supports uncontested or established
facts or repeats a point made by previous evidence)).
1423. Id. at 316.
1424. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 61.
1425. Liimatta, 45 P.3d at 317 (citing Korean Air Lines Co. v. State, 779 P.2d
333, 339 (Alaska 1989)).
1426. Id.  The supreme court also held the superior court abused its discretion
on several other evidentiary rulings but did not base its reversal on those grounds.
Id. at 318-19.
1427. 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002).
1428. Id. at 1139-40.
1429. Id. at 1139.
1430. Id. at 1140.
1431. Id.
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truck.1432  When Moody’s car attempted to stop the fuel truck, the
truck hit the car causing Moody permanent injuries.1433  Moody filed
suit against Delta Western, alleging that the company negligently
failed to remove the keys from the truck’s ignition.1434  Delta West-
ern was granted summary judgment by the superior court based on
the Firefighter’s Rule.1435  The supreme court examined the public
policy reasons noted by a majority of other courts considering this
issue—namely, that the public, through salaries, already compen-
sates public safety officials to respond to dangerous situations often
caused by negligence.1436  Therefore, requiring the public to also pay
for injuries incurred by officers in such responses imposes a double
payment on the community for services already purchased.1437  Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of
summary judgment to Delta Western.1438
In Powell v. Tanner,1439 the supreme court held that a genuine
issue of material fact remained as to whether Harcourt was vicari-
ously liable for Tanner’s accident.1440  Tanner was hired by Harcourt
as an Independent Contractor to sell its educational materials.1441
She came to Anchorage to demonstrate the materials at a teacher
in-service.1442  After picking up the rental car, she attempted to
change lanes and collided with Powell’s vehicle.1443 Powell sued
Harcourt under multiple theories, including respondeat superior
liability.1444  The superior court granted summary judgment for
Harcourt finding that Harcourt could not be liable under the “in-
dependent contractor rule.”1445  The supreme court reviewed this
determination de novo to find that a genuine issue of material fact
remained as to whether Tanner was an independent contractor or
an employee.1446  The court used factors from the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958) to determine that factual dis-
putes remain for many of the factors, making a grant of summary
1432. Id.
1433. Id.
1434. Id.
1435. Id.
1436. Id. at 1141-42.
1437. Id. at 1142.
1438. Id. at 1143.
1439. 59 P.3d 246  (Alaska 2002).
1440. Id. at 255.
1441. Id. at 247.
1442. Id.
1443. Id. at 248.
1444. Id.
1445. Id.
1446. Id.
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judgment inappropriate.1447  Further, the court found that the supe-
rior court’s striking of witnesses did not need to be decided because
by reversing the grant of summary judgment, it was likely that dis-
covery would be re-opened and no prejudice would exist by ex-
cluding the witnesses.1448
In Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety,1449 the su-
preme court reinstated Prentzel’s negligence and civil rights
claims.1450  Prentzel was arrested, but released without being
charged, for violating his DWI release conditions.1451  Prentzel sued,
alleging false arrest, negligence in training the officers, and viola-
tion of his civil rights.1452  The trial court dismissed all claims on the
pleadings.1453  The supreme court reinstated Prentzel’s claim against
the arresting officers, because the allegation of malice created a
factual question that could not be disposed of on the pleadings.1454
Additionally, the supreme court found it was error to dismiss
Prentzel’s negligence claims, because the legal question of whether
or not the State owed Prentzel a duty to supervise and train state
troopers so they do not make the mistakes made in this case is best
decided in a factual context.1455  The court also ruled that the supe-
rior court erred in not construing the civil rights claim to cover the
actions of the state troopers and their supervisors acting in their
personal capacities.1456  However, the court affirmed the dismissal of
Prentzel’s Bivens1457 claim because the issue was inadequately
briefed.1458
In Wasserman v. Bartholomew,1459 the supreme court held (1)
that the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, (2)
the trial court did not misapply the test to determine whether the
police had used excessive force, and (3) the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying a motion to disqualify the trial court
judge.1460  In 1990, Wasserman was grocery shopping when he was
1447. Id. at 249.
1448. Id. at 254.
1449. 53 P.3d 587 (Alaska 2002).
1450. Id. at 596.
1451. Id. at 589.
1452. Id.
1453. Id. at 590.
1454. Id. at 591.
1455. Id. at 592.
1456. Id. at 595-96.
1457. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
1458. Prentzel, 53 P.3d at 596.
1459. 38 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2002).
1460. Id. at 1165.
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mistaken for a dangerous fugitive by police officers.1461  The officers
wrestled Wasserman to the ground and handcuffed him.1462  When
they realized their mistake, the officers released him.1463  Wasser-
man subsequently sued officers for injuries allegedly sustained
during the incident.1464  The trial court ruled in favor of the officers,
and Wasserman appealed.1465  The supreme court affirmed.1466  The
trial court’s rulings were not erroneous because it had made de-
tailed findings, indicated the evidentiary support, evaluated the
credibility of the witnesses, and explained its weighing of the evi-
dence.1467  The trial court did not misapply the test to determine
whether the police used excessive force against Wasserman be-
cause the court used the well-established objective reasonableness
test and applied the facts accordingly.1468  Finally, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Wasserman’s motion to dis-
qualify the trial court judge because mere evidence that a judge has
exercised his judicial discretion in a particular way is not sufficient
to require disqualification.1469
In Wells v. State,1470 the supreme court held that the State was
immune from liability under Alaska law1471 for failing to install a
guardrail because such an act was discretionary.1472  Wells was in-
jured in a car accident and claimed that his injuries were due to the
failure of the State to install a guardrail on the road where the ac-
cident occurred.1473  By statute, the State was immune from liability
from tort suits “based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a state agency.”1474  The court held that the installation
of guardrails was discretionary and thus the State was immune
from liability.1475  The supreme court also held that state standards
and requirements for the construction of roads do not apply to the
maintenance of roads constructed prior to the issuance of the stan-
1461. Id.
1462. Id.
1463. Id.
1464. Id. at 1166.
1465. Id.
1466. Id. at 1165.
1467. Id. at 1167.
1468. Id. at 1169-70 (applying Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
1469. Id. at 1170-71.
1470. 46 P.3d 967 (Alaska 2002).
1471. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 2002).
1472. Wells, 46 P.3d at 969.
1473. Id. at 968-69.
1474. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250.
1475. Wells, 46 P.3d at 969-70.
YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC 04/22/03  12:57 PM
194 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:1
dards.1476  The court affirmed the denial of Wells’ motion for sum-
mary judgment and held the State had no duty to adhere to “clear
zone” standards in the maintenance of the road in question be-
cause such standards were not in place when the road was designed
and built.1477  Finally, the court held that the trial court was within
its discretion in allowing the State and Chugach Construction
Company, who constructed the road, to amend their expert witness
lists, as the State and the construction company had a plausible
claim of surprise to the Wells’ expert witness’s testimony claiming
Wells was injured by striking the boulders on the side of the road,
which had not been asserted earlier.1478  Accordingly, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court’s decisions on summary judgment.1479
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